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ABSTRACT

Kang, Seok Ryul. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. US Strategic Retrenchment
and Security-Seeking Behaviors of the US Allies in Northeast Asia. Major Professor:
Keith L. Shimko.

This research is planned to explore how a regional state could improve its security during
the time of its patron’s strategic retrenchment. It introduces a theory of a regional state’s
security-promoting behaviors during the time of its patron’s retrenchment. According to
this theory, it is hypothesized that there is covariation between the level of a regional
state’s security concern and the scope of its domestic drives to increase societal
contribution to autonomous defense posture. It also hypothesizes the existence of
covariation between the level of a regional state’s security concern and the level of its
commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against its patron’s strategic interests.
Empirical findings from the case study of the security-seeking behaviors of the US allies
in Northeast Asia support the two research hypotheses. A reader may want to test the
validity of the theory against another context of a superpower’s strategic retrenchment
.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction


Following the US defeat in the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration shifted the
US strategic posture in East Asia from the Cold War confrontation to strategic
retrenchment.1 Known as the Nixon Doctrine, the US strategic posture required that each
of the US allies in East Asia should be in charge of its own military defense in general
while the US looked for a more passive and secondary role in the defense of the regional
allies. This military retrenchment was followed by the development of the Sino-American
rapprochement, which signaled that Washington would adopt a position of strategic
ambiguity between China and its regional allies.
An empirical puzzle is that the US regional allies of Northeast Asia did not respond
to the US strategic posture in a uniform fashion. For example, the Republic of Korea
(ROK or aka South Korea) attempted to maximize the contribution of domestic society to
an autonomous defense capability, while Japan minimized its efforts, while the Republic
of China (ROC or aka Taiwan) introduced a moderate campaign to increase domestic
contribution to autonomous defense posture. The Japanese leadership also directed its


1
Retrenchment can be defined as a “policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a
decline in relative power.” See Paul K. Macdonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The
Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no.4 (2011): 11.
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military policies toward the superpower’s strategic interests while South Korea and
Taiwan pursued military policies against the patron’s strategic interests. Why did they
develop such a different behavior?
To solve this empirical puzzle, the present study introduces a theory of a regional
state’s security-promoting domestic drives in response to the patron’s retrenchment. This
research topic has been underdeveloped by the existing scholarship on an asymmetric
alliance. This scholarly tendency should be problematic because the structural certainty
under anarchy and the imperative of self-help make results in internal balancing as the
state’s default strategy. The present research discusses the state’s internal balancing
strategy in the context of an asymmetric alliance between a regional state and its patron.
This study also introduces a theory of a regional state’s pursuit of a military policy
against its patron’s strategic interests. Existing scholarship has underdeveloped this
research topic despite the significant implications involved in the security relationship
between a superpower and its regional allies.
This research also contributes to existing scholarship on the security relationship
between the US and its regional allies in Northeast Asia. Each of the regional states
examined in this study is known to be highly dependent upon the US security
commitment. Thus it is arguably difficult to find substantial variation among them in
terms of the scope of security-promoting domestic drives in the face of the superpower’s
retrenchment. But the present study finds such variation in the context of the regional
states’ security-seeking behaviors during the 1970s. Because of the substantial level of
dependence, it is also arguably hard to expect that each of them will pursue a military
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policy against the US strategic interests. But this study finds that such a behavior indeed
is a regional state’s rational strategy to promote security.
This research argues that the level of a regional state’s security concern is a function
of how it perceives the military threat posed by its adversary and how it perceives the
reliability of the patron’s security commitment. Then it hypothesizes that that there is a
co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security concern and the scope of a
regional state’s efforts to increase domestic contribution to an autonomous defense
capability. It also hypothesizes that there is a co-variation between the level of a regional
ally’s security concern and the level of its commitment to the pursuit of a military policy
against its patron’s strategic interests.
These hypotheses are tested against the context of the three regional states’ securityseeking behaviors during the 1970s. The case study documents each of the states’
perception of security in response to the Nixon administration’s strategic posture. The
case study finds that the Japanese leadership experienced a substantially low level of
security concern while the leadership of South Korea experienced a substantially high
level of security concern. In addition, the level of the Taiwan leadership’s security
concern is estimated to be relatively higher than that of Japan but relatively lower than
that of South Korea.
Then the case study finds empirical evidence which lend support to the research
hypotheses. First, it finds that the Japanese government established a minimalist approach
to security while South Korea introduced huge-scale domestic drives to rapidly increase
the contribution of domestic society to autonomous defense capability, while the
leadership of Taiwan introduced relatively modest level of security-promoting domestic
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drives. Second, the case study finds that South Korea was strongly committed to the
pursuit of military policies against the US strategic interests while Japan directed its
military policies toward the superpower’s strategic interests. It also finds several points
which suggest that the leadership of Taiwan was less committed than its counterpart of
South Korea to the pursuit of a military policy against the US strategic interests.
There are three points to note regarding the implication of this research. First, this
research suggests that a regional state’s choice between the contrasting military behaviors
toward its patron is a function of its assessment of security in response to the patron’s
retrenchment. In this respect, the present study suggests that a regional state’s assessment
of security leads to a dynamic of conflict and cooperation in the security relationship
between the regional state and its superpower patron. Second, this study suggests the role
of perception in the dynamic of cooperation between a regional state and its superpower
patron when they do not agree how to interpret security environment. Third, this research
follows the second-image reversed logic, which argues that the imperative of security
competition under anarchy induces states to organize themselves in order to meet external
security challenges. But the present research suggests that a regional state’s perception of
security affects its relationship with domestic society. In this respect, this study suggests
that the role of perception needs to be fully integrated into the existing scholarship on the
second-image reversed logic.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses a regional
state’s perception of security in response to its patron’s strategic retrenchment. The third
section suggests a theory about a regional state’s domestic drives to promote societal
contribution to autonomous defense posture. In the fourth section, this study suggests a
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theory about a regional state’s pursuit of military policy against its patron’s strategic
interests. The last section elaborates on the research design. After suggesting research
hypotheses, this section discusses the case study research design of this research. Then it
elaborates on how to operationally measure the independent and dependent variables of
the research hypotheses.

1.2. A Regional State’s Security Assessment under the Retrenchment of Its Patron

In the context of the alliance relationship, the patron’s extended deterrence is a
linchpin of the ally’s security. Extended deterrence consists of threats to retaliate against
the adversaries in order to prevent a military attack on the junior ally.2 To demonstrate
the credibility of extended deterrence, the superpower should not only assure its ally of
its willingness to provide security support in times of need but also persuade adversaries
that it will defend the junior ally.3 In this respect, a regional state’s evaluation of the
reliability of the patron’s extended deterrence is affected not only by its evaluation of the
superpower’s willingness to provide a security guarantee for but also by its evaluation of
the patron’s posture toward the adversaries of the alliance.


2
Paul K. Huth, ęExtended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review 82,
no.2 (1988): 424.
3
Goldstein introduces the notion of collective goods to discuss the credibility of the security relationship
between allies having asymmetric capabilities. According to this discussion, a regional state’s negative
assessment of the capability and willingness of its patron will lead her to believe that the patron will regard
the security relationship not as a collective good but as a private good. Thus, the regional ally will be
concerned that it will be eventually excluded from the patron’s provision of security. See Avery Goldstein,
“Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” International Organization 49,
no. 1 (1995): 39-71.

6
The present research argues that a regional state uses the presence of the superpower
patron’s conventional forces in her territory as a heuristic for evaluating the patron’s
willingness to provide security support. A superpower deploys sizable conventional
military forces in the territories of the regional ally as an essential strategy to maintain the
credibility of extended deterrence.4 However, it is also tempted to retrench militarily in
the face of a decline in its relative power vis-à-vis other major powers and domestic
attitudes hostile to a high level of global military commitment. Pressures from the
international and domestic situations can drive a superpower to reduce its conventional
force deployment abroad. This military retrenchment causes a regional ally to be
skeptical of the superpower’s commitment.
This research also argues that a regional ally is likely to use the patron’s approach
toward the adversary as another heuristic to evaluate the security guarantee. According to
this argument, a regional state should be sensitive to its patron’s diplomatic initiative to
ease tensions with the adversary. Such a diplomatic initiative will lead the superpower to
maintain strategic ambiguity between its regional ally and the adversary. Thus, a regional
state may be concerned that the superpower may not be solidly committed, causing the
regional state to fear abandonment.5
In addition, a regional state may estimate that the adversary will make use of the
patron’s diplomatic initiative as an opportunity to wedge itself between the patron and its
junior allies. This is particularly the case when a regional ally estimates that its adversary


 Alexander Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust? Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance
Dynamics,” Unpublished Manuscript (2012): 18-9.Manuscript available at
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-Lanoszka-Protection-States-Trust022012.pdf (Accessed last March 30, 2016).
5
Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no.4 (1984): 471-72.

7
will use the patron’s diplomacy as an opportunity to realize its revisionist designs.6 The
history of the adversary’s military postures affects this estimate. The more the adversary
has been militarily offensive, for example, the more a regional state perceives that its
adversary will make use of the superpower’s retrenchment for its revisionist purposes.
This in turn leads to the regional state’s opposition to the patron’s approach toward the
adversary.7 When the adversary has not been militarily offensive, in contrast, a regional
ally is unlikely to perceive that the patron’s retrenchment will lead to the adversary’s
revisionist military behaviors.
It is conceivable that a regional state’s assessment of threats is filtered through its
perception of the patron’s reliability when it is highly dependent upon the patron
commitment.8 For example, if a regional state has experienced high levels of threat from
the adversary and it is skeptical of the patron’s commitment, then the level of its threat
perception of the adversary will be substantially high. In contrast, strong confidence in
the patron commitment should alleviate the regional ally’s threat perception of the
adversary, even if it has experienced high levels of threats. It is also conceivable that


6
For a comprehensive discussion of wedge strategies, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy
Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics.” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 155-89.
7
Given the adversary’s offensive posture, a regional state is likely to prefer the strategy of coercive
diplomacy. This logically flows from the deterrence model, which supposes the existence of an adversary,
whose foreign policy goal is perceived as revisionist. The deterrence model argues that great dangers arise
if a revisionist perceives the status quo powers to have less capability or resolve. Thus it suggests that a
status quo must display the ability and willingness to wage war to avoid such a disastrous situation. Based
upon this policy preference, a regional state is likely to oppose to its patron’s policy of easing tensions with
the adversary of the alliance. Regarding the discussion on the deterrence model, see Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976),
58-62.
8
Victor Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and
Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 269.
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skepticism of the patron’s commitment may magnify a regional state’s threat perception,
even if she is in a security-abundant environment.
To summarize, a state’s security is dependent upon its assessment of the likely
behavior of another state. In this respect, the present study discusses a regional state’s
perceptions of the likely behaviors of its patron and the adversary given patron’s
retrenchment. This leads to the argument that a regional state’s security concern is
composed of her threat perception of the adversary and her estimate of the reliability of
the patron.
A superpower’s retrenchment is thus an external shock that leads its regional allies
to reevaluate not only the patron’s commitment but also the military threats posed by the
adversary. Facing the patron’s retrenchment, a regional state should try to increase its
security. To develop a theory explaining a regional state’s security-driven internal and
external behaviors in response to its patron’s retrenchment, the present research refers to
the existing literature that suggests that a study of a state’s security-seeking behaviors
must analyze how anarchy-driven pressures are translated via decision-makers’
perceptions of external security environments.9 This leads to the analysis of how a
regional state’s assessment of security under the patron’s retrenchment affects its
security-seeking behaviors.
The present research explains two empirical puzzles regarding a regional state’s
behaviors in response to its patron’s retrenchment. First, this research develops a theory
to explain how a regional state’s security assessment affects its willingness to increase the

9
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no.1 (1998):
152.

9
contribution of domestic society toward defense. Second, the present study explains why
one regional state pursues military behaviors that will jeopardize the strategic interests of
its patron, while another regional state moves in a direction favored by its security
provider. This comparative analysis helps to identify the dynamics of military conflict
and cooperation between a superpower and its regional allies.

1.3. A Regional State’s Security-Promoting Domestic Drives in Response to its Patron’s
Retrenchment

A superpower’s retrenchment suggests that support from the security provider will
become costly. Consequently, a regional state becomes more reliant on the establishment
of an autonomous defense capability.10 This leads the state’s leadership to increase the
contribution of domestic society to defense.
The existing scholarship on asymmetric alliances pays little attention to a junior
ally’s security-enhancing domestic drives in response to the retrenchment of its patron.
Neorealism suggests that the systemic imperative of anarchy leads a state to introduce
external balancing in the form of aggregating capabilities with other states, and internal
balancing in the form of increasing autonomous military capabilities through costly

10
According to the notion of arms-alliance trade-offs, a state is expected to rely on its own military
capabilities when support from allies is relatively costly. Regarding this proposition, see Michael F. Altfeld,
“The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test,” Western Political Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1984): 523-544; James
D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security,” International Organization 47, no.
2 (1993): 207-33; Gerald L. Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,”
International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 421-46. A flip side of this proposition is that the relative
increase in the cost of the establishment of domestic programs for military build-ups should lead a state to
search for allied support for the sake of security. Regarding this argument, see Michael N. Barnett and Jack
S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73,” International
Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369-95.

10
domestic drives.11 However, the neorealist literature has characterized the balance of
power as a system in which international alliances are central. This leads the neorealist
approach to pay little attention to a state’s security-enhancing domestic drives in response
to external security environments.12 This scholarly tendency may be problematic because
the imperative of self-help and structural uncertainty under anarchy makes internal
balancing the state’s default strategy. Some level of internal balancing will take place
even in a state that has the luxury of external security assistance.13
However, it also needs to be noted that there are two methodological hurdles to deal
with when it comes to using the notion of internal balancing.14 First, “it is often difficult
to distinguish internal balancing against specific external threats from other sources of
arms buildups.”15 In this respect, one needs to distinguish military build-ups resulting
from domestic mobilization drives from military build-ups resulting from the vested
interests of the military, bureaucratic politics or from domestic pressure. Second, there is
a task of distinguishing between the state’s military build-ups as a security-enhancing


11
Waltz, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
12
In this respect, Levy and Thompson suggest that “most of the balance of power literature conceives of
balancing in terms of counterbalancing alliances, especially for multipolar systems, which characterize the
vast majority of the European system during the last five centuries. The literature on the absence of
balancing against the United States also focuses on coalitional balancing.” See Jack S. Levy and William R.
Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?”
International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 23. With regard to the relative absence of scholarly discussion on
the state’s internal balancing, Levy and Thompson suggest that the notion of internal balancing is hard to
operationally define, because of which discussion tends to focus on the state’s external balancing. See Levy
and Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe.”

 Joao Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 67.
14
Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe,
1495-1999,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 14
15
Levy and Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea,” 23.
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strategy and the state’s tendency to ratchet up the competitive level of military
capabilities.
While acknowledging the methodological hurdles above, the present research
characterizes the internal balancing strategy as the state’s strategy to increase societal
contribution to an autonomous defense posture in response to its patron’s strategic
retrenchment. This characterization refers to existing scholarship that suggests that
political leaders must draw on domestic society and economy for popular support and
required material resources. Classical realists acknowledge that the nature of state-society
relationship is vital to the conduct of internal balancing strategy. According to them,
“Power over opinion is … … not less essential for political purposes than military and
economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion
has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader.”16 It was also
argued that “The quality of government is patently a source of strength or weakness with
respect to most of the factors upon which national power depends, especially in view of
the influence the government exerts upon natural resources, industrial capacity, and
military preparedness.”17 Yet the classical realists leave aside systemic analysis of how
internal balancing strategy is influenced by the state’s relationship with domestic society.
This analysis has been substantially addressed by the neoclassical realist literature,
which suggests the need to study how a state’s response to international challenges and
opportunities is translated through the state’s capacity to direct domestic human and


16
Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations (London: Macmillan & Co, 1964), 132.
17
Morgenthau, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New
York: Knopf, 1966), 154.

12
material resources for national security purposes. For example, Fareed Zakaria traces the
US’s rapid international expansion between 1899 and 1980 to an increase in the state’s
capacity to direct domestic resources for national security objectives. This increase in
extractive capacity is attributed to the emergence of a strong state vis-à-vis its domestic
society.18 Aaron Friedberg’s study of the United States and the Soviet Union during the
early Cold War era also discusses how the state-society relationship of the two great
powers affected their strategies of military preparedness against each other. 19 Like his
fellow neoclassical realists, Randall Schweller explores how a state’s relationship with
domestic society affects the state’s capacity to drive domestic mobilization campaigns for
military preparedness against external threats. According to him, legitimate states are
likely to possess a high level of policy capacity in mobilizing and extracting national
resources for national security objectives. In contrast, policymakers are likely to have less
capacity in directing domestic resources for national security purposes when the state’s
relationship to society is weak.20


18
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998).
19
Friedberg’s study of the United States’ strategy of military preparedness against the Soviet Union found
that the state’s power over domestic society and economy was substantially limited during the early period
of the Cold War. This induced the United States to take the “outward-directed force posture and military
strategy” and “a supporting set of inward-directed power-creating mechanisms.” The Soviet Union, on
the other hand, did not witness countervailing domestic constraint on the state’s ability to direct domestic
resources for military preparedness. This led the state to militarize its domestic society, which enabled the
state to compete with the United States on a global scale. The end result of this “true garrison state,”
however, was the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union. See Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of
the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000), 341; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison
State?” International Security 16, no. 4 (1992): 141.
20
Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 45-54.

13
The neoclassical realist literature examines how a state’s relationship with domestic
society affects its internal balancing strategy against external threats.21 In this respect, it
follows the suggestion that one should explorer how a state’s relationship with domestic
society influences security-seeking behaviors shown by states.22 While acknowledging
the neoclassical realist conclusion, this research alternatively explores how a state’s
external security environments affect its capacity to direct national resources for military
preparedness against external threats.
This alternative approach is based upon a survey of existing literature that endorses
the notion that external pressures shape a state’s internal structure. Gerschenkron
explored how domestic structures of states are influenced by the timing of
industrialization and the pressure of the international system.23 Drawing on
Gerschenkron’s discussion, Moore argued that the pressure from an international system
and the timing of industrialization led to the development of three possible modes of
modernization: democratic, fascist, and communist.24 After reviewing these studies,
Gourevitch introduced the notion of second-image reversed logic, which argues that
anarchy-driven security competition “induces states to organize themselves internally so
as to meet these external challenges.”25 Michael Desch finds that war and external


21
This approach can be endorsed by a group of studies discussing how a state’s relationship with domestic
society affects the state’s foreign economic policy. Regarding this point, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, no.2 (1999): 5-55.

 Matthew Evangelista, “Issue-Area and Foreign Policy Revisited.” International Organization 43, no.1
(1989): 147-71.
23
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 1962).
24
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
25
Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,”
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 896. Introducing this notion, he examined how the state
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threats led to the expansion of the state’s scope and to the increased cohesion of the
state.26 Resende-Santos introduces the second image reversed logic into his critical
review of Waltz’s version of neorealism and argues that anarchy-driven competition
forces each state to adopt the strategy of military emulation, which in turn leads to the
restructuring of the state’s central fiscal-administrative-coercive apparatus.27
To establish a theory of a regional state’s internal balancing strategy in response to
its patron’s strategic retrenchment, the present study integrates the role of perception into
the existing scholarship on the second-image reversed logic. A regional state’s security
concern in the face of the patron’s retrenchment shows how systemic pressure of
international anarchy affects its security assessment. Uncertainty and insecurity are
inherent in international anarchy. This suggests that a state’s security is contingent upon
its assessment of the likely behavior of another state. A superpower’s retrenchment may
make its junior ally distrustful of the patron’s commitment. In addition, the security
provider’s retrenchment may affect its ally’s threat perception of the adversary. A regional
state is thus supposed to organize itself internally in the face of the patron’s retrenchment
based upon its security assessment.
The present study should hypothesize a causal link between a regional state’s
security concern and its efforts to increase societal contribution to autonomous defense.
For this purpose, this study refers to Michael Barnett’s discussion on the state’s strategy


domestic structure is affected by the following two factors at factors at the level of international politics:
the distribution of power among states and the distribution of wealth and economic activity.
26
Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International Organization 50, no.
2 (1996): 237-68.
27
Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army.
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for military preparedness.28 He discusses three types of strategy: namely,
accommodational, restructural, and international strategy.
The essence of an accommodational strategy is that political leaders restrict
selection of policy instruments for military preparedness to those which are presently
contained in its central apparatus. States will invariably initiate this strategy because there
are few domestic political costs to conducting it. As international pressure increases,
however, states’ needs for security are unlikely to be met through the strategy of
accommodation. This leads political leaders to look for either a restructural strategy,
defined as the state’s attempt to restructure its present compact with society so as to
increase the domestic contribution for national security, or international strategy, defined
as the state’ attempt to distribute the costs of balancing strategy onto foreign states.29
Political leaders are likely to introduce international strategy when the state’s
relationship with its economy and society is constrained as they find it difficult to impose
costs attached to state’s military preparedness on domestic society. Foreign assistance,
whereas, places restrictions on the recipient’s security-related policies that the aid donor
regards as contrary to its own strategic interests. Conversely, a state that has the
capabilities to redeploy internal resources and impose the costs of increasing national
security on society is likely to introduce the restructural strategy. Introducing this


28
Michael N. Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli
Security Policy, 1967-1977.” World Politics 42, no.4 (1990): 529-62.

 Barnett discusses two forms of the state’s restructural strategy. One is a “centralization scenarios” in
which “the state intervenes and increases its direct control over societal resources.” This is when the state
introduces direct taxation, moves from the reliance on a mercenary army to the establishment of a standing
army, or nationalization of key economic sectors. The other form of the restructural strategy involves the
expansion of the state’s material base by unleashing market forces for increasing productive activity. See
Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 543.
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domestic offensive strategy, however, comes with societal resistance and the cost of
establishing expensive administrative apparatus to control a domestic society. 30
Barnett’s discussion suggests that political leaders are unlikely to make efforts to
increase domestic contribution for military preparedness when the state is not vulnerable
to external security environment. In contrast, they are supposed to make efforts to
increase domestic contribution for military build-ups as the state’s external vulnerability
increases, particularly when the state does not have an alternative source of international
support for its security and when political leaders are not constrained by domestic
resistance against drives for directing national resources toward military preparedness.
The present study integrates the role of perception into the study of a state’s strategy
for military preparedness. Accordingly, it is theorized that there is co-variation between
the level of a regional state’s security concern under its patron’s strategic retrenchment
and the scope of the state’s efforts to increase societal contribution to an autonomous
defense capability.31 According to this theory, it is hypothesized that the more negatively
a regional state estimates its security in the face of the patron’s retrenchment, the more it
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Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 543-44.
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This theory can be endorsed by the argument that variation in the state’s external pressure leads to
variation in the state’s security-promoting domestic strategy, which in turn leads to variation in the state’s
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lessened the chances of invasion. This geographical condition induced England into maintaining a navy,
instead of constituting a standing army and mobilizing domestic resources to sustain it. A navy force could
not be used for domestic repression. Consequently, the absence of military tools for domestic repression
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very vulnerable to geopolitical location in the sense that there was nothing natural that lessened the chances
of invasion. This geographical condition in turn led Prussia to establish a standing army, which was not
supervised by representative bodies. This in turn led to the emergence of the garrison state. Regarding the
geographical differences between England and Prussia, see Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978):
896.
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is willing to increase its societal contribution to defense. It is also hypothesized that the
less negatively a regional state estimates the security implications of the security
guarantor’s strategic posture, the less it is willing to increase the security burden on
domestic society.

1.4. A Regional State’s Military Behaviors against the Strategic Interests of Its Patron

There are several cases in which a superpower’s strategic interests are jeopardized
by the military behaviors of its regional allies. For example, a regional state’s offensive
military behaviors will negatively affect the patron’s strategic interest to establish
peaceful status-quo. Another example is a regional state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons that
place a superpower’s strategy of nonproliferation at risk. A superpower must deal with
the regional state’s military behaviors that will jeopardize its strategic interests or risk a
loss of control over the junior ally. Despite the significant implications involved in the
alliance between a superpower and its regional allies, existing scholarship is
underdeveloped to explain why a regional ally pursues military behaviors against the
patron’s strategic interests.
For instance, this question remains an empirical puzzle for a group of studies that
emphasize the tendency toward policy coordination between a regional ally and its
patron. A third party to the alliance is supposed to judge the commitment of the allies to
one another via the similarity of their foreign policies. Thus, allies are likely to look for
intra-alliance solidarity in their foreign policy in order to send a signal to a third party
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that their alliance is a credible one.32 From this perspective, a regional state is supposed
to develop its military policies in line with its patron’s strategic interests.
A regional state’s engagement in military behaviors against its patron is also a
puzzle for studies characterizing an alliance between asymmetric capabilities as pacts-ofrestraint, through one in which the stronger party manages the behaviors of its weaker
partner.33 According to this scholarship, a superpower has the capability to manage its
regional allies so as to prevent them from pursuing military behaviors that will negatively
affect its strategic interests. It is also able to punish the junior allies’ pursuit of
objectionable military behaviors by coercive threats.34 Considering the pact-of-restraint
aspect of the alliance, it is still puzzling why a regional state would pursue a military
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policy against the patron’s strategic interests, which could prompt coercive threats from
the patron to reverse them.
From the perspective of the existing scholarship, a regional state’s pursuit of military
policy against its patron’s strategic interests is characterized as the state’s irrational
behavior, which can be explained by the state’s domestic political structure or the
existence of reckless political leaders.35 To establish a theory of the regional state’s
military behaviors against its patron, however, this study alternatively argues that the
notion of rationality should be fully considered in the study of a regional state’s military
behaviors against its patron’s strategic interests. This leads to the characterization of the
regional state’s military behavior against its patron as the state’s rational strategy to
promote security.
To discuss a regional state’s military behaviors against its patron, the present
research refers to the existing scholarship to explain why a regional state pursues an
independent nuclear weapons capability despite the existence of the nuclear protection of
its patron. The patron’s commitment to a nuclear umbrella may be sufficient for a
regional ally to dampen its security concern. Thus such a regional ally is unlikely to
engage in nuclear behavior, which jeopardizes its patron’s strategic interests of nonproliferation.36 In this respect, it is puzzling why a regional ally that enjoys nuclear
protection of its patron pursues an independent nuclear weapons capability, which could
prompt coercive threats from the patron to reverse the objectionable military policy. To
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resolve this empirical puzzle, one may argue the nuclear behavior as the junior ally’s
strategy that targets not only to secure its security but also to have leverage in negotiation
with its patron regarding the terms of the patron’s security guarantee.37
While referring to this argument, this research characterizes a regional state’s pursuit
of military policies against the patron’s strategic interests as a form of that state’s strategy
to put pressure on the superpower. This characterization helps to explain why a regional
state pursues such adventurous military policies that may prompt the patron to engage in
coercive punishment. But the existing scholarship on a regional state’s nuclear behavior
does not explain why a regional state develops its military policies in line with the
strategic interests of its patron while another regional ally pursues a military policy
against the patron’s strategic interests.
This research theorizes that the level of a regional state’s commitment to the pursuit
of a military policy against its patron is a function its security assessment during the
security provider’s retrenchment. According to this theory, a regional state is supposed to
maintain deferential behaviors toward its patron because this will raise the reputational
costs the security provider will pay for retrenchment.38 As its security concern increases
under its patron’s retrenchment, however, it should find a way to pressure the superpower
to reverse the course. For this purpose, a regional ally pursues a military policy that will
jeopardize the patron’s strategic interests. This suggests that there is covariation between
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the level of a regional state’s security concern and the level of its commitment to the
pursuit of a military policy against its patron.
According to the theory, it is hypothesized that the more negatively a regional state
assesses its security in response to its patron’s retrenchment, the more it is hypothesized
to be committed to the pursuit of a military policy against its patron’s strategic interests.
In contrast, the less negatively a regional ally assesses the security provider’s
retrenchment, the less it is hypothesized to be committed to pursuing a military policy
against the strategic interests of its patron.
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1.5. Research Design

1.5.1. Research Hypotheses

Test of the research hypotheses follows the “congruence method,” which suggests
that in order to identify a causal effect between independent and dependent variables, one
must begin with a theory positing the temporal co-variation between the variables and
then assess the validity of the theory against historical cases.39 First, this study expects to
find co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security concern and the scope of
its drives to increase domestic contribution to an autonomous defense capability
(Hypothesis 1). Second, the present research expects to find covariation between the level
of a regional state’s negative assessment of security and the level of its commitment to
the pursuit of a military policy against the strategic interests of its superpower patron
(Hypothesis 2).

Hypothesis 1: The more negatively a regional state estimates its security in the face
of its patron’s retrenchment, the more it launches domestic drives to increase the societal
contribution toward an autonomous defense capability. In contrast, the less negatively a
regional state estimates the security implications of the patron’s retrenchment, the less it
introduces domestic drives to establish military capability for self-defense.
Hypothesis 2: The more negatively a regional state estimates its security in response
to the patron’s retrenchment, the more it is committed to pursuing a military policy that
jeopardizes the strategic interests of the security provider. In contrast, the less negatively
a regional state estimates the patron’s retrenchment, the less it is committed to the pursuit
of a military policy against the security guarantor’s strategic interests.
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1.5.2. Case Selection

The research hypotheses are tested against the context of how the US regional allies
in Northeast Asia, namely Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, responded to the Nixon
Administration’s strategic retrenchment in Northeast Asia during the 1970s.40 The Nixon
Doctrine is known as the most representative instance of U.S. retrenchment in Northeast
Asia. According to this doctrine, each of the US allies should be in charge of its own
military defense in general, and the US would have acted as a nuclear umbrella if
requested.41 This military retrenchment reflects the US need to look for a more passive
and secondary role in the defense of its regional allies. The retrenchment was followed by
the Nixon Administration’s announcement of the achievement of rapprochement with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC or aka China), which signaled that the US would adopt
a position of strategic ambiguity between China and its regional allies in Northeast Asia.

Table 1-1. The US Troop Level in Japan, ROK, and ROC, 1969-1976.42
1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

Japan

84,802

82,264

71,485

61,747

56,240

51,608

48,337

46,794

ROK

66,531

52,197

40,740

41,600

41,864

40,387

40,204

39,133

ROC

9,243

8,813

8,565

8,289

8,267

4,619

2,584

2,090
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Each of the three regional states is arguably a hard case to use in supporting the
theory about a regional state’s security-enhancing domestic drives.43 The US’s Cold War
strategy in Northeast Asia was to create a hub-and-spokes system, with the United States
as the hub and no apparent institutionalized military cooperation between the spokes. The
absence of institutionalized cooperation, coupled with the bipolar nature of the period
examined in the case study, suggests that each of the states was highly dependent upon
the US’s security commitment. Thus, it is arguably difficult to find substantial variation
among them in terms of the scope of security-promoting domestic drives in the face of
the US retrenchment.
In addition, because of their dependence on the United States, the three states were
not supposed to engage in military behaviors that were against the strategic interests of
the United States, which could conceivably prompt U.S. retaliation. Furthermore, the
existing scholarship on the Cold War diplomatic history finds that the alliance between
US and the regional allies worked as institutional mechanism to prevent the junior allies
from provoking a larger military conflict that might spoil the patron’s strategic interests. 44
Thus, the selected states are also hard cases to use in supporting the argument that a



 The case selection follows the suggestion that a qualitative case study needs to use hard case(s) in
supporting its own theory. See Harry Eckstein, "Case studies and theory in political science," in Handbook
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regional state’s negative assessment of security has the potential to cause it to pursue
military behaviors that are against the strategic interests of its patron.
The case study focuses on the Nixon Administration’s retrenchment as the primary
factor influencing each of the regional states’ security assessments. There are two points
to note regarding how the case study is designed to control for alternative factors that
have the potential to affect each of the regional states’ security assessments. First, the
case selection helps to control for alternative factors at the level of the international
system, such as the distribution of power among great powers, offense-defense balance,
and international economic pressure, which may affect the regional states’ security
assessment.45 Second, each of the states was unable to find another state to act as an ally
in response to the Nixon administration’s retrenchment. In this respect, the case study
controls for the possibility that a superpower’s retrenchment may not lead its allies to
work on domestic drives for military preparedness when they have alternative sources of
allied support.
The case selection also helps to control for the neoclassical realist argument that a
regional state’s relationship with domestic society should affect its willingness to increase
the societal contribution toward an autonomous defense capability. There are two points
to note. First, South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed not only high levels of autonomy from
domestic society but also high levels of capability to penetrate and mobilize their
domestic societies in conducting the states’ national policies. In addition, because anti-
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Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/01): 136-41.

26
statist ideology was not widely embedded in the domestic societies of these two states,
the leadership of the two states did not witness substantial domestic resistance to the
state’s initiative to launch domestic drives toward an autonomous defense posture.46 In
contrast, Japan’s security policy is known to have been substantially constrained by antimilitarist norms embedded in domestic society. But the Japanese leadership did not
witness any substantial domestic oppositional movements regarding the state’s security
policy during the 1970s.47 Second, none of the three states are constrained by class
conflicts. The establishment of large-scale rearmament programs is socially divisive in
nature, and thus, a state whose society is divided by class interests is likely to be faced
with domestic resistance when introducing mass-scale programs for the establishment of
an indigenous military capability.48 The absence of class conflicts thus suggests another
explanation for the absence of domestic resistance toward each of the regional states’
security-promoting domestic campaigns.
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1.5.3. Measurement of Variables

1.5.3.1. A Regional State’s Security Assessment

The case study should make inference of security assessment of each regional state’s
leadership. The primary method of inference is qualitative analysis of the written and
spoken statements of each state’s leadership regarding its adversary’s military threats and
its patron’s reliability. Because of the limited availability of these primary source data,
the case study also introduces two alternatives methods. First, it refers to primary source
documents and secondary source literature that contain information on each state
leadership’s perception of security. Second, the case study refers to the development of
security environment each regional state directly faced. This provides circumstantial
evidence to make inference of each state’s assessment of security.
The case study uses documents from the following primary data sources. First, the
U.S. Government Printing Office published two volumes of documents that contain
information about how the leadership of South Korea and Japan assessed the state’s
security in response to the Nixon administration’s strategic posture in Northeast Asia.49
Second, the U.S. Government Printing Office also provides two published volumes of
documents that contain information about how the leadership of Taiwan assessed the

49
One is Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, eds.
Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2010). This study refers
to the e-book version of this volume, which is available at
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state’s security in response to the US retrenchment in Northeast Asia.50 Third, the
National Security Archive, located at George Washington University, provides a digital
compilation of declassified records on the US-Japan alliance from 1960 through 1976.51
From this compilation, the case study obtained primary source documents that contain
information about how the Japanese leadership assessed the state’s security under the
Nixon administration’s retrenchment. Fourth, the National Security Archive, provides a
digital compilation of declassified records on the US-China relations from 1960 through
1998. From this compilation, the case study obtained documents that contain information
about how the ROC leadership’s security assessment.52 Fifth, under the sponsorship of
the National Security Archive, the U.S.-Japan Project conducted interviews with former
Japanese officials who were closely involved with the formulation of Japan’s security
policy since 1960.53 The case study of Japan obtained data from this primary source.
In the case of Japan, the case study considers the fact that the security policy during
the 1970s was formulated under the initiative of the Defense Agency of Japan (JDA). In
this respect, the case study focuses on how the JDA policymakers assessed the state’s
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security in response to the US retrenchment. In comparison, the case study of the other
two states measures security assessment of the state’s top political leaders: the ROK
president Park Chung Hee and his core policymakers in the case of South Korea, and the
ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and his core policymakers in the case of Taiwan. In the
case of the two states, it was relatively easy to form a consensus among policymaking
leaders because the two states’ structure of policymaking process was highly centralized.
The formation of a consensus allowed them to act as a realist version of a unitary actor
under the state’s security initiative.54
According to the theory of this research, a regional state’s security concern can be
discussed as a continuous variable. First, at one end of the spectrum, there is a regional
state that believes that its adversary will make use of the superpower’s retrenchment for
its revisionist purposes and, at the same time, suspects that the superpower will not
provide security assistance in times of needs. The level of such a state’s security concern
should be substantially high. Second, at the opposite end, there is another regional state
that is confident in the patron’s commitment and, at the same time, is confident that its
adversary will not introduce revisionist behaviors. The level of such a state’s security
concern should be substantially low.
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In measuring the independent variable, the case study focuses on how each regional
state’s leadership assessed the state’s security in response to the Nixon administration’s
strategic posture in East Asia. But measuring the dependent variables makes it necessary
for the case study to examine each regional state’s security-seeking behaviors during the
whole period of the 1970s. This helps to fully documents how each leadership’s
assessment of security affected the formulation of the security-promoting domestic drives
and how each regional state’s security assessment affected its commitment to the pursuit
of a military policy against the US strategic interests. The extension of timespan can be
also justified by the fact that the Nixon administration’s strategic posture in East Asia was
sustained until the Carter administration.

1.5.3.2. A Regional State’s Military Behaviors against the Strategic Interests of Its Patron

The case study examines the compatibility between each of the regional states’
military behaviors and the US’s strategic interests in Northeast Asia. For example, the
US’s key strategic interest in Northeast Asia was to establish a peaceful status quo in this
region. Thus, a regional state’s military policy that was incompatible with the superpower
state’s desire to establish a peaceful status-quo in Northeast Asia could be described as a
military behavior that would jeopardize the US’s strategic interests in this region.
A regional state’s willingness to engage in military behaviors against the strategic
interests of its patron can be discussed as a continuous variable. To operationally measure
this variable, the case study documents the level of internal cohesion within the
leadership of the three states when pursuing such adventurous behaviors. The more the
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cohesive leadership of a state, the more it is committed to the pursuit of a military policy
against the patron’s strategic interests.
In addition, the case study examines how each of the regional states responded to the
US’s coercive efforts to reverse the military behaviors against its strategic interests. When
a regional state is strongly committed to the pursuit of the military behaviors, it is
unlikely to abandon them, even in the face of the patron’s coercive efforts. In contrast, a
superpower will find it relatively easy to make its junior ally abandon the objectionable
behaviors when the junior ally is modestly committed to the pursuit of these behaviors.
Finally, a regional state will voluntarily abandon the pursuit of military behaviors against
the strategic interests of its patron, even without the presence of the patron’s coercive
efforts, when it is weakly committed to the pursuit of the behaviors.

1.5.3.3. A Regional State’s Security-Enhancing Domestic Drives

The measurement of a regional security-promoting domestic drives begins with
discussing the state leadership’s initiatives to direct domestic resources toward the
establishment of an autonomous defense capability because it is the essential strategy to
increase the contribution of domestic society to defense. Because the state is
“institutionally separated from organized production,” political leaders should introduce
centralized control over the economic activity of domestic society to direct national
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resources toward achieving self-sufficiency in the establishment of an autonomous
defense posture.55
This domestic drive takes two forms: mobilization and extraction. Mobilization
refers to the state’s intervention in the domestic economy to produce the required
materials for the establishment of indigenous military capabilities, whereas extraction
refers to the direct conversion of societal wealth into military power through taxation,
requisition, and expropriation.56 When faced with immediate external threats, political
leaders are likely to introduce extraction because it enables them to gain rapid access to
domestic resources. In contrast, mobilization is a state’s relatively long-term strategy to
establish the industrial and technological basis of the state’s military capabilities.57
One may argue that examination of a change in defense spending as a share of
national income is a straightforward way of measuring a regional state’s willingness to
direct national resources toward the establishment of an autonomous defense posture. In
this respect, the case study examines each state’s defense spending. However, there are
two points that should be addressed in using this quantitative indicator. First, one often
finds it difficult to exclude all appropriations of a non-military character when using an
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existing database for the state’s military expenditure. Secondly, a change in military
expenditures is also determined by a state’s other security needs. Thus, the quantitative
indicator may not reflect the precise level of a regional state’s security concern in the face
of the patron’s retrenchment.58
A regional state’s security concern makes the state’s leadership select policy
instruments intended to increase the domestic contribution to an autonomous defense
capability. In doing so, political leaders will invariably begin by restricting the selection
of policy instrument to those that are presently contained in its central apparatus in order
to avoid domestic resistance.59 As the security concern increases, a regional state must
introduce large-scale campaigns to direct national resources toward the establishment of
an autonomous defense capability.60 This should decrease the amount of national
resources that will be directed toward programs other than national defense. In addition,
there may be large-scale institutional and societal costs involved in sustaining the state’s
security-promoting domestic drives.61 The large-scale campaigns can thus generate
resistance from affected societal groups.62
The leadership of a state must overcome the societal constraints when introducing
mass-scale domestic campaigns. This requires the leadership to place domestic drives on
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solid societal ground.63 For example, it may attempt to increase the institutional capacity
to penetrate domestic society to secure societal support.64 But this comes at the cost of
establishing an expansive administrative apparatus to penetrate into domestic society.65
The present study examines whether each regional states attempted to establish a societal
basis of national military preparedness when they needed to substantially increase the
contribution of domestic society toward an autonomous defense posture.
The inevitable tension between state and society suggests that the establishment of
an autonomous defense posture is very much a collective undertaking, carrying
considerable political costs and risks domestically.66 As such, political leaders should
make efforts to increase elite-mass linkage when launching massive-scale securitypromoting domestic drives.67 This requires the leadership of a state to justify the drives
to direct national resources toward an autonomous defense capability. Thus the case study
examines the “ideological mobilization” as a part of the security-enhancing domestic
drives.68
Existing scholarship discusses three strategies with which the leadership of a state
attempts to mobilize domestic support. First, political leaders deliberately inculcate state
63
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sponsored nationalism because it tends to increase the cohesion of domestic society and
the mass public’s propensity to identify with the state. This in turn facilitates the state’s
efforts to direct national human and material resources toward military build-ups.69 In
contrast, fragmented states find it difficult to direct domestic resources under the
initiative of national security.70 Second, the leadership of a state introduces ideology as a
way of mobilizing the mass public’s support.71 However, an ideology may thwart the
initiative of the state’s leadership, depending on its contents.72 Third, political leaders
manipulate international conflicts to justify costly domestic campaigns to establish
national military preparedness.73
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The case study discusses a regional state’s willingness to launch security-promoting
domestic strategies as a continuous variable. Accordingly, at one end of the spectrum lies
a state that restricts policy options to those that are presently available in its central
apparatus. This state is unlikely to introduce any substantial domestic drives. In contrast,
at the other end of the spectrum, there lies another state that attempts to introduce
maximal-scale security-promoting domestic drives to establish an autonomous defense
posture. Such a state introduces substantial domestic drives to direct national resources
toward the establishment of an autonomous defense capability. Political leaders of this
state also try to increase the institutional capacity to penetrate domestic society to place
the domestic drives on solid societal ground. In addition, the leadership of this state is
likely to mobilize mass public support for the state’s security initiatives.
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1.6. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter suggested that the present research was planned to explore how a
regional state could increase its security in response to its patron’s strategic retrenchment.
What made this author interested in this research topic was an empirical puzzle that is
found in the behaviors of the US allies in Northeast Asia, namely, Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan, during the time of the superpower’s strategic retrenchment in the 1970s.
Why did they develop different behaviors rather than responding to the superpower’s
retrenchment in a uniform fashion? To solve this empirical puzzle, I introduced a theory
of a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors during the time of its patron’s
retrenchment, which is composed of three sections: operationalization of a regional
state’s security concerns during the time of its patron’s retrenchment, a theory of a
regional ally’s security-seeking domestic drives, and a theory of a regional state’s pursuit
of a military policy against its patron’s strategic interests.
First, the theory operationally defined a regional ally’s assessment of security under
the patron’s retrenchment. Rather than simply considering the state’s security concern as
the fear of abandonment, the theory treated it as a combination of a regional state’s
perception of patron reliability and its perception of military threats posed by the
adversary. This study will introduce three methods to infer each regional state’s security
assessment. The primary method of inference will be qualitative analysis of the written
and spoken statements of each state’s leadership regarding its adversary’s military threats
and its patron’s reliability. In addition, each case study will refer to primary source
documents and secondary source literature that contain information on each state
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leadership’s perception of security in response to the Nixon administration’s
retrenchment. The case study will also refer to the development of the security
environment each regional state directly faced, because this method provides
circumstantial evidence to make inference of each state’s assessment of security.
Second, I argued that a regional state’s security concern will lead it to introduce
domestic drives to promote societal contribution to its autonomous defense posture. It is
theorized that there is co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security concern
and the scope of its efforts to increase domestic contribution to an autonomous defense
capability. To measure the state’s security-promoting domestic drives, the case study will
examine a change in defense spending as a share of national income because this is a
straightforward way to measure the scope of a state’s domestic drives to increase the
societal contribution to an autonomous defense posture. But this study also acknowledges
that this quantitative indicator may not reflect the precise level of a regional state’s
security concern under the patron’s retrenchment. In this respect, the present study will
use other qualitative indicators to measure the security-seeking behaviors. Each case
study will examine whether there was the state leadership’s initiative to direct domestic
resources toward autonomous defense capability. It will also examine whether each
leadership tried to mobilize domestic support under the initiative of national security.
Third, the present study theorized that a regional state’s pursuit of military policies
against its patron’s strategic interests is a function of its security assessment during the
security provider’s retrenchment. According to the theory, it is hypothesized that there is
co-variation between the level of a regional state’s negative assessment of security and
the level of its commitment to the pursuit of a military policy that jeopardizes the
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strategic interests of its security provider. Each case study will use the following three
qualitative indicators to measure the level of each regional state’s commitment to the
pursuit of a military policy against its patron. First, it will measure the compatibility
between each of the regional states’ military behaviors and the US’s strategic interests in
Northeast Asia. Second, the case study will examine the level of internal cohesion within
the leadership of the regional states when pursuing a military policy against the US
strategic interests. Third, it will examine how each of the regional states responded to the
US’s coercive efforts to reverse the military behaviors against its strategic interests.
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CHAPTER 2. CASE STUDY OF JAPAN

2.1. Japan’s Perception of Security

2.1.1. Japan’s Security Assessment in Response to the Nixon Doctrine

During the early stage of the Nixon presidency, the most important issue between
the US and Japan was the reversion of Okinawa, which had been occupied by the US
since the end of the Second World War. The Japanese voices to demand the return of
Okinawa grew louder with the escalation of the Vietnam War. A growing fear of
entrapment contributed to the movement to oppose the US’s use of military bases in
Okinawa for its conventional military operations during the Vietnam War. The opposition
to the Vietnam War also implied that the automatic renewal of the US-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty would not be guaranteed.1 It was in this domestic context that Prime
Minister Sato pledged to reclaim Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.
The return of Okinawa was also important issue for the Nixon Administration
because it needed to preserve the effectiveness of the American military bases in
Okinawa, which was critical to maintaining the US deterrence capability in East Asia. It
revealed the desire to revert the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan under
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favorable terms so as to retain base functions on Okinawa. Crucial negotiations
surrounding the issue of the return of Okinawa lasted from June 1969 to June 1971, when
the two allies signed the negotiated agreement.2
The U.S.-Japan negotiations suggest two points that help us to discuss the Japanese
response to the Nixon Administration’s strategic posture in East Asia. First, the
negotiation process reconfirmed the US security commitment to the regional allies in East
Asia. The two allies reached an agreement regarding the US use of the military bases in
Okinawa for regional contingencies in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, as well as
for the continuation of the US’s conventional military operations for the Vietnam War.3
Japan referred to this agreement in evaluating the superpower’s security commitment.
Secondly, Japan was committed to honoring the strategic interests of the United States in
East Asia to secure the reversion of Okinawa under favorable terms. The Sato
Administration concluded that Japan should be ready to assume a larger regional role as a
way of supporting the patron’s strategic posture in Asia. Considering this deferential
attitude, Japan was shocked by the Nixon administration’s unilateral announcement of the
Nixon Doctrine and of the normalization of relations with the PRC, which would have
the potential to negatively affect its security.
Nixon’s image in Japan was “an inflexible and uncompromising anti-Communist
ideologue” whose Cold War fundamentalism would not change.4 However, his message
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about the policy of disengagement in Asia led the Japanese to be ambiguous regarding the
patron’s resolve to defend Japan.5 There was also concern regarding the longer-term
implications of the Nixon Administration’s vision to extend Japan’s place far beyond the
role of financially supporting US military activities in East Asia. This concern led to the
apprehension that the ultimate objective of the Nixon doctrine would be a recasting of the
security relationship between Japan and the United States.6
The Nixon administration unilaterally proposed a force rationalization program,
which reduced total US troop levels to approximately half of their strength in 1960.7 This
program induced the Japanese fear of US military disengagement from Japan.8 This fear,
to some extent, is also related with the issue of how the reduction of US forces would
compromise the operational defense capabilities of the superpower’s allies in Northeast
Asia.9 However, the anxieties centered on the abrupt and non-consultative manner in
which the Nixon Administration had proceeded.10 In other words, the anxiety over the
patron’s military retrenchment was rooted in the erosion of the basis of trust the Japanese
deemed so important to the security relationship between Japan and the United States.
The anxiety over the patron’s military retrenchment made the Japanese leadership
publicly express the fear of abandonment in spite of domestic political incentives that
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might have prevented it from doing so.11 First, the Sato administration was not supposed
to publicly voice anxiety over the patron’s retrenchment because it would create public
suspicion that the state’s leadership would attempt to justify the presence of nuclear
weapons within the territory of Japan.12 Second, the impending renewal of the US-Japan
mutual security treaty in 1970 weighed against the overt expression of concern regarding
US abandonment. Fervent expressions of the abandonment fear would make the Japanese
public focus on the issues regarding the state’s defense buildup, which would in turn
ignite antimilitarist forces in Japan. This situation would not be conducive to easing the
automatic renewal of the security treaty. However, the Japanese leadership overtly
expressed concern regarding the patron’s abandonment, instead of tempering the
expression of this fear as a way to preempt domestic antimilitarist forces.
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2.1.2. The Nixon Shock and Japan’s Assessment of the US Reliability

Nixon initially adopted a strategy of confrontation with the People’s Republic of
China because of his Cold War fundamentalism. His commitment to anti-Communist
ideology also led to the Nixon Administration’s emphasis of the threat posed by China
until it was confident in the adversary’s intentions to accommodate the US.13 Then it
suddenly shifted its strategy by announcing the president’s visit to China to launch a
diplomatic initiative to normalize relations, while assuring Japan that it would not
contemplate any basic change in its policy toward the PRC.14 This unilateral approach
reflected the ideas of Kissinger and his NSC staff, who were highly concerned that any
prior consultation with Japan would undermine the Nixon Administration’s diplomatic
initiative toward China.15
The Sato administration followed the US’s hardline posture because it believed that
a close alliance with the United States would lead the patron to accommodate Japan’s
national interests.16 Sato overly emphasized the Chinese threats, even though his threat
perception of the communist China was relatively more modest. This modest level of
threat perception suggests that there was little fear of the Chinese threat in Japan because
of the recognition that the economic and technological gap between the two countries
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was so great and would continue to grow for the foreseeable future.17 Nonetheless, he
emphasized the Chinese threats because he wanted to ensure that Japan would agree with
the Nixon Administration’s hardline attitudes toward communist China.18 The emphasis
of the Chinese threat also reflected the ideological hostility toward the adversary as a
revolutionary power.19
Thus the sudden shift in the US policy toward China led to the erosion of trust in the
patron’s reliability. Japan was particularly concerned about how its interests would be
discussed during negotiations between the United States and China.20 Because of the
suspicion that Beijing’s fundamental objective would be to “split Japan off from the
U.S.” and “neutralize” it, Japan was particularly concerned whether the PRC leadership
would attempt to use the superpower’s new China policy to drive a wedge between Japan
and the United States.21
The unilateral manner of the Nixon administration made Japan suspect a lack of
sympathy on the part of the patron about Japan’s predicament.22 As Reischauer put it,
“Japanese public … … responds more strongly to the style and mood of our relationship
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than to its actual content … … Japanese feel that by speaking so frankly (harshly they
might say), and acting so unexpectedly, we have shown ourselves to be unfriendly and
unreliable.”23 The Japanese assessment was that the patron’s commitment would no
longer be guaranteed because it might change depending on the superpower’s global
tactics and strategy.24 Consequently, Japanese faith in the reliability of the security patron
was shattered.25 As Alexis Johnson assessed, “[after] this ‘Nixon shokku [shock]’ as the
Japanese called it, there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our
two governments”26
The Nixon Administration’s new China policy also raised the issue of whether the
superpower would maintain its security commitment to Taiwan. Japan suspected that the
real intent of the Nixon Administration was to admit the communist China into the United
Nations instead of Taiwan. This suspicion made Japan criticize the patron for “its
heartless disregard” for its obligations to its allies.27 To stress the patron’s obligation, the
Japan Government referred to the 1969 Joint Communique, which emphasized the
importance of the security of Taiwan in the security of Japan.28 Japan’s concern also
centered on the 1972 communique between the US and the PRC, which for the first time,
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included the statement on the withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan.29 The leadership of
Japan suspected that the communique committed the United States to the ultimate
removal of her forces from Taiwan.30
Japan’s concern, however, was not a top policy issue to deal with for Kissinger and
his NSC Staff, who took the initiative in the foreign policymaking process during the
Nixon Presidency.31 In contrast, the Department of State was concerned with how the
Nixon Administration’s unilateral manner would affect the alliance between the United
States and Japan.32 Thus it argued that the Nixon Administration should calm Japan’s
increasing anxiety over the possible softening toward communist China.33 This led to the
suggestion that the US should demonstrate its willingness to maintain its commitment to
the security of Japan via “a more realistic and forthcoming discussion of US policies and
plans affecting the security of Japan.”34 However, Kissinger and his NSC staff
minimized the involvement of the State Department in the process of the rapprochement
with the PRC.35
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2.1.3. The Amelioration of Japan’s Security Concern

The anxiety over the superpower’s unilateral manner, however, did not foster a
rampant security concern. One factor to explain this is Japan’s security assessment in
response to the US military withdrawal from Vietnam. The Japanese logistical support for
the US military operations in Vietnam, coupled with the escalation of the Vietnam War,
led to concerns about the risk of being entrapped in the Vietnam War.36 This anxiety was
manifested in Japan’s vehement rejection of any clear mention of a security link between
Japan and Vietnam in the Nixon-Sato joint communique in 1969, which was in contrast to
the acceptance of a clear security link between Japan and South Korea.37 The heightened
fear of entrapment was also reflected in public opinion during the 1960s; the majority of
the Japanese public was concerned about the risk of Japan being entrapped in the
Vietnam War.38 The US posture of military retrenchment in Vietnam decreased the
potential for Japan’s entanglement in the Vietnam War, because of which the Japanese
anxiety regarding the security environment was mitigated.39 Thus the Nixon
Administration’s Vietnamization program did not make Japan substantially concerned
about the patron’s reliability, which contrasted with the reaction to the US force reduction
programs in Japan and South Korea.
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Japan’s security concerns were ameliorated by the development of détente in the
Korean peninsula.40 The inter-Korean communique in 1972 made the Japanese
government confident that a workable détente between the two Koreas would be
established.41 The Japanese assessment was similar to the expectation of the U.S.
Department of State indicating that the two Koreas would introduce a step-by-step
approach to perpetual peace in the Korean peninsula.42 The positive assessment of the
Korean thaw suggests that the belligerence of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK or aka North Korea) became less of a critical factor in Japan’s assessment of
threats in Northeast Asia.43
Japan’s anxiety over the patron’s reliability was also mitigated by the Nixon
Administration’s assurances that Washington would maintain its commitment to Korea.
The US forces reduction programs were indeed designed to implement further reduction
of the US military presence in Korea.44 Furthermore, the Nixon Administration regarded
the establishment of détente in Northeast Asia as a precondition to implementing further
reductions of US forces.45 The development of détente, however, made the US decide to
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continue the presence of its forces in South Korea because it came to acknowledge that
the US military presence in Korea would be necessary to aid in the development of
détente in the Korean peninsula.46 This acknowledgement led to the Nixon
Administration’s numerous assurances to Japan that the US would continue to honor its
commitment to Korea, which in turn shored up Japanese confidence in its patron’s
commitment to Korea.47
Japan’s threat perception was mollified to a substantial degree as it came to regard
the Sino-American rapprochement as a driving force in establishing stability in Northeast
Asia. The summit between the Unites States and the PRC in February 1972, which
affirmed that neither side had any territorial ambitions, led to the Japanese assessment
that communist China would search for stability in Northeast Asia by normalizing its
relations with the United States.48
More important to the mollification of Japan’s security concerns was the agreement
between the leadership of the United States and the PRC about the role of the US military
presence in Japan in the stability in Northeast Asia. Throughout the Sino-American
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negotiation process, the Nixon Administration emphasized the danger of the withdrawal
of US forces from East Asia to justify the US-Japan Security Treaty.49 The leadership of
China, in response, emphasized the security treaty between the United States and Japan
as a brake on Japan’s military expansion because it was concerned that the superpower’s
military retrenchment in Northeast Asia would lead to the reemergence of Japanese
militarism.50 The leaderships of the two states thus came to an agreement that US
tutelage would safely prevent the resurrection of Japanese military expansion.51
Japan’s advancement of relations toward China was another key factor contributing
to the amelioration of Japan’s security concerns. Japan’s new approach toward China
began with Sato’s public expression of a personal desire to meet with the leadership of
China and his implied recognition of the PRC as the sole, legitimate representative of
China.52 His remark was followed by the 1972 Foreign Ministry white papers that
explicitly stated that the normalization of relations with the PRC should be the state’s
most important foreign policy objective.53 This new foreign policy direction also
reflected the voices of the Japanese business community, who wished to normalize
economic relations with the PRC.54
However, Sato’s commitment to maintaining Japan’s security relationship with
Taiwan constrained the prime minister from leading Japan’s foreign policy in the new
direction. His reluctance to abrogate Japan’s peace treaty with Taiwan led to China’s
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criticism of Japan as a reactionary state.55 Beijing also criticized Japan’s allowing the US
use of military bases in Japan for the defense of Taiwan.56
The Tanaka Administration stepped up the pace of these overtures to normalize
relations with China by shifting the previous commitment to Taiwan. This policy change
was welcomed by the PRC’s leadership. Then China introduced conciliatory actions
toward Japan.57 The culmination of the rapprochement process was the summit between
Japan and the PRC in September 1972, which was hailed as a new historic chapter in
Japan’s relations with China. The joint communique from the summit affirmed the
termination of the state of war that had existed between the two states and the
establishment of full diplomatic relations. It also affirmed the determination of the two
states to uphold principles of peaceful coexistence on the basis of mutual respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese leadership further made it clear that
China neither perceived a threat from nor posed a threat to Japan.58 Tanaka’s visit to
Beijing thus contributed to the lessening of Japanese threat perception.
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2.2. Japan’s Minimalist Defense Posture during the 1970s

2.2.1. The Rise and Fall of the Independent Defense Concept

The Nixon administration’s military retrenchment allowed Japanese voices
demanding the state’s establishment of an independent defense capability to rise. The
concern about the reliability of the patron’s commitment made Arita Kiichi, the directorgeneral of the Defense Agency of Japan (JDA), argue that “if the arrival of the US help
were delayed, Japan must be able to prevent any aggressor from achieving a fait
accompli.”59 This argument led to the suggestion of an autonomous defense posture in a
draft white paper, which was later called the Arita Paper. In this paper, he urged that
Japan acquire defense capabilities sufficient for preventing invasion by other states,
securing the safety of sea transportation, and maintaining air supremacy.60 The Arita
paper was targeted to enable Japan to resist an invasion without security support of the
United States. This paper, however, was not formally approved by the Sato Cabinet
before Arita was replaced by Nakasone Yoshiro in January of 1970.
The debate on the development of an autonomous defense capability was fueled
when Yasuhiro Nakasone was appointed as the new director-general of the JDA. Known
to be a defense hawk, he had publicly espoused the necessity of establishing an
autonomous defense posture to assume primary responsibility for its defense while
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claiming the state’s security dependence upon the United States should be reduced.61
Upon becoming the director-general of the JDA, he initiated a policy review of the Basic
Principles of National Defense (BPND), which had defined the state’s defense posture
since 1957. The 1957 BPND affirmed Japan’s avoidance of major rearmament, the state’s
dependence on the security commitment of the United States, and the emphasis on a
gradual defense buildup in accordance with domestic conditions.62 His criticism was that
the BPND had made the Japanese people lack the will to defend their own country and
made the state depend on the patron’s commitment to an unacceptable degree.63 Thus,
Nakasone took the initiative in proposing the revision of the BPND, shifting the priorities
in the state’s security policy formation “away from the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan
Security relationship and toward the development of an autonomous defense.”64
Nakasone’s emphasis on autonomous defense as the guiding principle of the state’s
security policy was also evident in his taking the initiative in the publication of the state’s
first defense white paper in October of 1970.65 The white paper started with his criticism
that there had not been any firm and unified opinion among the Japanese policymaking
elites about how the security of Japan should be achieved. His idea was that the Defense
Agency should take the initiative in stimulating greater defense consciousness among the
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Japanese public.66 His emphasis on the promotion of the defense consciousness was
similar to the Sato Government’s launching of a comprehensive campaign in 1968 to
raise the public’s defense consciousness, which stressed national pride, social order, and
traditional values, and rally support for the state’s negotiation of the return of Okinawa
from the United States.67
While defining the notion of autonomous defense as the state’s efforts to increase
national defense potentials and the state’s determination to deal with aggression primarily
on its own, the paper proposed that the Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the
United States should supplement Japan’s own autonomous capabilities for defense. Like
the Arita Paper, it insisted on the realization of the superiority of the state’s military
capabilities in the air and at sea.68 As the US Embassy in Tokyo emphasized, the most
significant aspects of the white paper were “the fact of its publication” and the emphasis
on “the collective will of the Japanese people to defend their country.”69
A final point to note is Nakasone’s emphasis of the notion of kokusanka
(indigenization) in defense production as essential to the state’s autonomous defense
posture. His policy paper, entitled the Basic Policy on Equipment Production and
Development, emphasized the importance of kokusanka as follows: “From the standpoint
of autonomous defense, it is desirable for Japan to be defended with equipment
developed and produced by Japan alone. From this point on, the development and
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production of military equipment will be limited to Japanese industries as a matter of
principle.”70 The emphasis of the importance of indigenous defense caused the JDA to
attempt to financially support the state’s fourth five-year defense buildup plan, which ran
from 1972 to 1977. Under the new defense plan, the JDA proposed to increase the state’s
R&D budget by 350 percent, a budget increase of 220 percent over the third defense
buildup plan. This was unprecedented in its scale.71
Nakasone’s emphasis of the importance of kokusanka was also welcomed by the
Japanese business community, which had demanded an increase in the domestic
production of military equipment. The Defense Production Committee of the Keidanren
(Japan Business Federation) thus attempted to catch up to the enthusiasm of Nakasone,
releasing a paper that promised to increase its own capital investment in defense
production and R&D.72 These cases showed that the espousal of the notion of kokusanka
could lead to the Japanese leadership’s efforts to mobilize domestic resources in the
establishment of an autonomous defense capability.
However, there was growing concern that the campaign to prioritize the
development of an autonomous defense posture would negatively affect Japan’s security
relationship with the United States. According to these concerns, emphasizing the
concept of autonomous defense would further encourage the patron’s disengagement
from Japan and East Asia because it would signal to the patron that Japan would no
longer need its security commitment.73 In addition, Prime Minister Sato was concerned
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that the campaign for autonomous defense would jeopardize the negotiations regarding
the reversion of Okinawa. Thus, he attempted to restrain Nakasone, though he initially
supported the quest to augment the state’s defense capabilities.74 Even Nakasone himself
downplayed the concept of autonomous defense when faced with the possibility of the
patron’s drastic disengagement.75
The setback of Nakasone’s campaign became conspicuous as it came to lose
domestic political support. Most political leaders of the ruling party turned their backs on
Nakasone because of the concern about the misgivings of neighboring countries and the
consideration of domestic criticism of Nakasone’s initiative.76 Even the Japanese
business community came to withdraw its support for Nakasone’s campaign because of
its expectation that the prospect of normalized relations with the PRC would create
business possibilities that would far outweigh those of indigenous defense production.77
In addition, Nakasone’s initiative came to face resistance from the state’s
policymaking agencies. He attempted to bypass the Japanese decision-making process.
But this bothered relevant agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance and the National
Defense Council, which in turn led to their strenuous resistance to the JDA’s initiative in
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the process of preparation.78 In particular, the Finance Ministry criticized the JDA’s
proposed version of the state’s defense buildup plan for being “fiscally impossible.”
Thus, it proposed a postponement of the defense buildup plan. Facing such a situation,
the JDA announced its plan to examine significantly reducing the scope of the fourth
defense buildup. According to this plan, annual growth in defense expenditure would fall
from the originally proposed 18.8 percent to the 15 percent level seen in the third defense
buildup plan.79
This episode of the rise and fall of the Nakasone campaign shows that the Japanese
concern about the reliability of the US commitment led to a campaign to prioritize the
establishment of the state’s autonomous defense capabilities. It reflected the idea that
Japan’s economic and political power should be significantly directed toward the state’s
military power.80 The return of Okinawa and the Nixon Administration’s retrenchment
made a group of political leaders in the ruling party and the Japanese business community
espouse the state’s assertive posture to security. Nakasone’s campaign was thus supported
by these domestic groups.81 It was also supported by the Japanese military.82 There was
a good chance of Japan’s more self-assertive posture to security if Nakasone’s campaign
had been implemented as it stood.83 However, it could not sustain the political
momentum it had built.
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The episode of the rise and fall of the autonomous defense doctrine suggests that a
study of Japan’s defense posture should first focus on how the state’s assessment of
international security environment affects its formulation of a defense posture and then
examine how the state’s domestic political constraints affect its approach to defense and
national security. This section applies this two-step approach to the study of how the
Japanese leadership’s security assessment in response to détente affected the formulation
of Japan’s defense posture during the 1970s. In doing so, the present study highlights the
causal connection between the leadership’s security assessment and the establishment of
Japan’s minimalist approach to security during the 1970s. Two cases that illustrate the
development of the minimalist approach are the establishment of the Standard Defense
Force Concept to set limits on the state’s defense capability and the establishment of the
one percent of GNP limit to defense spending. These two cases suggest that the Japanese
leadership did not have an incentive to consider increasing the societal contribution
toward national military preparedness.84

2.2.2. The Establishment of the Standard Defense Force Concept

The debate over Japan’s defense posture during the 1970s was characterized as
bureaucratic dominance over politicians in the defense decision-making process. The
ruling party did not exercise influence over the process of formulating the state’s defense
posture because it wanted to avoid aggravating tensions over the defense issue.85 This
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made it possible for Takuya Kubo and his team of civilian officials in the Defense
Agency of Japan (JDA) to take the initiative in the formulation of Japan’s defense policymaking process.86
As the director of the JDA, Kubo took the initiative in articulating the state’s defense
posture during the development of détente in Northeast Asia. Referring to the trend
toward détente, his seminal internal memorandum in 1971 suggested that Japan would be
unlikely to become embroiled in a large-scale conflict in the near future and that hence, it
would be unnecessary to decide the scope of the state’s defense posture to cope with a
large-scale attack that potential adversaries might bring to bear on Japan.87 This led to
the argument that Japan’s defense posture should be established based on lowering the
assumed level of threat from a large-scale limited attack to a hypothetical conflict of
limited scale.88
Kubo’s threat assessment led to his criticism of the Necessity Defense Force
Concept, which was the basis for the previous three defense buildup plans. It postulated
that Japan should maintain defense capability in proportion to the potential military
capabilities of surrounding countries.89 In contrast, Kubo suggested the Standard
Defense Force Concept as the general guideline for the state’s defense planning, which
proposed the creation of a standard defense force, consisting of a relatively small,
modern, well-equipped, and highly professional military force, which would be



 Ibid., 19.

 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 102.

 Takao Sebata, Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007 (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, Inc., 2010), 113.

 Ibid., 111.

61
appropriate for a peaceful international environment.90 He argued that the creation of
such a force would be more practicable than vainly seeking to maintain the forces that
would be needed to deal a full-scale conflict.91
The notion of the Standard Defense Force Concept was initially deliberated within
the JDA. Then Kubo tried to win the support of the moderate leaders of the ruling party,
as well as the political parties and the Japanese public.92 However, the military leaders
within the SDF and the right-idealists inside the LDP suggested three criticisms.93 First,
the threat perception rationale behind the new defense concept was criticized because of
its assumption that there would not be any large-scale attack on Japan.94 Second, there
was the criticism that it would be impossible to decide the goal of Japan’s defense
buildup without considering the military capabilities of neighboring countries. Third, the
no-threat argument was criticized for assuming that there would not be any drastic change
in the international situation. As the head of the JDA, Michita Sakata supported Kubo and
civilian officials within the defense agency by persuading the SDF to accept the newly
suggested concept.95
The Standard Defense Force Concept provided the intellectual foundations for the
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976, which was Japan’s first
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comprehensive defense strategy since the end of World War II.96 The 1976 NDPO stated
that the “most appropriate defense goal would seem to be the maintenance of a full
surveillance posture in peace time and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to
the point of limited and small-scale aggression.”97 This shows that the new defense
concept became the core of the state’s defense strategy. The drafters of the NDPO also
tried to make the Japanese public and the opposition parties accept the new concept by
emphasizing that it could be used to restrain the quantitative buildup of the SDF.98
However, the 1976 defense plan also reflected the debate between the proponents
and critics of the rationale behind the Standard Defense Force Concept. First, the debate
was about how to set a limit on Japan’s defense capability. The JDA initially envisioned
the level of defense capability in peacetime as the upper limit of the state’s defense
maintenance. In this respect, Sakata regarded the 1976 NDPO as a means of curbing
Japan’s increase in defense capability.99 Subsequently, however, it became the
predominant opinion that the 1976 defense plan should define the minimum level of the
state’s defense maintenance.100 This change was the outcome of Kubo’s compromise
with the existing criticisms of the new defense concept.101 Second, the drafters of the
1976 defense plan came to emphasize the role of the security commitment of the United
States as a means of coping with a hypothetical large or even full-scale conflict.102 This
emphasis suggests that the 1976 NDPO accepted the criticism that the formulation of
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Japan’s defense posture should consider the possibility of a drastic change in the
international security environment.

2.2.3. The Establishment of the One Percent of GNP Limit to Defense Spending

Throughout the creation of the 1976 NDPO, conflicts between the proponents and
opponents of the Standard Defense Force Concept were resolved through an incremental
process. Given the absence of political leadership in the formulation of the state’s defense
posture, the Japanese decision-making bureaucrats introduced incremental measures to
manage political conflicts because of their willingness to develop a prior consensus on
defense issues instead of risking a bruising political battle.103 One may want to refer to
this distinctive process of defense policy formation to explain the establishment of the
minimalist approach to Japan’s defense posture.104 To explain why this approach initially
emerged as the dominant strategic doctrine, however, the present study argues that one
should examine how the Japanese leadership’s threat assessment affected the decision to
set the scope of the state’s defense posture.
This argument also applies to a study of Japan’s low level of defense spending.
Existing scholarship explains the relatively low expenditure of national wealth on defense
by referring to Japan’s structural features. This perspective focuses on the following two
features to explain the establishment of the longstanding 1 percent of GNP limit on
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defense spending: the existence of strong counter-pressures from the industrial and
societal sectors regarding the state’s establishment of a defense posture, and the relatively
subordinate status of the JDA and other pro-defense forces within the Japanese
policymaking structure.105 The emphasis of these features led to the characterization of
Japan’s defense spending decision-making process as “residual” in the sense that
bureaucratic influence restricts changes in defense spending to an incremental pace.106
This budgetary incrementalism helps to manage conflicts among relevant bureaucrats by
relegating disputes to the budgetary process, enabling the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to
exert a substantial influence on defense spending.107 It also makes it difficult for the
Japanese government to make substantial increases in defense spending, even in the face
of external pressure to increase the state’s security.108
While acknowledging the existing scholarship, the present case study criticizes it for
disregarding the question of why the Japanese government came to establish the one
percent of GNP limit on defense expenditure during the mid-1970s, when Northeast Asia
witnessed the development of détente. Japan’s defense expenditure had remained under
one percent of GNP since it first dipped under that ratio in 1967.109 Then, the ruling party
came to decide, in November of 1976, to limit the state’s defense expenditure to one
percent of GNP.110 The present study argues that the introduction of the principle of the
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one percent limit reflected the Japanese leadership’s security assessment in the face of the
development of détente in the Northeast Asia.
To begin with, Prime Minister Tanaka emphasized the one percent limitation
framework based on Kubo’s assessment that the development of the détente substantially
decreased the security threat to Japan.111 He referred to the framework to deal with the
external and internal concerns regarding the military implications of the rapid economic
growth of Japan. In his talks with the PRC’s premier Zhou Enlai in September of 1972,
which was the first meeting between the two states’ leaders to establish diplomatic
relations, he informed Chou that the limit of Japan’s defense spending would be one
percent of GNP. Chou gave his tacit consent to Tanaka’s commitment to limit the scope
of Japan’s defense buildup. The one percent limit framework was thus used to relieve the
PRC’s concern about the resurgence of Japanese militarism.112 The ruling party also
moved to place a quantitative constraint on the state’s defense spending to offset domestic
criticisms regarding the absence of a clear limit on the state’s defense spending. This led
to the decision on the part of the ruling party, in November of 1976, to limit the state’s
defense expenditure to within one percent of GNP.113
Kubo’s security assessment also affected the JDA’s position regarding the level of
defense spending within the framework of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, which
would run from 1972 through 1976. He argued that the state’s defense budget should
remain less than one percent of GNP. This argument was acknowledged within the JDA.
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However, he had to compromise, considering that the increased costs associated with a
qualitative improvement of the state’s defense capability and the possibility of an
economic downturn could cause defense expenditures to exceed the one percent
ceiling.114 In addition, the JDA contended that setting a limit on the state’s defense
budget of less than one percent of the GNP would be undesirable because Japan would
need to show its intent to increase the security burden to the United States. This led to the
argument that the state’s defense expenditure should be limited to around one percent of
GNP. In comparison, the MOF insisted that the defense budget should remain strictly
within one percent of GNP.115 This suggests that the two agencies reached a consensus
about the necessity of setting a limit on the level of defense expenditure, regardless of
their different approaches.116
It should be noted that the JDA’s position above was substantially different from its
previous position on the level of defense spending. The JDA appealed for an increase in
defense spending to two percent of GNP within the framework of the Third Defense Plan,
which ran from 1967 through 1971. This proposal was opposed by the MOF, the
Economic Planning Agency, and the MITI, which jointly argued that such a high rate of
defense spending would interfere with economic growth and squeeze other budgets. 117
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The MOF also opposed Nakasone’s 1970 proposal that defense expenditure should
increase by over 18 percent a year.118 These intergovernmental controversies show that
there was no consensus about how to set a limit on the level of defense spending.
The establishment of the principle of the one percent of GNP limit on defense
spending, coupled with the introduction of the Standard Defense Force Concept,
prevented any attempt to bring about a major change in the state’s defense posture. The
leadership of Japan did not have an incentive to introduce large-scale domestic drives to
direct national resources toward defense capability build-ups. Consequently, Japan did
not witness any substantial efforts on the part of the government to increase the societal
contribution to national military preparedness during the 1970s, when the development of
détente in Northeast Asia substantially ameliorated the Japanese government’s security
concerns. This was the context in which the US Department of State suggested the
following conclusion: “Since there is no prospect under foreseeable circumstances of
getting through the Diet a substantially larger defense program, the real question is
whether available resources can be spent more effectively.”119



 Ibid., 52.

US Department of State, “Japanese Defense Alternatives,” 3 August 1973, Japan and the United States
1960-1976.

68
2.3. Japan’s Military Policies to Honor the U.S. Strategic Interests

2.3.1. Japan’s Disengagement from Nuclear Weapons Development

The examination of Japan’s security assessment during the 1970s finds that this
regional state’s security concern was not serious. According to the theory of this research,
Japan was supposed to be unwilling to pursue a military policy that would jeopardize the
strategic interests of United States. The present study discusses the Japanese leadership’s
decision to disengage from nuclear weapons development as a case to illustrate the
regional state’s unwillingness to pursue military behaviors against the patron’s strategic
interests.
The foreign policymaking agencies within the Nixon Administration were divided
regarding the scope of Japan’s security efforts in response to the US retrenchment. This
interagency debate became unproductive because of the uncommitted stance shown by
Nixon and Kissinger.120 This situation led to the Nixon Administration’s dilemma
regarding how much it should ask the Japanese government to do in terms of increasing
its military capabilities.121 It was also divided regarding how to prevent Japan from being
remilitarized. The Defense and State Departments commonly emphasized the necessity of
security reassurance to constrain the resurrection of the remilitarization, while Kissinger
and his NSC team sought to balance a resurgent Japan in the balance-of-power system
among the great powers.122
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The internal division regarding how to guide the development of Japan’s defense
posture led to the superpower’s ambiguity toward Japan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
This ambiguity came from the conflict between the necessity of constraining the
resurgence of Japan as a great military power and the Nixon administration’s
encouragement of Japan’s nuclear weapons development. On the one hand, the Nixon
Administration reached the conclusion that Japan’s reemergence as a great military power
was not in America’s interests.123 This conclusion led to the suggestion that the US
policy stance should be “to encourage and support moderate increase and qualitative
improvements in Japan’s defense forces but to avoid pressure for substantially larger
forces or a larger regional security role for Japan.”124 On the other hand, the Nixon
Administration indeed encouraged Japan’s nuclear weapons development because of its
belief that nuclear capability would make Japan assume greater responsibility for its own
and regional defense.125 Throughout the negotiation over the reversion of Okinawa to
Japan, Nixon broadly hinted that the US would understand if Japan decided to go
nuclear.126 In addition, the impending SALT 1 agreement was a chance to include Japan’s
nuclear role in the US strategy in East Asia because the treaty could lead to a reduced US
nuclear posture in East Asia.127


Policy,” 54-6.
123
Komine, “The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 498.
124
US Department of State, “Japanese Defense Alternatives,” 3 August 1973, Japan and the United States
1960-1976.

 Schaller, Altered States, 213.

 Ibid., 218.

 Selig S. Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons.” in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate
and East Asian Security, ed. Selig Harrison S (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1996), 14-6.

70
The ambiguous stance toward Japan’s nuclear weapons development was coupled
with the controversy within Japan regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Because of its human resources and financial and technical capability to develop nuclear
weapons, Japan was one of the main targets for control by the NPT, which was concluded
in June of 1968.128 There also was the emergence of the pacifist opposition to the
presence of the US nuclear weapons on the island of Okinawa. The pacifists’ tactics were
successful in mobilizing the Japanese public opposition to the presence of nuclear
weapons within its territory. It was in a political context in which Premier Sato decided to
participate in the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. The Sato Cabinet signed the NPT in
1970, but this was followed by a domestic controversy over whether Japan should ratify
the NPT. This controversy mainly occurred because the Japanese government found it
difficult to secure a national consensus; all key players in the Japanese political system
were reluctant to tie Japan to the treaty’s restrictions without having a clear idea of its
implications for the security of Japan.129
The controversy over the ratification of the NPT suggested that there was a claim to
keep the option of developing nuclear weapons capability open. This claim was driven by
skepticism regarding the patron’s reliability as a security provider. As the US Department
of State assessed, there was skepticism regarding the credibility of the US nuclear shield
and its overall level of security commitment.130 It stimulated the nationalist claim that
Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons because the patron’s nuclear umbrella
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would not fully guarantee the security of Japan.131 Prime Minister Sato himself
demonstrated a personal interest in the state’s possession of nuclear force in response to
China’s atomic and thermonuclear weapons tests in 1964 and 1966.132 This suggested
that Japan’s ambitions for nuclear weapons arose from its fear of China’s nuclear
capabilities. The fear of China’s nuclear threats, however, did not lead to the development
of Japan’s nuclear weapons capability, because the Johnson Administration made a
repeated commitment to extended deterrence.133 Still, the Nixon Administration’s
retrenchment revitalized the Japanese leadership’s passion for the development of nuclear
weapons capability. It kept the nuclear option alive by emphasizing the necessity of
possessing tactical nuclear weapons for defense purposes. The white paper published in
1971, for example, declared as follows: “As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be
possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear
weapons without violating the Constitution.” Prime Minister Tanaka’s remark in March
of 1973 similarly suggested that “while we are not able to have offensive nuclear
weapons, it is not a question of saying that we will have no nuclear weapons at all.”134
Even Kubo, the architect of Japan’s minimalist defense posture during the 1970s,
underscored his regard for Japan’s latent capability to develop nuclear weapons as
leverage with which to persuade the United States to maintain its commitment to the
defense of Japan.135
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Despite its capability and the existence of a motive to go nuclear, the Japanese
government finally ratified the NPT in April of 1976 to ensure that Japan would avoid
nuclear armament. To be sure, this decision served to honor the US strategy to sustain
détente in Northeast Asia. Japan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons had the potential to trigger
an indefinite arms race between Japan and the PRC, resulting in the deterioration of the
stability in Northeast Asia.136 Furthermore, a nuclear Japan would be perceived as a
serious threat by other neighboring states in East Asia.137 Acknowledging that China
would not tolerate Japan’s development of nuclear weapons, the Nixon Administration
came to emphasize that the presence of US forces in Japan would contain Japan’s nuclear
weapons development.138 Japan’s ratification of the NPT also reaffirmed its dependence
on the extended deterrence of the United States. As a US Congressional report in 1977
pointed out, Japan’s avoidance of nuclear weapons development was “consistent with the
fundamental U.S. policy premise that major Japanese rearmament, such as the acquisition
of independent nuclear capability, would not be in the best interests of either Japan or the
United States.”139

2.3.2. Enhancement of Security Cooperation between the US and Japan

The rationale behind the establishment of Japan’s minimalist defense posture was
that the state’s Self-Defense Force could cope with a small-scale limited conventional
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attack, whereas the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty could cope with a larger scale
attack.140 In other words, Japan would need the US’s military assistance, and Japan
would only maintain a minimum force appropriate for the peaceful situation of the
détente. This suggests that the Japanese government needed to prevent the patron from
weakening its security commitment. In addition, there was the Japanese leadership’s
belief that the US military presence in Japan itself could be reduced as détente would
proceed and succeed.141 Furthermore, there was the concern about the reliability of its
patron’s commitment, even though Japan’s overall security concerns came to be
substantially lessened by the development of détente in Northeast Asia.142 In this respect,
Japan needed to prevent the patron from weakening its security assistance by developing
the state’s defense posture in its favored direction. The present study discusses the
Japanese government’s movement to institutionalize defense cooperation with the United
States as the regional ally’s deferential behavior to maintain its security ties to the United
States.
The core idea of the National Defense Program Outline in 1976 was to articulate
Japan’s military role in the alliance with the United States and to develop the desired
level of Japan’s indigenous defense capabilities to maintain and enhance the credibility of
the alliance.143 The two allies also reached an agreement, in 1975, to create a task-force
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to discuss their joint military operations. This agreement ultimately led to the adoption of
the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the two allies in November of 1978. The
Defense Guidelines went further than the 1976 NDPO in emphasizing Japan’s military
role in the alliance, articulating in detail the division of missions and roles between the
SDF and the US military.144 Thus military cooperation with the United States became
central to Japan’s stance on its defense policy.
The movement to formalize defense cooperation with the United States reaffirmed
Japan’s dependence on the patron’s security commitment.145 To be sure, it was consistent
with the necessity of the United States articulating the roles of the forces of the two allies.
A group of policymakers in Washington had suggested that the two allies should establish
the principle of shared responsibilities in the defense of Japan, encouraging Japan to
assume a greater degree of defense burden.146 This led to the articulation of the principle
of complementarity and a functional division of responsibilities between the two allies’
military forces.147 Washington expected that the establishment of this principle would
serve to maintain the long-term stability of the US-Japan alliance because it would reduce
the feelings of resentment toward the US military presence in Japan and help to reassure
other nations in East Asia that Japan would not intend to develop a destabilizing longrange military capability.148
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One may characterize the Japanese government’s movement as the regional ally’s
strategy to buck-pass to the United States. According to this perspective, the low-level
security concerns led Japan to prefer relying on its patron’s military support as opposed to
other costly alternatives to enhance the state’s security.149 The absence of domestic
antimilitarist sentiment during the 1970s may be another factor to explain the Japanese
government’s movement.150 These perspectives, however, do not discuss the strategic
motive behind the Japanese leadership’s movement. This case study argues for the
existence of a causal link between Japan’s security assessment and its movement to
institutionalize defense cooperation with the United States.151 This argument helps to
explain why Japan came to articulate its military role in the alliance, which had the
potential to provoke domestic antimilitaristic sentiment.

2.4. Realism, Constructivism and Japan’s Security-Seeking Behaviors

Japan’s posture to security has been a puzzle, which is not well explained by
exclusively relying on any single theory. This suggests that Japan’s security-seeking
behaviors are not shaped solely by its relative power, interest, normative structure, or
state structure but by their combination.152 In dealing with this complexity, Katzenstein
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and Okawara introduce the notion of “analytical eclecticism” into the study of Japan’s
security policy. This research strategy “aims to construct original causal modules that
reflect the complexity and messiness of particular problems in international life. It does
so by lifting analytical elements from multiple research traditions and allowing for the
recognition of causal mechanism not anticipated in the analytical frameworks of those
traditions.”153
The notion of analytical eclecticism helps the discussion of the present case study of
Japan against the existing scholarship of Japan’s security policy. In doing so, this section
draws on three groups of existing scholarship: namely, offensive realist, defensive realist,
and constructivist schools. This leads to the determination of the relative strength and
weakness of each approach in the explanation of Japan’s security-seeking international
and domestic behaviors during the 1970s.
To begin with, offensive realism posits that the severity of the security dilemma
under anarchy causes a state to seek maximization of relative power as a default
strategy.154 The offensive realist school claims that Japan will inevitably emerge as a
great power, acquiring massive military capabilities, including nuclear arsenals, as any
other economic superpowers are likely to do.155 Accordingly, this approach suggests
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Japan was supposed to introduce a huge-scale security-promoting domestic drive in order
to establish an assertive security policy in response to the US strategic posture in East
Asia.
This chapter finds that offensive realism does not explain Japan’s security-seeking
behaviors during the 1970s. There was a good chance of Japan’s more self-assertive
posture to security if Nakasone’s campaign had been implemented as it stood. However,
it could not sustain the political momentum it had built. Rather, the Japanese leadership
established a minimalist defense posture. In addition, the Japanese leadership voluntarily
disengaged from nuclear weapons development even under domestic and international
incentives to go nuclear.
Rather the case study supports the constructive school that has established “an
invincible case that Japan is in fact an anomaly to realism.”156 The constructivist studies
emphasize the following two factors at the domestic level: antimilitarism and the
structure of decision-making process surrounding Japan’s security policy. On the one
hand, the constructivist approach argues that Japan’s security policy is formulated within
decision-making process that “bias policy strongly against a forceful articulation of
military security objectives.”157 Accordingly, the state structure has made it virtually
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impossible “for an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in
Japan.”158 On the one hand, another group of studies emphasizes the normative context
in which the Japanese leadership has developed the state’s security policy. According to
this group, Japan’s military policy “has been – will continue to be – highly constrained by
antimilitarist norms,” which have been established legally and socially.159
The present case study lends support to the constructive argument that the
institutional features of Japan’s decision-making process have shaped Japan’s minimalist
defense posture. The establishment of the one percent of GNP limit on defense
expenditure was done through an informal interministerial coordination, which was an
“institutional expression of the notion that any important defense policy proposal must go
through an especially cautious consensus-building process in which virtually all relevant
ministries participate.”160 The case study finds that what was inherent in interministerial
coordination process was “a strong bias against any military interpretation of Japan’s
national security requirements.”161 The institutional feature made it virtually impossible
for the Japanese leadership to make substantial increases in defense spending.
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But the case study does not support the constructive school’s argument that the
development of Japan’s security policy has been not so much for coping with external
threats as for domestic institutional constraints. Rather, it suggests that a study of Japan’s
security policy should first consider how the Japanese leadership’s security assessment
affects the policy preference of the state.162 In addition, the case study identifies the
primary role of the Prime Minister and JDA in the formulation of Japan’s defense posture
during the 1970s. In this respect, the case study finds evidence that challenges the
constructivist characterization of the Japanese decision-making structure as the absence
of centralized decision-making process.163
According to the constructive school, the formulation of Japan’s defense posture in
the 1970s was highly constrained by anti-militarist norms. To be sure, the Japanese
leadership’s security assessment was similar to the mass public’s belief that “the status
quo of minimal SDF armament combined with perceptions of low external threat and the
U.S. alliance had worked well for Japan’s defense.”164 Thus it did not introduce any
dramatic departure from the mass public’s favor of a passive stance on security policy,
the status quo of minimal armament of the SDF, and minimal defense spending.165 But
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the establishment of the minimalist defense posture was not so much a result of the
constraining effect of the anti-militarist norms as a result of the leadership’s perception of
security.
Public opinion on the enhancement of the security cooperation between Japan and
the United States is another case to test the constructivist argument that the formulation
of Japan’s defense posture has been highly constrained by anti-militarist norms. Japan
articulated its military role in the US-Japan alliance, which had the potential to provoke
domestic antimilitaristic sentiment. But the case study does not find the existence of
domestic opposition to the government’s movement. Rather, consideration of the fear of
entrapment, which is a realist factor, helps to explain this anomaly to constructivism.166
Criticism of the offensive realist and the constructivist schools has led a group of
studies to suggest a defensive realist approach to Japan’s security policy. On the one
hand, this approach criticizes the constructivist school for glossing over the security
dilemma which Japan directly faces and for painting “a distorted picture of Japanese
security policy as if this core area of national interest hardly existed.” On the other hand,
the defensive realist school criticizes the offensive realist argument about the inevitability
of Japan’s reemergence as a great military power under the severity of security
dilemma.167 These criticisms lead the defensive realist studies to take a relatively
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optimistic view of the security dilemma Japan faces in the Northeast Asia. This leads to
the prediction that Japan will make a moderate attempt to secure itself.168
The case study lends support to the defensive realist argument about Japan’s security
dilemma.169 Throughout the Sino-American rapprochement process, Washington and
Beijing came to an agreement about the US military presence in Japan as a brake on the
resurrection of Japan’s military expansion. This suggests that Beijing was less concerned
about the reemergence of Japanese militarism. In addition, Beijing’s agreement to the US
military presence in Japan suggests that the Japanese leadership recognized the PRC as a
status-quo power in the Northeast Asia. As a result, the security dilemma between Japan
and the PRC was substantially mitigated.170
The case study also supports the defensive realist argument that the Japanese
government has tried to mitigate the misgiving of its Asian neighbors about Japan’s
assertive military posture.171 First, the case study finds that most political leaders of the
ruling party did not support Nakasone’s campaign for autonomous defense posture
because of the concern about misgivings of neighboring countries. Second, the Japanese
leadership believed that the creation of a standard defense force “would lessen to a degree
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the concern in the rest of Asia that Japan [would] again become militaristic.”172 Third,
the Japanese government enhanced its security cooperation with the United States instead
of establishing an assertive defense posture.
The case study also finds that the Japanese government moved to institutionalize
defense cooperation with the United States. From a defensive realist perspective, the
movement can be characterized as the strategy to buck-pass to the United States.173 But
the case study alternatively focuses on the security motive behind the movement. It
argues that Japan needed to prevent the patron from weakening its security assistance. In
this respect, the Japanese government’s movement can be characterized as the regional
ally’s deferential behavior to maintain its security ties to the United States. This argument
helps to explain why Japan came to articulate its military role in the alliance, which had
the potential to provoke domestic antimilitaristic sentiment.

2.5. Chapter Conclusion

This research theorizes that there is co-variation between the level of a state’s
security concern and the scope of its drives to increase domestic contribution to an
autonomous defense capability. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the less negatively a
regional state estimates the security implications of the security guarantor’s strategic
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posture, the less it will be willing to increase the security burden on domestic society. The
present research also theorizes that there exists co-variation between the level the level of
a regional state’s security concerns and the level of its willingness to pursue a military
policy against the patron’s strategic interests. This leads to the hypothesis that the less
negatively a regional state estimates the patron’s retrenchment, the less willing it is to
engage in a military policy that is against the security guarantor’s strategic interests. The
present chapter tests the two hypotheses against Japan’s security-seeking behaviors
during the 1970s.
Regarding Japan’s security concerns, the case study finds that the Japanese
leadership was indeed anxious over the US reliability as a result of the Nixon
administration’s abrupt and non-consultative manner in the military retrenchment. In
addition, Washington’s sudden shift in the US policy toward China led to the erosion of
the patron’s reliability. Japan was particularly concerned about how its interests would be
discussed during negotiations between the United States and China. The Nixon
administration’s new China policy also made Japan criticize the patron for its disregard
for its obligations to its allies.
The anxiety over US reliability, however, did not foster rampant security concern.
Rather Japan’s security concerns were substantially ameliorated because of the following
factors. To begin with, the US military retrenchment in Vietnam decreased the potential
for Japan’s entrapment in the Vietnam War. This mitigated the Japanese anxiety regarding
the security environment. Second, the development of détente in the Korean peninsula
ameliorated Japan’s security concern. Japan’s anxiety over the US reliability was also
mitigated by Washington’s assurances that it would maintain its security commitment to
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Korea. Fourth, Japan’s threat perception was substantially mollified as it came to regard
the Sino-American rapprochement as a cornerstone in establishing stability in Northeast
Asia. More important to the mollification of Japan’s security concerns was the agreement
between Washington and Beijing about the role of the US military presence in Japan in
the stability in Northeast Asia. Japan’s advancement of relations toward China was a final
factor contributing to the amelioration of Japan’s security concerns.
The case study finds that the Japanese concern about the reliability of the US
reliability led to a campaign to prioritize the establishment of the state’s autonomous
defense capabilities. Then the Japanese leadership came to the conclusion that Japan was
virtually secure under the development of détente in the Northeast Asia. According to the
theory of this research, Japan was hypothesized to restrain itself from introducing
domestic drives to promote societal contribution to an autonomous defense capability.
The case study suggests two findings to support this hypothesis.
First, the development of détente made Japanese policymakers conclude that Japan’s
defense posture should be established based upon lowering the assumed level of threat
from a large-scale limited attack to a hypothetical conflict of limited scale. This led to the
establishment of the Standard Defense Force Concept, which proposed the creation of a
standard defense force, consisting of a relatively small, modern, well-equipped, and
highly professional military force. This concept represents the Japanese leadership’s
decision to set a limit on the state’s defense capability. Second, the Japanese leadership’s
security assessment led to the establishment of the one percent of GNP limit to the state’s
defense spending. Prime Minister Tanaka took the initiative based upon the assessment
that the development of détente had substantially decreased the security threat to Japan.
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Then the ruling party moved to place a quantitative constraint upon the state’s defense
spending. In addition, the case study finds that there was inter-agency consensus about
the necessity of setting a limit on the level of defense expenditure.
These two movements to set a limit on the state’s defense capability prevented the
Japanese government from attempting to bring about a major change in the state’s
defense posture. This suggests that the Japanese leadership was not committed to
introducing a large-scale domestic drives to promote domestic contribution to an
autonomous defense capability. The leadership’s unwillingness was coupled with the
US policy stance to avoid pressure for a substantially large military capability or a larger
regional security role for Japan. As a result, the Japanese leadership established a
minimalist defense posture.
According to the theory of this research, it is also hypothesized that Japan was not
committed to the pursuit of military policies against the US strategic interests. This
suggests that Japan was supposed to maintain a deferential military policy toward the US
as a default strategy. The case study suggests two findings to support this argument. First,
the Japanese government voluntarily ratified the NPT to ensure that Japan would avoid
nuclear armament, despite its capability and the existence of a motive to go nuclear. This
served to honor the US strategy to sustain détente in Northeast Asia. Second, Japan
institutionalized defense cooperation with the United States to maintain its security ties to
the patron. This movement was consistent with the necessity of the United States
articulating the roles of the forces of the two allies.
To conclude, what was behind Japan security-seeking behaviors was the Japanese
leadership’s belief that Japan was virtually secure in the international environment.
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During the period of détente, the Japanese leadership came to be confident of the US
security commitment and, at the same time, was confident that the communist China
would not introduce revisionist behaviors. In this respect, Japan was at one end of the
spectrum, if we discuss the level of a state’s security concern as a continuous variable.
The next chapter studies South Korea, which was at the other end of the spectrum.
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CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY OF SOUTH KOREA

3.1. The ROK Leadership’s Perception of Security

3.1.1. Nixon Administration’s Force Withdrawal from South Korea

The Nixon administration’s overall alliance policy was based on the strategy of
Vietnamization. This overarching strategy affected the United States (US) alliance with
the Republic of Korea.1 The background for this study was the conflict between the US
and South Korea in dealing with military provocation by North Korea during January
1968.2 The ROK wanted military retaliation but Washington decided on negotiations
with North Korea, due to concern about the ineffectiveness of military retaliation and the
possibility of escalation into a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.3
The gap between the US and ROK caused the relationship between the allies to
deteriorate. Thus, US president Johnson dispatched former Deputy Secretary of Defense
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Cyrus Vance to the ROK in February 1968 to speak with ROK President Park.4 Vance
assured Park of America’s security commitment and promised US assistance to
modernize ROK’s counter-infiltration and counter-insurgency forces. In return, Park
confirmed that the ROK would not retaliate against North Korea.5 The ROK also urged
the Johnson administration to document its obligation to retaliate against any prospective
provocation by North Korea but Vance opposed the demand, stating that the US would
not officially accept such an obligation.6 Consequently, the two allies announced a joint
communiqué that omitted the US obligation to retaliate against the DPRK.
After his visit to South Korea, Vance recommended a comprehensive review of the
US policy toward the ROK. Accordingly, the US Department of State (DOS) compiled a
study entitled, US Policy toward Korea.7 This study suggested that the new US policy
should follow two strategic alternatives: “Reduce the present degree of US involvement”
and “Temporarily increase our resources input to Korea, helping the ROK to gain as soon
as possible the ability to defend itself successfully against an all-out attack by North
Korean forces alone, with only US logistic support.”8
Based upon this suggestion, Washington discussed how the US would implement the
strengthening and restructuring of the ROK regular forces and a gradual reduction of US
forces from Korea. It needs to be noted that this was the first formal recommendation for
a gradual phased reduction of US ground forces from South Korea. The State Department
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study served as a guideline for the formation of a more formal study group within the
National Security Council (NSC), which was to consider presidential options on
American policy toward the ROK. This NSC study group, however, did not finish its task
by the end of the Johnson administration.9
With the change of administrations, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s Assistant for National
Security, reorganized the NSC. The newly organized NSC included an office conducting
integrated studies of US alliance policy with her regional allies. In February 1969, this
office issued the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 27, which called for the
continuation of the Johnson administration’s Korean study in 1968.10 After the issuance
of the NSSM 27 in February 1969, Kissinger’s NSC team took about a year to decide the
level of US military presence in South Korea. The outcome of this NSC project was the
issuance of the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 48 on March 20,
1970, according to which the Nixon administration decided to withdraw one division
from South Korea – a reduction of 20,000 men.11
According to NSDM 48, the Nixon administration consulted with the ROK
government a number of times after it informed ROK president Park of the decision to
reduce the US military presence in Korea by 20,000 personnel by the end of Fiscal Year
(FY) 1971. On February 6, 1971, the two allies finally gave a joint statement to the press
about withdrawing the US 7th Division from South Korea by the middle of 1971 and the
redeployment of the 2nd Division stationed at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The troop
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 As a result of the withdrawal, about 41000 US troops remained in South Korea by the end of 1971.
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reduction was completed on March 27, 1971. The joint statement, however, does not
suggest that the Nixon administration was able to create “a situation in which US
withdrawals result from President Park’s initiative in view of present ROK strength and
the agreed need for future improvements in ROK forces.”12

3.1.2. ROK’s Security Assessment in Response to the US Force Withdrawal

While the Johnson administration was reassessing its overall alliance policy toward
South Korea, the South Korean government concluded that the US policy toward North
Korea would negatively affect ROK security. This concern came from two factors. First,
the disparity between the US tepid response to the Blue House raid and its immediate
response to the Pueblo Crisis, and the Johnson administration’s negotiations with the
DPRK led the ROK government to believe that US security commitment would be weak
in the face of aggressive North Korean military campaigns.13 Second, the ROK was
concerned that the US appeasement policy would lead North Korea to continue its
military provocation,14 perceiving the prior two incidents of military provocation as part
of the adversary’s larger plan to conquer the ROK.15 The ROK’s response to the Nixon
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administration’s reduction plan was similar to its response to the Johnson administration’s
appeasement toward North Korea.
To begin with, South Korea regarded the Nixon administration’s force reduction
plan as weakening the superpower’s security commitment. ROK President Park took the
reduction as a message that the US would not rescue the ROK if North Korea invaded
again.16 In his meeting with Kissinger on December 2, 1970, ROK Prime Minister Kim
Jong Pil similarly argued that “everyone in Korea understood [US force reductions in
Korea] meant a detachment of the US commitment to support [South] Korea and in effect
the re-establishment of an Asian defense system.”17
The Nixon administration’s decision to redeploy the 2nd Division away from the
DMZ also led South Korea government to believe that the US would weaken its security
commitment. The redeployment meant losing the “trip wire” that would initiate automatic
US involvement in the Korean peninsula.18 The ROK government insisted that it would
simply refuse to deploy ROK forces to replace the 2nd Division along the DMZ, leaving
the most vulnerable route for North Korean attack unprotected. The Nixon
administration, however, regarded the ROK’s resistance as a ploy and paid it little
attention.19
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In addition, the ROK’s lack of confidence in the patron’s commitment stemmed
from the Nixon administration’s mixed signals about the reduction plan. Seoul’s initial
reaction to the Nixon doctrine was that the level of US troops in the ROK would not be
reduced pursuant to the doctrine.20 The ROK government also believed that its military
contribution to the Vietnam War would prevent the Nixon administration from
withdrawing the US forces stationed in South Korea.21 Furthermore, in the summit
between the two allies held in San Francisco on August 21, 1969, Nixon confirmed that
the US would not apply the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea, stating that he rejected the
US domestic proposal to decrease the number of the US forces in the ROK.22 This led to
the general belief in Seoul that the ROK would be exempted from the doctrine.
Nixon’s remark at the San Francisco Summit, however, was followed by mixed
signals from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In his meeting on January 20, 1972 with
ROK ambassador Kim Dong Jo, Laird noted to Kim that “pressures for reduction of our
forces in Korea are increasing,” adding that “[ROK] forces should be modernized before
we withdraw any of our forces.” This remark led the ROK government to prepare for
negotiation with the Nixon administration even though Laird did not say that “any USG
decisions [about the withdrawal of US forces] had been made or that there would be any
immediate US troop withdrawals.”23
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The Nixon administration’s ambiguity and mixed signals about its military
assistance for the modernization of the South Korean forces also led Seoul to be skeptical
of America’s security commitment. The ROK government often explicitly linked the
timing of the withdrawal of US forces to US assistance for the modernization program,
arguing that the level of American military deployment in South Korea should remain
unchanged until the ROK military could be sufficiently modernized to offset the
reduction of US forces.24 Due to the difficulty in obtaining congressional approval for
the desired level of assistance, however, the Nixon administration did not provide the
ROK government with details about the modernization program. It initially planned to
inform the ROK of the limited nature of the modernization program and the necessity to
seek a supplemental plan to meet the ultimate objective of ROK military self-sufficiency.
Kissinger, however, suggested that the US should not inform South Korea, leading the
Nixon administration to express support for the modernization of ROK forces in general
terms, “subject to approval of the Congress to provide a balanced military assistance
program capable of meeting ROK needs.”25 Nixon personally promised to obtain
Congressional approval for providing substantially higher military assistance to
modernize ROK forces from 1971 through 1975. At the same time, however, he also
mentioned significant domestic pressure from the Congress and the public to require US
allies to assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense.26
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These mixed signals and the Nixon administration’s ambiguity about the
modernization program led ROK President Park to ask Ambassador Porter for greater
clarification regarding the “nature and extent of modernization” of ROK military forces.27
Park threatened non-cooperation by stating that no joint planning about the reduction
would be possible “until “a degree of satisfaction” would be achieved in modernization
talks” and the US assurance concerning “[ROK’s] security could be given to Korean
people.”28 The desire for a stronger assurance for security and US clarification of the
modernization program suggests that the ROK became skeptical of the US commitment.
ROK skepticism about US reliability was further deepened by the concern that the
Nixon administration would reduce the US forces in Korea even further.29 This concern
was behind the conflict between the US Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and the ROK
President Park in their meeting in August 1970 to finalize negotiations about the planned
reduction. Agnew suggested the US and ROK publicly announce that they would
negotiate the troop reduction and the modernization of the ROK forces at the same time.
To Park, Agnew’s suggestion implied that the Nixon administration would implement a
further reduction of US forces in the ROK. Thus, he refused this suggestion, requesting
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the Nixon administration’s commitment to announce there would be no further reduction
of the level of remaining US forces. He also made it clear that any future reduction would
be subject to ROK’s veto.30
Because of Park’s resistance, the negotiation in August 1970 ended without any
agreement. As US Secretary of State Rogers had predicted, the ROK request for full prior
consultation was the most controversial point during the US-ROK negotiation of
American troop reduction.31 The US disregard of this request, however, led the ROK
government to set aside its request for the Nixon administration’s assurance against
further military reductions in Korea.
The Nixon administration indeed regarded the modernization of ROK forces as a
precondition to implement further reduction of the US military. According to the NSDM
48, “Further withdrawals of substantial numbers of US personnel beyond the 20,000
personnel decided upon are not now planned, though they may be considered when
substantial ROK forces return from Vietnam or compensating improvements in ROK
forces are well underway.”32 Nixon also directed the DOD to evaluate the feasibility and
timing of further troop reductions in Korea.33 Accordingly, Laird called for the phased
withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea, with the first cut of 20,000 troops to be
followed by another cut several years later.34 The US Embassy in the ROK also
internally studied the possibility of reducing US ground combat forces in the ROK in FY
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1974, and even complete withdrawal of ground combat forces from South Korea in FY
1975-1976.35
However, the Nixon administration did not carry out the phased reduction plan
beyond the reduction in 1971 because neither the US Congress nor the administration
favored further reductions until the US-sponsored program to modernize ROK forces was
completed.36 The notion of a phased reduction, however, was revived with Jimmy
Carter’s campaigning in June 1976, which called for the withdrawal of all of US ground
forces in South Korea “on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after
consultations with both South Korea and Japan.”37 Carter’s plan was not realized
because of outright opposition from the ROK, Japan, and even the US military and
executive branch.38 For the ROK government, however, Carter’s plan was recognized as
the legacy of the Nixon Doctrine.39
The Nixon administration disliked the ROK’s hardline stand against the reduction
plan and its lack of sensitivity to American domestic situations affecting the program to
modernize ROK forces.40 Washington was also frustrated by the ROK government’s
delaying tactic in deploying ROK forces to replace the 2nd Division along the DMZ.41
The ROK government further threatened to replace the 7th Division with ROK troops
from Vietnam, and unilaterally implemented the withdrawal of ROK forces from
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Vietnam.42 Frustrated by this unilateral action, the Nixon administration requested that
South Korea not move suddenly with any announcement or decisions of further
withdrawals from Vietnam.43
The conflict between the two allies suggests that Washington expressed a lack of
understanding of the ROK position. As US ambassador to the ROK William J. Porter put
it, “From our point of view, the Korean [government] seems to lack confidence in US
intentions and our statements, and we do not understand why.”44 The Nixon
administration’s assessment of North Korea’s military threats needs to be discussed to
explain its lack of concern for ROK security.
There was a generally agreed estimate in Washington that North Korea would not
deliberately launch a full-scale military provocation. The CIA, for example, estimated
that “North Korea has no intention of initiating conventional operations against South
Korea in the foreseeable future,” and that “neither the Soviets nor the Chinese
Communists are encouraging such operations.”45 Similarly, the DOS consistently
estimated that “under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South
Korea; nor do we believe that Pyongyang is deliberately trying to provoke the Republic
of Korea into a resumption of major hostilities.”46
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To be sure, the Nixon administration acknowledged that North Korea would
continue its campaign of revolutionary war in South Korea, including “harassment of
ROK and US forces in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and armed infiltration of rear
areas.”47 The CIA, however, estimated that North Korea’s campaign, which was targeted
to create dissonance in South Korea and to discourage US support by generating pressure
on the US to withdraw from South Korea, had not been successful.48 Rather, the US
agency estimated that North Korea’s campaign of revolutionary war in South Korea
ironically solidified South Korean support for President Park and acceptance of his strong
rule.49
CIA also estimated that the military capability of South Korea would be able to
counter North Korea’s provocations. It estimated, for example, “[ROK] has developed a
sophisticated counterinfiltration system, which includes a national coordinating
committee and ancillary operational control centers. The coastal surveillance capabilities
have been markedly improved and they have constituted 20 counter infiltration battalions
backed up by efficient ROK militia. Perhaps the major factor in the ROK effectiveness
has been the dislike of the South Koreans for North Korean regime and the establishment
of strong anti-subversion laws.”50 In addition, it suggested the estimate that the overall
political stability of South Korea, its booming economy and its military strength would
pose “a substantial deterrent to North Korean invasion.”51
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The overall estimate of North Korea’s intentions and military capabilities, coupled
with the US estimate of the ROK’s overall capability vis-à-vis North Korea, led the
Nixon administration to conclude that its reduction policy would not affect the overall
balance of power in the Korean peninsula. As the CIA estimated, “[the] planned
withdrawal of one US Army division from South Korea will not of itself significantly
alter” the military balance between the two Koreas.52 Similarly, the Department of State
suggested the following conclusion: “If the modernization plan for ROK forces is
essentially achieved in terms of equipment, we have no doubt that the bilateral military
stand-off can be maintained.”53
The Nixon administration’s estimate of the North Korean threat, however, was
substantially different from that of South Korean leadership. This made the ROK
government persistently emphasize North Korea’s revisionist purpose in the Korean
peninsula. In his conversation with US Secretary of State William P. Rogers, ROK Prime
Minister Kim Jong Pil emphasized the North Korea’s revisionist purpose as, “[North
Korea] retains the hope of establishing bases, of damaging South Korean industry, of
harassing communication lines, and of compelling the ROKG [ROK government] to thin
out its defenses along the front line. Then, if they are successful in this, the North
Koreans will launch a general attack.”54 To put it simply, the ROK regarded North
Korea’s strategy as “liberating South Korea by Force.”55 President Park, in his
conversation with Nixon in August 1969, emphasized North Korea’s military
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preparedness to unify the two Koreas by force.56 The ROK government justified its
perception of North Korea by emphasizing the impetuosity and fanaticism of North
Korean leader Kim Il Sung.57
Because of its threat perception of North Korea, the ROK was concerned that the US
reduction policy would inevitably lead to North Korea initiating a revisionist war against
South Korea. President Park expressed this concern in his conversation with Nixon in
August 1969, saying “[North Korea] during the past 10 years or so has almost completed
war preparations to unify the country by force. He is looking for an opportunity to invade
the South. He has not done so because of US commitments to the ROK and the presence
of American troops in our country. Kim will provoke a war if he believes that this
American policy toward the ROK is going to change or has changed.”58

3.1.3. ROK’s Security Assessment under Détente in Northeast Asia

While the Nixon administration believed the military balance between the two
Koreas would prevent them from launching deliberate military action against each other,
it came to be concerned that a miscalculation by the two Koreas could lead to a major
military conflict in the area.59 This concern led Washington to discuss how the US would
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stop an independent retaliation by the ROK against a North Korean military
provocation.60
The US concern about possible military conflict in the Korean peninsula suggests
that the military balance between the two Koreas itself was not enough to guarantee
stability. In this respect, the Nixon administration needed to explore how it could ease
tensions between the two Koreas. As the US East Asian Interdepartmental Group’s study
of Korea estimated, détente in the Korean peninsula would prevent military
confrontation, thus decreasing the risk of US entrapment in a Korean war.61 The
establishment of détente between the two Koreas was also considered important to
maintaining the status quo in Northeast Asia, and led the Nixon administration to
recommend that the ROK government establish direct contact with North Korea.
Accordingly, Ambassador Porter recommended the ROK government to establish direct
negotiations with the North Korea on non-political issues, such as postal exchange and
the problem of divided families.62 He also recommended that the Nixon administration
needed “a little more leverage” to lead the ROK government to launch direct negotiations
with North Korea.63
The ROK government showed its own initiative to seek direct negotiation with
North Korea when President Park suggested talks on August 15, 1970. This presidential
speech was followed by the ROK government’s suggestion of Red Cross Talks with


60
Ibid., 59-63.
61
US Department of State, “Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) Korea: FY 1973,” 14 March
1972, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, National Archive.
62
Woo, Race to the Swift, 99-100.
63
US Embassy in Seoul, “Proposal for Increased Display of US Interest in Dialogue between ROK and
North Korea,” 18 February 1971, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, National Archives.

102
North Korea. The direct negotiation between the two Koreas began on August 20, 1971
when representatives of the Red Cross societies of the two Koreas met in Panmunjom for
the first exploratory discussions, which finally led to the public joint statement of the
South-North Communique on July 4, 1972. This statement declared that the two Koreas
had reached full agreement that “Unification shall be achieved through peaceful means,
and not through use of force against one another,” and that “a great national unity, as a
homogenous people, shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies
and systems.” As part of the joint statement, representatives of the two Koreas agreed to
take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military provocations.64 Through closed
prior consultations with the Nixon administration, the ROK government also issued the
6.23 Declaration, which supported the idea of joint membership of the two Koreas in the
United Nations.65
The ROK government’s initiative to launch the inter-Korean dialogues satisfied the
Nixon administration’s goal to ease tension in the Korean peninsula. President Nixon sent
President Park a personal letter with a positive assessment of the ROK’s initiative for the
Red Cross Talks. He expected that these inter-Korean dialogues would lead “in due
course to the development of further communication and exchange with [North
Korea].”66 The development of the inter-Korean dialogue, coupled with the US
rapprochement, also led the US Embassy in Seoul to estimate “the danger of major
hostilities [between the two Koreas] is less now than at any time since the 1953
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Armistice.”67 Similarly, the DOS welcomed the ROK’s 6.23 Declaration in 1973,
expecting that this declaration would lead the two Koreas to introduce a step-by-step
approach toward perpetual peace in the Korean peninsula.68
The development of the inter-Korean dialogues, however, did not change the ROK’s
threat perception of North Korea. Rather, South Korea persistently expressed its concern
about North Korea’s revisionist purpose, even during the détente period for the Korean
peninsula. President Park expressed his concern, saying, “[T]here are no indications of an
imminent attack on the ROK. However, we must always be aware of the Communist
capacity to commit aggression at any time. There may be no indications today but [North
Korea] has the capacity to attack and can pick the time to do so.”69 Similarly, ROK
Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil argued, “North Korea was at a peak in terms of its strength
and preparations for war” and that “[T]he North Koreans were already at a maximum
state of readiness and all they would do would be to redeploy some of their forces in a
more aggressive stance.”70
It should be inevitable that such concern about North Korea’s revisionist strategy led
to ROK’s belief that North Korea would make use of the inter-Korean dialogue for its
revisionist purpose. In this respect, President Park argued that North Korea’s intention
was to make use of the inter-Korean dialogues to realize its “long-term demand that US
forces should withdraw from [South] Korea” and to “try and influence US public opinion
to call for an end of US military aid to South Korea.”71 Similarly, he argued that “North
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Korea is trying to mislead the American public through a false peace offensive, thus
promoting demand for early withdrawal of US forces from Korea and an end to the
(ROK) military modernization program.”72
The Nixon administration criticized ROK’s argument about North Korea’s intention.
Secretary of Defense Laird expressed his criticism, saying, “The existing North Korean
threat is typified on the one hand as large and imminent and on the other hand as
quiescent as long as the ROK displays political and military stability. The ROK contends
that despite existing and prospective political and military stability, the threat is still high.
If the threat is as immediate and intense as the ROK frequently indicates, they could
surely sacrifice more in their behalf.”73 The Department of State agreed, stating, “We
have no knowledge of any immediate plans or preparations by North Korea for any
unusual military operations except exercises. Accordingly … we will have no choice
other than to make clear publicly we do not share [the] ROKG estimate … we find [the]
ROK campaign out of step with efforts to relax tensions in Asia, and a possible invitation
to Pyongyang for adventurism or miscalculation.”74
South Korea’s concern about North Korea’s revisionist purpose was coupled with its
belief that the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) would negatively affect ROK security. The news of Nixon’s opening to the PRC
inevitably raised new doubts about the reliability of America’s security commitment,
because the rapprochement implied “US acceptance of a hostile, powerful and


72
Ibid., 359-60.
73
Ibid., 262.
74
Ibid., 296.

105
revolutionary country in South Korea’s immediate neighborhood, tied by a military
alliance to North Korea.”75 The ROK government was worried that the Nixon
administration’s China policy would adversely affect the security of South Korea.76
Thus, the ROK leaders insisted that there should be neither discussion nor decision taken
regarding South Korea by the Nixon administration without consultation with the ROK
government.77
In particular, the ROK was worried that the rapprochement between the US and
PRC would lead to further removal of US forces from Korea, since the PRC had already
spoken to Western reporters about “the US getting out of Korea and the abrogation of the
US–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.”78 The PRC’s concern about the remilitarization of
Japan led it to propose that the US should gradually withdraw its forces from South
Korea. Kissinger responded to the PRC’s request, saying, “If the relationships between
our countries develop as they might, after the Indochina war ends and the ROK troops
return to Korea, I would think it quite conceivable that before the end of the next term of
President Nixon, most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea.”79
Kissinger’s response suggests that the Nixon administration regarded the détente between
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the US and PRC as a precondition to implement further reduction of the US forces in
South Korea.

3.2. The ROK Leadership’s Security-Promoting Domestic Drives

3.2.1. The ROK Initiatives to Increase Indigenous Military Capabilities

The documentation of the nature of the ROK leadership’s security concern shows
that the leadership’s assessment of North Korea’s threats was filtered through its
perception of the US reliability as a security provider. The leadership experienced high
levels of threat from the adversary and this threat perception was magnified by its
skepticism of the superpower’s security commitment to South Korea. Consequently, the
level of the leadership’s security concern was substantially high. This made the ROK
leadership prioritize the state’s military capability for self-defense.
President Park introduced the notion of self-defense after the US withdrew the 7th
Division from South Korea. In his January 1970 New Year’s address, for example, he
argued that the ROK should maintain the military capability to defend itself alone against
an all-out attack by North Korean forces. Similarly, in his 1971 New Year’s address, Park
emphasized the ROK’s preparedness for self-defense as the only way to deal with the
security crisis caused by the US strategic posture in Northeast Asia. He argued that the
state’s self-defense capability would be contingent upon the South Korean people’s
willingness to achieve a great national unity. In addition, the president’s New Year’s
address in 1972 emphasized the necessity of promoting the state’s industrial base to
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support military capability and self-defense.80 The rapprochement between the US and
PRC also evidently led Park to emphasize the necessity of self-defense, stating, “We
cannot let our vigilance down at the reemergence of Big Power politics. Just as an
individual must protect himself, so a nation must consider security and survival as
indispensable. When a nation’s survival is at stake, politics, economy, culture, everything
should be organized and mobilized for that single purpose.”81
The ROK government’s efforts to develop weapons production began with the
president’s direction in August 1970 to establish the Agency for Defense Development
(ADD) and the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC), around the time when the US
and ROK negotiated the reduction of the US Forces in South Korea.82 The ADD openly
developed military weapons, equipment and materials and assisted in the development of
defense-related technology. On the other hand, the WEC was a covert governmental
committee responsible for weapons production and procurement.83 These two
governmental agencies took the primary role in developing weapons production
capability during the 1970s. Park also appointed Oh Wŏnch'ŏl as the head of the Second
Economic Secretariat (SES) and assigned him the task of creating a blueprint for
developing the state’s weapons production capacity. As chief of the SES, Oh’s tasks
included developing skilled manpower, missile capability and nuclear weapons, as well
as re-planning the development of national land and modernizing the ROK military.84
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On November 11, 1971, Park directed Oh to immediately organize weapons
production to arm 20 divisions of the ROK Homeland Guard with light weapons. He
planned the light weapons development program, which the ADD began to implement
under the code name, “Lightening Operation.” On December 16, 1971, the ADD
completed the production of eight types of light weapons, including M1 carbines, M19
guns, A4 machine guns and 60mm trench mortars. The trial demonstration of these
weapons was conducted on April 3, 1972, only five months after the president’s
direction.85 A presidential directive to produce 105mm cannons for the armament of
Korean regular forces immediately followed the demonstration, so the ADD developed
and demonstrated a trial version of the cannon.86
The presidential guidance was apparently the driving force behind establishing an
indigenous capacity to produce various required conventional weapons. Park directed his
chief of staff, Kim Chŏngnyŏm, to deliver his order to both the chief of the ADD and the
Minister of Defense so they would begin the production of light weapons immediately,
ordering Kim to tell the two agencies, “It’s a Presidential Direction.”87 The president’s
initiative led the ADD to make all-out efforts for weapons production. Park also needed
to deal with skepticism from the Department of Defense about the ROK’s indigenous
weapons production capacity. The DOD did not believe the ROK had the capacity to
produce high-quality weapons for immediate use, and suggested that the ROK should
depend on US military assistance for the production of required weapons.88 To overcome
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this skepticism, Park assigned Oh and his Blue House secretaries in the Second Economic
Secretariat primary responsibility for planning the weapons production program and
allowed the DOD only a secondary role in developing the state’s weapons production
capability during the 1970s.89
Despite the efforts to produce Korean-made conventional weapons, technological
hurdles made it difficult for the ADD to produce the required light weapons and 105mm
cannons. The ADD did not secure enough engineers and skilled workers to produce these
weapons by the time Park decided to launch the weapons production programs. Neither
did it have enough data and information to implement the weapons production.
Furthermore, South Korean industry could only precisely manufacture items to one-tenth
of a millimeter, which was not sufficient to manufacture weapons.90
This suggests that the ROK government needed US military assistance to develop
her indigenous capacity for large-scale weapons production. Through the trial
demonstration of its Korean-made weapons, the ROK was able to convince the Nixon
administration to assist the ROK’s weapons production. The US consequently provided
the ROK with technological advisers and technical plans for conventional weapons
production.91
But it should be noted that the US also sought to control the development of the
ROK’s indigenous weapons production capacity in return for its assistance in the process.
The Department of State and US Embassy in Seoul were concerned that the ROK’s
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initiative for weapons production may have the potential to provoke North Korea, thus
negatively affecting the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with the PRC.92 In this
respect, the DOS and DOD suggested that US military assistance should focus on
promoting the ROK’s capacity to produce defensive weapons.93 The Nixon
administration also tried to secure leverage to control the development of the ROK’s
weapons production program. Accordingly, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense William
P. Clement, in the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in September 1973, urged the
ROK to “consider the desirability of developing joint endeavors which bring together
American industrial technology with Korean industry to develop an industrial base
capable of supporting Korea’s defense requirement.”94

3.2.2. Military Expenditure and Taxation for Autonomous Defense Capability

Identification of the nature and patterns of ROK defense spending during the 1970s
helps to determine how the leadership of South Korea secured financial support from
domestic society for the state’s military preparedness. According to Table 3-1, the relative
weight of ROK defense spending to the state’s Gross National Product (GNP) from 1970
through 1979 is 4.75% on average, with the lowest level being 3.2% in 1974 and the
highest level being 6.6% in 1979. Intuitively speaking, this indicates that ROK defense
spending constituted an important portion of the national economy of South Korea. The
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relative weight of defense spending to the state’s public expenditure shows a steady
increase during the 1970s, from 23.2% in 1970 to 30.8% in 1979. This shows the ROK
government’s commitment to secure a financial base for the for the state’s military
capability overall.

Table 3-1. Defense Spending in South Korea, 1969-198095
Year

GNP

Defense Spending

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

7.4
8.2
10.0
9.7
12.6
17.5
18.4
24.0
31.5
46.0
48.3
69.3

0.298
0.333
0.411
0.428
0.475
0.558
0.719
1.500
1.800
2.600
3.181
3.460

% of
GNP
4.0
3.9
4.1
4.4
3.8
3.2
3.9
6.3
5.7
5.6
6.6
5.7

% of
Public Expenditure
22.8
23.2
24.6
24.8
28.0
29.3
28.8
32.9
34.7
37.0
30.8
35.6

The pattern of South Korea’s defense spending during the 1970s was related to
declining US military aid.96 The ratio of US aid to the ROK’s total defense spending
dropped from 56.2% to 14.3% from 1969 to 1974. Beginning in 1972, US military
assistance was replaced by military loans, but the amount of the loans accounted for less
than 10 percent of the total defense expenditure of South Korea. The US completely
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phased out its military assistance by 1978 and continued to decrease the amount of the
military loans. This fostered the ROK leadership to establish a domestic financial base to
support the state’s military capability.
South Korea’s defense spending doubled from $719 million in 1975 to $1.5 billion
in 1976, and its share of the state’s GNP rose from 3.9 percent to 6.3 percent. This sharp
increase can be explained by the ROK government’s efforts to secure a revenue base for
its Force Improvement Plan. To finance this plan, the ROK government initially raised a
total of 16.13 billion South Korean won (approximately $32 million in US dollars)
between 1974 and 1975 through mass media campaign. In July 1975, the government
introduced a compulsory National Defense Tax as the new revenue base for the plan.97
This enabled the ROK government to spend about six percent of the state’s GNP annually
on the Force Improvement Plan since 1976. With the introduction of the National
Defense Tax, the ROK government set the goal of surpassing North Korea’s defense
expenditure by 1976.98 The gap began to considerably narrow as South Korea sharply
increased its defense expenditure, and South Korea has surpassed North Korea on
defense expenditure since 1977.99
It is clear that the ROK government’s commitment to financially support the Force
Improvement Plan was the result of declining financial assistance from the United States
from 1971 through 1975. The two allies’ approaches toward this program show the
“continuing discrepancy between United States and Korean perceptions of the military
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needs of the Republic of Korea.”100 The ROK indicated that $200 million of military
assistance per year from 1971 through 1975 would be required to bring its forces to a
state “at which genuine modernization could begin,” and that substantial help from the
Nixon administration is required in establishing ROK’s defense industries.101 In addition,
the ROK demanded that the modernization program should increase its capability to deal
with North Korea’s infiltration and guerilla strategy.102 In the end, the ROK government
suggested that $3-4 million would be required to modernize ROK forces from 1971
through 1975.103 The Nixon administration, however, planned to spend only $1.5 Billion
for the modernization plan, far less than requested.104
For the following two reasons, the Nixon administration even found it hard to obtain
congressional approval of the $1.5 billion for modernizing ROK forces. First, the
congress was demanding that US allies assume a greater share of responsibility for their
own defense, so there was no guarantee that the congress would approve the requested
funds.105 Considering this pressure, the Nixon administration estimated that the ROK’s
modernization program “would be limited largely to [ROK] ground forces,” thus
requiring additional money to provide a reasonable level of modernization of ROK naval
and air forces.106 Second, the congress regarded the program as part of the US annual
security assistance program, not as a five-year package.107 This meant that congressional
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approval would be affected by US domestic political currents in any given year. From
1972 through 1975, the actual amounts of modernization funds approved by the congress
were indeed less than the amounts requested by the Nixon administration. Consequently,
the US fulfilled the modernization program two years after the scheduled completion
year.108
Table 3-2 presents the structure of South Korea’s military expenditures during the
1970s by appropriation categories. This table shows that expenditures related to the
purchase of military equipment accounted for only 10.1 percent of the total defense
spending in 1970. That percentage increased significantly to 18.1 percent in 1975, and
28.1 percent in 1976. The phase-out of US military assistance and the ROK government’s
efforts to catch up with North Korea’s military capability were largely responsible for the
heavy investment in this category since the mid-1970s. In addition, the ROK government
allocated a noticeable share of the defense budget to investment in research and
development since 1971 to increase the state’s self-reliant military capability through
defense industrialization.109
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Table 3-2. ROK Military Expenditure by Appropriation Category, 1970-1979110
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Military
Personnel
69,073
(67.5)
81,825
(60.7)
96.987
(55.9)
108,131
(58.9)
144.107
(48.6)
208,720
(47.2)
298.920
(42.5)
393,301
(41.4)
483,557
(37.5)
591,828
(38.8)

Maintenance
22,968
(22.4)
38,217
(28.4)
55,500
(32.0)
60,391
(32.9)
123,153
(41.4)
141,169
(31.9)
170,975
(24.3)
234,943
(24.7)
336,539
(26.1)
451.776
(29.6)

R&D

341
(0.2)
2,054
(1.1)
2,137
(1.1)
8,234
(2.8)
12,726
(2.9)
36,035
(5.1)
36,224
(3.8)
30,878
(2.4)
45,389
(3.0)

Purchase of
Military Equipment
10,295
(10.1)
14,365
(10.7)
19,097
(11.0)
12,971
(7.1)
21,348
(7.2)
79,854
(18.1)
197,818
(28.1)
285,165
(30.0)
438,397
(34.0)
436,868
(28.6)

Total
102,336
134,748
173,638
183,630
296,842
442,469
703,748
949,633
1,289,353
1,525,861

3.2.3. The Development of Heavy Industrialization in South Korea

The ROK leadership’s all-out efforts to establish the military industrial base began
immediately after North Korea’s abduction of a South Korean patrol boat in early June
1970.111 President Park issued a directive to build the defense industry, and Deputy
Prime Minister Kim Hakryŏl proposed constructing core industries to establish the
required industrial base.112 The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was tasked with
financially supporting this project, and conducted negotiations over 15 months with
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Japan, the United States and various European countries to secure foreign loans. All of
these nations, however, were skeptical of the ROK government’s ability to implement the
industrialization project, so the EPB was not able to raise the required capital.113
This desperate situation ironically led to the most extraordinary development of the
ROK’s military industrial infrastructure during the 1970s. After the project to construct
the four core industries became bogged down, the ROK government needed to find
alternatives. Oh Wŏnch'ŏl, then assistant vice minister in the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, proposed to Kim Chŏngnyŏm, President Park’s chief of staff, his ideas about the
state’s defense industry.114 Impressed by Oh’s idea, Kim immediately let Oh meet with
the president. In the meeting on November 10, 1971, Oh explained to Park his ideas of
“choosing the most prominent private manufacturing companies currently available, and
assigning them to manufacture either weapon parts or specified quantities,” and that
development of the state’s defense industry should be “managed within the framework of
heavy and chemical industry development.”115
His idea was so persuasive that Park appointed him as his senior economic secretary
in the Second Economic Secretariat (SES) in the Blue House. Park’s appointment of Oh
as head of the SES was the beginning of what was to become the ROK’s heavy and
economic industry (HCI) triumvirate, which referred to the combined roles of President
Park, Kim Chŏngnyŏm, and Oh Wŏnch'ŏl in the management of the HCI program. This
combined role was crucial to providing the three ingredients essential for developing the
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defense industry and implementing the HCI program: Park’s strong leadership, Kim’s
expertise in economic management, and Oh’s industrial vision.116 The HCI triumvirate
was the driving force behind promoting the state’s industrial base for defense capability.
The defense industry program took a giant leap forward when Park declared the HCI
Plan as the top priority of the state. This declaration was based upon the HCI
triumvirate’s conclusion that the state’s defense industry should be based upon the
production systems of big business, and promotion of the ROK defense industry would
be managed as an “integral part of heavy and chemical industrialization.”117 To put it
simply, the triumvirate recognized that development of the state’s defense industry would
be impossible without the infrastructure of heavy and chemical industries. The
inseparability of the defense industry from the HCI plan was emphasized during the
meeting on January 31, 1973, in which President Park maneuvered his cabinet minister to
approve the plan.118
Oh’s industrial vision brought a fundamental shift from Park’s reliance on the
economists of the EPB to a reliance on technocrats of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry (MCI), as well as the Presidential Economic Secretariat.119 The Economic
Secretariat at the Blue House became firmly ensconced as a critical decision-making
body for the formulation and implementation of policies relating to the HCI plan,
bypassing and sometimes dictating to the EPB and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).120
The presidential initiative helped to overcome EPB objections to the state’s intrusive
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control over the development of industry and the MOF’s concern about the loss of
monetary policy as a result of the big-push for the HCI plan.121 This suggests that Park
was willing to push for the HCI plan even at the cost of losing monetary policy
discipline.122 At the same time, however, Park was fully aware of the importance of
winning bureaucratic support from the EPB and MOF, which commanded indispensable
economic resources, controlled the strategic policy network, and possessed the ROK’s
best bureaucrats. Thus, he continued “showering” the two bureaucratic bodies with
organizational privileges instead of simply “silencing” their voices.123
Park also established the interministerial Council for Promoting Heavy and
Chemical Industries (CPHCI) to prevent the HCI project from getting lost in bureaucratic
bickering, and to introduce efficient operational channels for the formulation and
implementation of the HCI plan. The CPHCI, chaired by Park himself, was given the
mission of “setting the agenda, designing a concerted effort of resource mobilization and
allocation, and laying out a division of labor among the economic ministries.”124
According to the HCI plan, six industries (chemical, electronics, machine-building,
metal, ship-building, and steel) were designated as objects of the state’s intense scrutiny
and development. The ROK government created one large industrial complex with state
of the art production facilities for each of the strategic industries by procuring properties
from farmers, bulldozing the land and installing the required industrial infrastructures.125
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The ROK leadership also offered the targeted industries various policy supports, such as
no pressure for repayment, and the removal of administrative obstacles.126 In addition,
the South Korean government committed an enormous amount of financial support to
ensure the success of the HCI drive.127
The ROK government established the National Investment Fund (NIF) in 1973,
which was funded by issuing national investment bonds and pension funds. In principle,
the projected capital for the HCI project would come from this fund. But the South
Korean government also secured external capital, putting priority on foreign loans over
direct investment or joint ventures. The targeted industrial enterprises were the first to
receive financial support from the government and to receive available foreign capital.
These governmental efforts enabled the development of strategic industries “completely
insulated from commercial pressures and insured from failure by government
subsides.”128 Additionally, the ROK government tried to take advantage of all available
intellectual input from both Korea and abroad.129

Table 3-3. Chaebŏl Participation in Heavy and Chemical Industries. 130
Chaebŏl

Number of Affiliates

Hyundai

1974
9

1978
31

Samsung

24

33

Daewoo

10

35

Acquisitions in the Heavy and Chemical Industries
aluminum, automobile*, machinery*, heavy
electrical, heavy machinery, iron & steel, oil
refining, shipbuilding
electric switching system, general machinery,
petrochemicals, shipbuilding
automobile, machinery, shipbuilding
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Table 3-3 continued
Lucky
Hyosŏng

17
8

43
24

Kukje
Sunkyung
Samhwa
Ssangyong
Kŭmho
Kolon

7
8
10
17
15
6

22
23
30
20
22
22

electronics*, oil refining*, petrochemicals*
auto parts, heavy electrical machinery,
petrochemicals
iron & steel, machinery
chemical, machinery
electrical, machinery
cement*, heavy electrical, heavy machinery
iron & steel, petrochemicals
heavy electrical, petrochemicals

The state’s initiative led to phenomenal success, despite skepticism from
international economic development agencies such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the World
Bank.131 As presented in Table 3-3, the governmental initiative led ROK’s big business,
so-called Chaebŏl, to partake in the targeted strategic industries.

3.2.4. Establishment of the Societal Base of Autonomous Defense Posture

The main goal of the financial system of South Korea during the 1970s was to
“hemorrhage as much capital as possible” into the growth of strategic industries required
for the development of the state’s military capability.132 A negative consequence of the
favoritism toward these targeted strategic industries, however, was the “bifurcation of the
financial market,” which led the ROK government to allocate relatively few resources to
other socio-economic sectors.133 Consequently, the top-down drive for the HCI project
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proceeded “in tandem with society’s deepening sense of alienation.”134 This suggests that
the ROK needed to silence any plausible social tensions inherent in the state’s drive for
the HCI project.
For this purpose, the ROK leadership launched the Saemaŭl Movement in April
1970, a social campaign to justify the state’s big push for heavy and chemical
industrialization. It initially began as a top-down campaign for the development of rural
areas that largely depended on agricultural sectors. Despite the rhetoric and aims of this
movement, however, the ROK’s emphasis on the HCI drive led the state to pay very little
attention to the development of the agricultural sector. Rather, the Park administration
transformed the Saemaŭl Movement into a community mobilization campaign to promote
the renewal of the Korean people’s spirit of independence, self-reliance and
determination to strive for national development.135 In this regard, the ROK’s campaign
for the Saemaŭl Movement represented “nationwide spiritual mobilization for state-led
heavy industrialization.”136
This ideological mobilization was also evident in the ROK government’s
introduction of political measures to secure societal support of the HCI project. The Park
administration estimated that the dialogue between the two Koreas would potentially
weaken the South Korean public perception of North Korea as a military threat.137
Similarly, it estimated that the peace offensive of North Korea during the course of the
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dialogue was targeted to create a loss of cohesion in ROK’s national opinion about North
Korean threats.138 It seemed inevitable that the state’s rationale for maximizing national
security to deal with the adversary would be also weakened. Such concern led Park to
declare an emergency situation on December 6, 1971, exhorting “all people to knuckle
down and prepare for [the] worst in [the] name of patriotism and national security.”139
This suggests that the ROK intended to establish “a one voice system to prevent a split in
national opinion.”140
In addition, the Park regime surprisingly announced the establishment of the Yushin
system in October 1972,141 accompanied by the state’s declaration of martial law,
abandonment of the existing constitution, disbandment of the National Assembly, and
preparation of a plan for the indirect election of the president. The ROK government also
introduced coercive measures to silence domestic opposition toward the Yushin
system.142
With the establishment of the Yushin system, the ROK government maximized its
capacity to penetrate into domestic society. In doing so, it transformed the Saemaŭl
Movement into a mass mobilization campaign for the Yushin reform.143 President Park
publicly stated that the Saemaŭl Movement was the same as the Yushin reform and vice
versa, the objective of both being to lead every Korean to work hard to build a prosperous
welfare state. Following the presidential statement, the ROK government transformed the


138
FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 370.
139
Ibid., 297.
140
Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 139.
141
Yushin can be translated as “revitalizing reforms.”
142
Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 37.
143
Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 141-43.

123
Saemaŭl Movement to leave no room for any loose ends in the state’s organization of the
mass public. The ROK government systemically organized the entire nation under four
categories: school, residential areas, social institutions, and workplaces. Even the armed
forces were affiliated under the Armed Forces’ Saemaŭl Movement. In each of the
categories, the ROK government established “a strictly top-down, pyramidal cellular
structure.”144 Thus, the establishment of the Yushin system ultimately transformed the
entire nation into “a vast, densely woven web, from the tiniest family unit to the Saemaŭl
Movement Headquarters in the Blue House.”145
The establishment of the Yushin system enabled the ROK leadership to restructure
the apparatus of the government into a garrison state or a quasi-wartime state.146 With
centralized and concentrated power, the ROK government was able to effectively
mobilize resources for heavy and chemical industrialization. In this respect, the Yushin
system can be characterized as a political success.147 In addition, the ROK government’s
maximized capacity to penetrate into the domestic society of South Korea enabled it to
silence social tension inherent in the state’s rapid industrialization.148 Thus, the state-led
drive for heavy and chemical industrialization proceeded without any evident social
resistance.
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3.3. The ROK’s Military Behaviors against the US Strategic Interests

3.3.1. ROK’s Development of Missile Capability

From the perspective of South Korea, the US forces stationed in her territory
signified the projection of military capability to deter North Korea.149 The Nixon
administration’s reduction plan thus meant not only a weakening of the US commitment,
but also a weakening of the American commitment to deter North Korea. In this respect,
the leadership of South Korea needed to establish not only the state’s ability to defend
against a North Korean first strike, but also the ability to deter a North Korean attack.
South Korea tried to secure a deterrence capability by developing missile and
nuclear capabilities throughout the 1970s. Washington pressured the ROK leadership to
limit the scope of its missile capability, while providing technological assistance. The
ROK’s nuclear project during the 1970s was evidently not favored by the United States.
The US made all-out efforts to dissuade the ROK from producing nuclear weapons, and
succeeded in containing the ROK’s independent steps toward nuclear weapons
production. However, it was not able to completely dissuade the ROK from developing
independent nuclear weapons capability.
The president’s direction in December 1971 began the development of an
independent missile system. Park was particularly concerned about the dangers of the
DPRK’s Frog missiles, which were forward-deployed near the DMZ. His concern was
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that South Korea did not have any effective means to immediately counterattack
Pyongyang. This led to the conclusion that the ROK had to acquire an independent
capability to counterattack the capital of North Korea. He judged that South Korea could
deter North Korea’s initiation of war by establishing an independent missile capability to
strike Pyongyang.150
According to the president’s direction, the goal was to produce a surface-to-surface
ballistic missile with a range of 200 kilometers (roughly 125 miles) at the initial stage,
and to progressively expand the range in later stages. By September 1972, a group of
scientists and engineers from several governmental agencies assembled a missile
development plan that called for the successful testing of mid-range surface-to-surface
missiles by the end of 1976 and long-range missiles by the end of 1979.151 To virtually
guarantee the state’s financial support, Park designated the missile project as part of the
Yulgok Operation to modernize ROK forces.152 The ADD was the designated primary
agency for the missile program. The missile development project started with a sixmember study group within the ADD, which reviewed the feasibility of the project, and
was expanded during the late 1970s to an ambitious project with 600 researchers.153 The
ADD concentrated its resources and actively sought to purchase required parts and
components, propellant and guidance technologies from the international market, as well
as to recruit a group of South Korean engineers and scientists from the United States.154
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To be sure, the development of surface-to-surface missile capability was made
possible by US technology transfer.155 This technological assistance, however, does not
suggest that the US was fully supportive of the ROK’s missile capability development.
The US initially turned down the ROK government’s request for an alternative missile
system to develop surface-to-surface missile capability. Facing such opposition, Lee Hu
Rak, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), instructed the WEC to
begin procurement of the Israeli-made Gabriel surface-to-surface missile, despite the
Pentagon’s objection that the missile system would endanger portions of the US military
assistance program. The ROK military was also concerned that Washington would react
negatively to the procurement plan.156
As the US Department of State concluded, the development of ROK’s independent
missile capability itself could destabilize the status quo in the Korean peninsula.
Furthermore, Washington also came to regard the ROK’s independent missile program as
an integral part of South Korea’s nuclear weapons programs during the 1970s.157
Consequently, the US began to exercise direct pressure to control the ROK’s missile
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capability development as part of its all-out efforts to stop the nuclear weapons
programs.158 ADD’s successful experiment with more advanced propulsion materials in
1976 led the US to pressure South Korea to cease its missile program.159 The US also
increased surveillance of South Korea as the ROK government continued its unilateral
efforts to seek other international sources of assistance in developing missile capability
and other conventional weapons.160 In spite of this watchful observance however, the US
did not have clear information on how advanced the ROK was in developing its missile
capability until South Korea succeeded in its open test launch of the first Koreanproduced surface-to-surface K-1 missile on September 26, 1978.161 This new
development led Washington to implement a chain of inspection tours in South Korea
from November 1978 to June 1979, until US President Carter’s visit to South Korea.
The ROK’s leadership responded to the US pressure in two ways. On the one hand,
the ROK government agreed to American demands to restrict its missile capability. The
agreement between the US and ROK allowed the range of the Korean-made missiles to
be 180 kilometers (112 miles) and the weight of warhead to be 1,000 pounds, while the
Missile Technology Control Regime allowed the development of missiles with a range of
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300 kilometers (187 miles) for military use.162 South Korea agreed to the US demand to
secure the US guiding technology and equipment, which were required to complete the
surface-to-surface missile development.163 On the other hand, President Park, after the
open test launch of the Korean-made missile, encouraged the ADD to set up a long-term
project to develop ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km, suggesting that Washington
was not able to dissuade the ROK from developing an independent missile capability
beyond the US-allowed scope.164
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3.3.2. ROK’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons during the 1970s

As the DOS estimated, the ROK’s nuclear weapon program during the 1970s was
the reflection of lessened confidence of the ROK government in US security
commitment, and consequent desire on the part of South Korea to reduce its military
dependence on the patron.165 The ultimate goal of South Korea was to secure the state’s
future. ROK military leaders went through reviews of the state’s security situation under
the Nixon Doctrine and raised the option of the nuclear weapon development to deal with
the North Korean military threats and US withdrawal of forces stationed in ROK.
President Park made the final decision to go nuclear and inaugurated the WEC in the
Blue House.166 Park’s commitment to the development of nuclear weapons capability
stemmed from his awareness of ROK strategic vulnerability in the Korean peninsula that
could not be reduced simply by increasing conventional military capabilities.167 The
WEC adopted by consensus the president’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons
capability.168
Following the president’ decision, the ROK government expedited the acquisition of
nuclear weapon-related technology. Because of its limited access to the sensitive
materials needed to produce a nuclear weapon and the expected US opposition, the ROK
tried to find the supplier of a facility to reprocess nuclear fuel other than the United
States. For this purpose, Minister of Science and Technology Ch'oe Hyŏngsŏp visited
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France and Britain in 1972 to seek technological cooperation in building a reprocessing
facility. In addition, members of the WEC visited other nuclear-capable countries such as
Israel, Norway, and Switzerland in 1972. Additionally, the ROK sent a group of Korean
scientists to India and Taiwan to consult on technical issues about the operation of the
National Research Experimental (NRX) experimental reactor. These efforts were
successful in procuring foreign assistance for ROK’s nuclear project. By 1974, the ROK
signed a contract with the French company, Saint Gobain Technique Nouvelle, for the
purpose of acquiring the design of a nuclear reprocessing facility. In addition, ROK
scientists secured the import of the NRX experimental reactor from France and Canada,
which would enable South Korea to produce weapons-grade plutonium.169
The top-secret nuclear weapons program proceeded uninterrupted until the middle of
1974, when India’s successful nuclear test led the United States to tighten monitoring on
other potential challengers of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. It was against
this background that the US embassy in Seoul learned of the ROK’s nuclear weapons
development.170 In March 1975, Washington concluded that the ROK was proceeding
with the initial phase of nuclear weapon development. From the US perspective, the
ROK’s nuclear weapons program had the potential to destabilize Northeast Asia and the
Non-Proliferation system. The US Department of State emphasized the gravity of the
issue as follows:
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In the case of Korea, our general concerns [of nonproliferation] are intensified by its
strategic location and by the impact which any Korean effort to establish nuclear
capability would have on its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan. ROK
possession of nuclear weapons would have [a] major destabilizing effect in an area in
which not only Japan but USSR, PRC and ourselves are directly involved. It could lead to
Soviet or Chinese assurances of nuclear weapons support to North Korea in the event of
conflict. Further, ROK efforts to secure a nuclear weapon capability will inevitably
impact on our bilateral security relationship.171

Washington was particularly concerned about South Korea potentially acquiring its
own reprocessing capability. Once the ROK had direct access to separated plutonium, it
would be widely regarded as either having nuclear weapons or acquiring them in a short
period. This perception would potentially destabilize all of Northeast Asia. This concern
led the Ford administration to conclude that “no special safeguards short of a complete
prohibition on reprocessing and storage of plutonium in South Korea are likely to provide
adequate protection against the most troublesome contingency.”172
Despite the serious concern, Washington initially decided to tread gently to avoid a
serious rift in the security relationship between the US and ROK. Kissinger instructed the
US embassy in Seoul to have the ROK government ratify the NPT as a credible
commitment to eschew the acquisition of nuclear weapons.173 The Ford administration
also introduced economic leverage to persuade South Korea to ratify the NPT. In March
1975, the US Congress suspended Export-Import Bank loans totaling $236 million to the
nuclear energy industry of South Korea, stating that the ROK’s timely ratification of the
NPT would be an important factor in the Export-Import Bank eventually gaining
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congressional approval to finance South Korea’s civilian nuclear industry.174 The veiled
threat to block financial support convinced the ROK government to ratify the NPT in
March 1975. The ratification of the NPT, however, did not reflect any real change in the
ROK’s nuclear behavior.
Washington’s next step was to confront the ROK leadership about the reprocessing
deal with France.175 In July 1975, US Ambassador to the ROK Richard Sneider was
instructed to deliver US opposition to the purchase of the reprocessing facility. Sneider
took the case against the reprocessing deal “methodically up the chain of command” in
order “not to confront [ROK president] Park and to allow him to save face.”176 The
ambassador’s efforts were closely coordinated with Washington. A series of increasing
intense conversations were held between Philip Habib, the assistant secretary of state for
East Asian and Pacific affairs, and Hahm Pyong Choon, the ROK ambassador to the
United States. Washington also created a number of incentives to offer in return for the
ROK’s cancellation of the French deal, including guaranteed access to reprocessing under
US auspices for the civilian nuclear industry of South Korea, and access to additional US
technology under a formal science and technology agreement.177 The introduction of
these positive inducements reflected the US expectation that the ROK government would
seek positive gains in exchange for suspending its reprocessing deal with France.178
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The introduction of carrots and sticks, however, was unable to stop the ROK’s
movement toward acquiring its own reprocessing capability.179 This situation led
Washington to employ “the heaviest threat ever wielded by the United States against
South Korea.”180 It broadly threatened that the nuclear behavior would directly endanger
the security relationship between the US and ROK. Ambassador Sneider delivered the US
warning that the ROK’s unwillingness to change its nuclear behavior would only
“jeopardize availability of technology and largest financing capability which only the US
could offer, as well as vital partnership with US, not only in nuclear and scientific areas
but in broad political and security areas.”181 In his face-to-face talk with ROK President
Park, Habib delivered Kissinger’s message that the Washington would recalculate the
entire alliance, including the withdrawal of the US commitment to nuclear umbrella.182
The Ford administration also threatened to cut off $275 million in US annual military
assistance to South Korea and cease its cooperation with the ROK in developing the
civilian nuclear program.183
The threats from Washington led the ROK government to reverse its position on
purchasing the French reprocessing facility.184 A group of US officials then visited Seoul
to negotiate the cancellation of the ROK reprocessing deal with France.185 Following this
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visit, the ROK government reluctantly agreed to cancel the reprocessing deal in January
1976.186
The Ford Administration also persuaded Canada and France to revoke their offers of
nuclear cooperation with South Korea. The Canadian government was willing to
coordinate its policy with the US nonproliferation effort because it was already sensitive
to the risk of nuclear proliferation following the success of India’s nuclear test, and was
facing domestic criticism for supplying the authoritarian South Korea with nuclear
technology. France also agreed to suspend its assistance to the ROK government. In
addition, the Belgonucleaire Company of Belgium cancelled its contract to introduce a
plutonium reprocessing facility to the ROK. This series of blocks effectively frustrated
the ROK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, because securing a facility to reprocess nuclear
fuel was the greatest technological hurdle for South Korea.187
Despite the pressure from Washington, the ROK leadership’s commitment to
develop an independent nuclear capability continued. From the perspective of South
Korea, the US-ROK agreement in January 1976 meant only the renunciation of its efforts
to secure nuclear weapons technology through foreign assistance, not the renunciation of
its right to develop nuclear weapons technologies through its own efforts.188 The ROK’s
efforts to develop indigenous nuclear weapons reemerged as the notion of a phased
reduction of US forces was revived in Jimmy Carter’s campaign in June 1976. In the year
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after he entered office, Carter announced plans to withdraw almost all US troops and
approximately 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.189
The ROK’s renewed effort followed the Japanese model to become a potential
nuclear developer.190 In this respect, the nuclear project during the late 1970s focused
more on the acquisition of nuclear materials and the development of indigenous nuclear
technologies that would enable the future production of nuclear weapons, rather than an
outright revival of the covert nuclear weapons program.191 However, President Park also
confidentially expressed the possibility of completing the development of a nuclear bomb
by the first half of 1981, which indicates the military intention of the nuclear project.192
In December 1976, the ROK government established the Korean Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation (KNFDI), whose main task was to acquire reprocessing
technology “indirectly through learning civilian nuclear technologies.”193 By October
1978, this government’s agency constructed a nuclear fuel fabrication facility, which
could be used to acquire spent nuclear fuel for producing weapons-grade plutonium.194
Washington continued its surveillance of the ROK’s nuclear project during the late 1970s,
but could not find convincing evidence of a military intent for the project.195
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The ROK’s nuclear project entirely changed after the assassination of President Park
in October 1979. Park’s successor Chun Doohwan suspended the weapons-related
nuclear project and took definitive steps “to dismantle the ROK’s nuclear weapons
potential” to win US support for the new regime of South Korea, which was inaugurated
in 1980.196 In return, the Reagan administration promised to increase the US security and
economic commitment to South Korea. At the same time, it threatened removing these
benefits if the nuclear weapons project would continue.197 With an eye to winning US
support, the new regime also made a conspicuous effort to cripple the missile
development program by carrying out two sharp reductions in the number the ADD
researchers by 1982, which profoundly damaged the ROK’s capability to develop longrange missiles.198
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3.4. Chapter Conclusion

The theory of this research expects to find co-variation between the level of a
regional state’s security concern and the scope of its efforts to increase domestic
contribution to an autonomous defense capability. Accordingly, a regional state is
hypothesized to introduce huge-scale security-promoting drives when it is highly
concerned about security in response to its patron’s retrenchment. This research also
suggests the existence of co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security
concern and the level of its commitment to the pursuit of military policies against the
patron’s strategic interests. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a regional state is strongly
committed to the pursuit of military policies against the patron’s strategic interests when
it is highly concerned about security.
This chapter finds that the Nixon administration’s force withdrawal made the ROK
leadership highly skeptical of the US security commitment. First, South Korea regarded
the US force reduction plan as the weakening of the superpower’s commitment to Korea.
Second, the Nixon administration’s redeployment of the 2nd Division away from the
DMZ led to the leadership’s belief that US would not rescue the ROK if North Korea
invaded again. Third, Washington’s mixed signals about the force reduction plan led to
the leadership’s loss of confidence in the patron’s reliability. Fourth, South Korea came to
be skeptical of the US reliability as a result of the Nixon administration’s ambiguity and
mixed signals about its military assistance for the modernization of the ROK forces. Last,
the ROK’s skepticism was deepened by the suspicion that Washington would reduce the
US forces in Korea even further.
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South Korea was also concerned about North Korea’s revisionist behaviors. A series
of the adversary’s provocations in 1968 and the Johnson administration’s conciliatory
policy made the ROC leadership believe that the superpower’s policy would lead North
Korea to continue its revisionist behaviors. This belief led to the notion that the US force
reduction policy would inevitably lead to the adversary’s initiating a revisionist war.
The case study also finds that the ROK’s threat perception of North Korea as a
revisionist power did not change even under the development of détente in the Korean
peninsula. Because of this threat perception, the ROK leadership believed that North
Korea would even make use of the détente for its revisionist purpose. In addition, South
Korea believed that the Sino-American rapprochement would negatively affect the ROK
security. It was also concerned that the rapprochement would lead to further reduction of
the US forces from Korea.
To summarize, the ROK leadership’s assessment of threats was filtered through its
perception of the US reliability. The leadership experienced high levels of threat from
North Korea and this threat perception was magnified by its skepticism of the patron’s
commitment. Consequently, the level of the ROK’s security concern was substantially
high. According to the theory of this research, South Korea was hypothesized to make allout efforts to promote domestic contribution to autonomous defense capability. The case
study supports this hypothesis.
To begin with, the case study finds that the existence of strong leadership was
behind the ROK government’s efforts to promote domestic contribution to autonomous
defense capability. President Park’s guidance was apparently the driving force behind the
development of defense industry. Park and his core policymakers also took initiative in
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placing the heavy industrialization, which was the state’s mobilization strategy to produce
required defense materials through the development of targeted strategic industries. They
decided which industries should be developed and introduced various policy instruments
to financially support the development of the targeted strategic industries.
The imperative of security also made the ROK leadership introduce policy
instruments to gain rapid access to domestic resources. For this purpose, the ROK
government introduced the strategy of extraction to directly convert domestic financial
resources into the state’s defense capability. This included the compulsory National
Defense Tax in 1975 and the National Investment Fund in 1973. These policy instruments
facilitated South Korea’s development of heavy industrialization projects as well as the
increase in the overall defense capabilities of the ROK regular forces. In addition, the
ROK’s defense spending focused on increase in the state’s defense capability.
The imperative of establishing autonomous defense capability required that the
ROK leadership rapidly increase the development of the state’s defense industry. This
explains why the ROK government depended not only upon state-owned enterprises but
also on big business in domestic market to increase in increasing defense capabilities.
The urgency of security made ROK leadership prioritize security over economic
rationale. Thus the ROK policymakers constrained market rationality in favor of
promoting the targeted strategic industries, harnessing domestic and international market
forces where necessary for security purposes. As a result, during the 1970s, the state’s
defense industry and was almost completely insulated from market pressure and even
insured from failure through government subsides.
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Finally, the ROK leadership established a societal base of autonomous defense
capability. This began with the introduction of the Saemaŭl Movement, which justified
the state’s push for the heavy industrialization. It also introduced a series of political
measures to secure societal support for the industrialization project. Furthermore, the
establishment of the Yushin system made it possible for the ROK regime to maximize its
capacity to penetrate into domestic society. Thus the ROK leadership was able to silence
social tension inherent in the state’s rapid industrialization. As a result of these domestic
drives, the ROK regime established a garrison state in South Korea, strengthening
government control over domestic society.
It is also hypothesized that South Korea was strongly committed to the pursuit of
military policies against the strategic interests of the United States. This hypothesis is
supported by this case study. The ROK government tried to develop a missile capability,
even beyond the scope allowed by the United State. This military behavior was against
the US strategic interests to establish the status-quo in the Korean peninsula. The ROK
leadership also developed an independent nuclear weapon capability, which evidently
jeopardized the superpower’s interests of nonproliferation. The imperative of security
was the driving force of the ROK’s military behaviors against the patron’s strategic
interests. According to the theory of this research, they can be characterized as the ROK
leadership’s strategy to pressure upon the United States to reverse its objectionable
strategic posture in East Asia. The leadership was so much committed to the pursuit of
missile and nuclear weapons programs that it was unwilling to abandon them even under
Washington’s pressure.
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY OF TAIWAN

4.1. The ROC Leadership’s Perception of Security

4.1.1. The Taiwan Issue between Washington and Beijing

After losing the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist
Party Kuomintang retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949 and established the Republic
of China (ROC).1 In his stead, Mao Zedong and his Chinese Community Party (CCP)
seized power over mainland China and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
October 1949. Following the experience that the US military retrenchment from South
Korea led to the communist invasion of South Korea in 1950, Washington decided to
secure Taiwan from invasion by communist China. This led to the signing of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China in 1954.
US could have improved relations with the PRC during the 1950s, as the American
public had more or less accepted the CCP’s control over mainland China.2 But a central
problem was that Washington could not weaken the US commitment to Taiwan.
Eisenhower’s “New Look” Doctrine, which emphasized the notion of nuclear deterrence,
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made the US’s reputation for resolve even more central to its strategy. Accordingly,
Taiwan became important to the US’s grand strategy during the early stages of the Cold
War confrontation in East Asia. The US commitment to Taiwan, coupled with communist
China’s strategy of confrontation, led to a constant dispute between Washington and
Beijing until the Nixon administration changed the direction of US policy toward
communist China.3
Nixon built his career as a politician by advocating the US security commitment to
Taiwan.4 However, this commitment dampened as he gained more foreign policy
experience. He came to disagree with Chiang Kai-shek when the ROC president argued
that the only way to defeat the Communist threats was with bullets. Indeed, Nixon
remarked, “Chiang was a friend and unquestionably one of the giants of the twentieth
century. I wondered whether he might be right, but my pragmatic analysis told me he was
wrong.”5 He also reoriented his commitment to the Cold War confrontation. This laid the
basis for Nixon’s Foreign Affairs article in 1967 calling for an end to China’s isolation.6
Nixon’s strategy in East Asia was to minimize conflict with Beijing in order to better
exploit Sino-Soviet tensions. However, he was not prepared to sacrifice Taiwan because
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US credibility as a security guarantee weighed heavily in his China policy. 7 He was
convinced that the abandoning Taiwan would deeply damage the United States’
credibility in the eyes of its regional allies in East Asia. In addition, he believed that
sacrificing Taiwan was not necessary to achieve the normalization of relations with the
PRC, because he was convinced that Beijing was not deeply concerned with Taiwan.
Nixon acknowledged that Beijing would push Washington to recognize the PRC’s
sovereignty over Taiwan and withdraw US military protection from the island. But he
also believed that the US-PRC cooperation in dealing with the Soviet Union could lead to
agreement on the Taiwan issues that would be acceptable to the United States.8
Following the president’s initiative in reorienting US policy toward China, Kissinger
introduced the notion of the strategic triangle among the US, the USSR, and the PRC. As
a national security advisor to the president, he thought that the United States could play
the PRC and the Soviet Union each against the other.9 By giving importance to Beijing
in the US global strategy, however, Kissinger simply dismissed Taiwan as
inconsequential.10 Thus, Kissinger’s approach raised the question of whether Taiwan
would be sacrificed on the altar of great-power politics.
Nixon and Kissinger did not realize the importance the PRC leadership attached to
the issue of Taiwan. Rather they regarded Taiwan as merely one of several impediments
in the relationship between China and the United States.11 However, the communist
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leadership made it known from the first tentative contacts in 1970 that the recovery of its
sovereignty over Taiwan should be a precondition for any improvement of relations
between Washington and Beijing.12 Nixon believed that Beijing’s claim over Taiwan was
simply ritual, targeted at protecting the policy of opening relationship with America from
criticism within the Chinese leadership.13
When Kissinger paid a secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, he realized that the PRC
leadership was still preoccupied with Taiwan.14 Zhou En-lai, the PRC premier, indicated
that there would be no reconciliation without settlement on Taiwan. He asserted without
hesitation that “The U.S. must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government
in China and that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must
be restored to the motherland.” Zhou also demanded withdrawal of the US military forces
and facilities from Taiwan within a limited period.15 To justify such demands, he referred
to Dean Acheson’s White Paper, which mentioned that “It was the Chinese people
themselves who won their own liberation, who liberated our motherland, and drove away
the reactionary rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique.” He also referred to the Truman
administration’s statement that “It had no territorial ambitions regarding Taiwan or any
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other Chinese territories,” and that “It wouldn’t interfere in China’s internal affairs and
would leave the Chinese people to settle internal questions.”16
In response, Kissinger promised that the US would set a firm timetable to remove
two-thirds of its forces from Taiwan, which were there only because of the Vietnam War,
once the US had found a way to make peace in Vietnam. He also indicated that the other
third of the forces would be removed as relations between US and China improved.17 On
the other hand, he rejected Zhou’s demand that US renounce ties with Taiwan. He also
rejected the premier’s assertion that the purpose of Nixon’s visit to China should be to
discuss the Taiwan issue as a prelude to normalization of relations.18
As Kissinger recalled, the series of meetings during his visit to Beijing was
dominated by “the tension between the Chinese thrust for clarity and ours for ambiguity”
regarding Taiwan.19 Chou sought clarity, while Kissinger tried to remain ambiguous
regarding the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.20 Kissinger was vague about
the fate of the US-Taiwan defense treaty, remaining tied to the formalities of a decaying
US-Taiwan mutual security treaty, which was still indispensable to Taiwan.21
Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 was a chance for Washington and Beijing to
confirm the understanding reached by Kissinger and Zhou during the previous year. As
the president put it, “Taiwan was the touchstone for both sides” during his meetings with
the Chinese leaders. Nixon was “committed to Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent
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nation,” while the Chinese leaders “were equally determined to use the communique to
assert their unequivocal claim to the island.”22 Beijing pushed for U.S. commitment to
total and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from the island. In response, Nixon
insisted on linking the withdrawal of forces to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
problem.23
The two sides issued the Shanghai Communique, in which they agreed that “The
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States
Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan
question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and
states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and
military installations from Taiwan.”24 This statement suggests that Washington promised
not to challenge Beijing’s position that Taiwan was a part of China and not to support
Taiwan’s independence. From Washington’s perspective, the key compromise on Taiwan
was the US promise to withdraw all of its military forces and installations from the island
in return for Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. But the
compromise was formulated in such a way that both sides avoided addressing in specific
terms the termination of the US security commitment to Taiwan. Beijing did not press
Washington on the termination of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and the US did
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not press the PRC for an explicit commitment to peaceful resolution of the issues
surrounding Taiwan.25

4.1.2. Taiwan’s Assessment of US Reliability

The ROC leadership expressed doubts about the reliability of the US security
commitment to Taiwan. In his memoir, James Shen, who served as the ROC’s last
ambassador to the United States, mentioned three points to support his argument that
Washington betrayed Taiwan during the 1970s.26 First, he maintained that Washington
did not consult with Taiwan in advance regarding the reorientation in US policy toward
communist China. Second, he pointed out that the US gave up its security commitment to
Taiwan and decided to terminate the mutual defense treaty between the US and Taiwan.
Third, he maintained that Washington did not do all it could do, or all it had promised to
do, to keep the ROC’s representation in the UN. The three points help to interpret how
the ROC leadership evaluated the patron reliability.
Washington did have reasons not to inform the ROC of the intentions and plans in its
new China policy. As Kissinger remarked, “It is a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang
[Kai-shek] at the end of his life. But we have to be cold about it.”27 An internal
document explained the US position in detail: “Telling the ROC frankly about our longterm plans has both advantages and disadvantages. By informing Premier Chiang Ching
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kuo [son and successor of Chiang Kai-shek] we could give him time to make internal
adjustments on Taiwan so that his own position is not endangered, and stability is not
undermined, when we make our move. Also, we would have an opportunity to influence
the ROC’s reaction. On the other hand, this would be risky because the ROC could
decide to take countermeasures to try to forestall what we plan to do. They could leak our
intentions publicly to try to stimulate a debate within the U.S. Government and public.”28
Washington’s ambiguity, however, led the ROC to suspect that questions related to
Taiwan were being discussed behind its back.29
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek and his core policy advisers
believed that the United States had no alternative but to support the ROC. At the same
time, they came to fear that Washington might abandon Taiwan or compel its leadership
to adopt conciliatory policies toward China.30 Taiwan reiterated its opposition to all
official contact between Washington and Beijing, by way of official statements and
diplomatic protest. In particular, Taiwan criticized the voices calling for the US to
reorient its policy of containing communist China.31
In this respect, it was no wonder that Taipei was alarmed by the first tentative
contact between the US and the PRC, the February 1970 Warsaw meeting. In particular,
what concerned the ROC leadership about the meeting was the fact that Washington did
not inform Taipei in advance of what the US planned to discuss at its talks with the PRC.
Moreover, Washington gave only evasive replies when ROC representatives subsequently
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asked for a briefing on the talks. The ROC response suggests that what concerned Taiwan
about US reliability as a security provider was the secrecy in the Nixon administration’s
policy toward China. This secrecy resulted in lack of prior consultation between
Washington and Taipei, thus depriving the ROC leadership of a clear sense of the US
commitment to Taiwan.32
After the Warsaw meeting, Taiwan’s primary concern was whether Washington was
prepared to make any concessions to Beijing on Taiwan in order to improve relations
with China. To gauge Nixon’s intentions on Taiwan in the context of the new China
policy, Chiang Ching-kuo visited Washington in April 1970. He asked whether
Washington intended to reach some sort of nonaggression agreement or peaceful
coexistence with Beijing. Such an agreement, he believed, would be tantamount to
Washington’s recognizing Beijing as the legitimate government of the Chinese mainland.
He also wanted to know whether Washington still intended to support Taiwan in the event
of another attack from the PRC.33
After the trip to Washington, however, Chiang came to believe that relations
between the United States and Taiwan would soon change decisively. He was certain that
Nixon would undermine the US’s commitment to recognizing the ROC as the only
legitimate government of China, fatally challenging its international status, and thereby
drastically weakening the legitimacy of the Chinese Nationalist Party in Taiwan.34
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Taiwan’s concern about US reliability was also expressed in James Shen’s
conversations with US policymakers. In his first meeting with Nixon, Shen was told that
the US would continue to honor its obligation under the mutual defense treaty and would
continue to support the ROC’s membership in the UN.35 But he soon learned of
Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, shortly after assuming his post as the
ROC ambassador to the United States. He lodged a strong protest and expressed profound
regret, describing the US approach toward the PRC as “hardly be described as a friendly
act.”36 He also stressed how “indignant,” “bewildered, and “shocked” Taiwan was by the
US’s opening to Communist China. Then he asked, “Where is all this going to end?”37
This statement pointed to Taiwan’s underlying fear of abandonment by the US.
After Nixon’s visit to Beijing, Shen raised three points about the Shanghai
Communique to the US president.38 First, he criticized the Communique for omitting any
reference to the US defense commitment to Taiwan. Second, he asked why the US said
that it would not challenge Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Third, he asked
about the Communique’s reference to the withdrawal of US forces and military
installations from Taiwan. Later, Shen also raised the question of how the US would
maintain the defense treaty with Taiwan once it recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate
government of China.39 Behind the question lay the fear that recognition of the PRC as
the sole legal government of China would lead to the withdrawal of legal recognition of
the ROC government in Taiwan, which would eventually lead to the automatic lapse of
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the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.40 These question altogether show that the ROC
leadership was deeply suspicious that Nixon and Kissinger had sacrificed Taiwan on the
altar of great power politics.

4.1.3. Taiwan’s Expulsion from the United Nations

The ROC’s representation of China in the UN was another issue that Washington
needed to deal with, even though it was not a key matter of contention between
Washington and Beijing. Throughout the 1950s, the US had been able to mobilize a
majority in the UN General Assembly to prevent any challenge of the ROC’s membership
in the UN. But the entry of several newly independent nations into the UN during the
1960s resulted in a steady increase in pressure for the UN to admit the PRC. In dealing
with this situation, the Nixon administration suggested a dual-representation formula that
would place both the PRC and the ROC in the UN.41 But Washington also feared that the
dual representation plan might induce Beijing to abort the incipient Sino-American
rapprochement.42
As a founding member of the United Nations, the ROC clung to the doctrine that its
presence in the General Assembly and the Security Council must remain inseparable and
indivisible. Thus, it could not accommodate the realities of the PRC’s growing
international prominence. Nor did Taipei cooperate with Washington on the outcome of
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the 1971 debate in the General Assembly on who should represent China in the United
Nation.43 The UN General Assembly ended up passing the Albanian resolution, which
recognized the PRC as the only lawful representative of China to the UN. As a result of
this decision in October 1971, the PRC took over Taiwan’s membership in the UN,
expelling it from the organization.
In his memoir, Shen referred to the April 1971 talks between Chiang Kai-shek and
Robert D. Murphy, a personal representative to President Nixon, to support his argument
that Washington did not do all it had promised to keep the ROC in the UN.44 Murphy
proposed that both the PRC and the ROC have seats in the UN General Assembly and
that the latter maintain China’s seat in the Security Council. Chiang agreed to the
proposal on the condition that the US promise not to sponsor the PRC’s admittance to the
UN and that it attempt to rally a majority against admitting the PRC to the UN.45 Shen
reiterated Chiang’s demand when he traveled to Washington to become the ROC’s
ambassador to the United States. During the 1971 UN debate, however, Washington did
not explicitly suggest whether the ROC or the PRC should hold China’s permanent seat
in the UN Security Council. Rather, the Nixon administration gave the impression that it
was prepared to allow this question to be decided by the UN General Assembly. Taipei
regarded this position as a betrayal of the US pledge conveyed during the MurphyChiang talks.46
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To be sure, the imperative of normalizing relations with the PRC caused Washington
to abstain from using all leverage to influence the 1971 UN debate on the membership of
the two Chinas.47 Faced with US hesitance, Taiwan came to believe that the US-PRC
rapprochement severely undermined the ROC’s battle to maintain its membership in the
UN. In this respect, Shen criticized Kissinger’s presence in Beijing in October 1971 for a
second round of discussions with the communist leadership, just when the UN General
Assembly was debating the ROC’s membership in the UN.48 Taipei believed that
Washington defaulted on its promise to use US veto power to fight communist China’s
representation in the UN. It also believed that Washington did not try enough to modify
the process of US-PRC rapprochement to gain an advantage for the ROC in the debate
about China’s representation in the UN.49

4.1.4. Taiwan’s Assessment of the PRC’s Threats

This study argues that a state’s security concern is a function of its assessment of its
patron’s reliability and of military threats from its adversaries. The previous section
suggests that ROC leadership, faced with the developing rapprochement between
Washington and Beijing and the ROC’s possible expulsion from the United Nations,
came to be skeptical of US reliability. So the next question is how Taiwan assessed the
PRC’s threats during the 1970s.
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The development of Sino-American rapprochement caused concern among the ROC
leadership that Beijing “would aim its major efforts at extracting U.S. concessions on
Taiwan.”50 In addition, the declining US support for South Vietnam caused Taiwan to
believe that it would be compromised next. As Shen remarked, “The betrayal of South
Vietnam gave the Republic of China a breathing spell. People high in [the] U.S.
government were overheard to say that ‘Selling one ally down the river was quite enough
for one year without abandoning another – the Republic of China.’”51 The declining
belief in US reliability led to the widespread fear that the US intended to achieve a
“decent interval” between the termination of the US-Taiwan defense treaty and the
eventual conquest of Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China.52 Behind
the fear was the threat that communist China would use the Sino-American
rapprochement as an opportunity to realize its revisionist purpose.
The development of Sino-American rapprochement led the PRC leadership to
advance the notion of Taiwan’s “liberation” by mainland China. As Washington assessed,
it was Beijing’s anticipation of rapid Sino-US normalization that caused the PRC to
launch a peace offensive toward Taiwan. Beijing tried to induce talks with Taipei and
initiate a process whereby peaceful reunification could be achieved. However, the
communist leadership was pessimistic about the prospects for normalization, leading the
PRC to overtly express its readiness to liberate Taiwan militarily from the ruling
Kuomintang regime. As a result, Beijing introduced a harder line toward Taiwan.53
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Thus, a remaining issue was whether Beijing would try to incorporate Taiwan using
military force. Washington’s assessment was that PRC leadership would not try to
achieve its aspiration for political dominance in Asia by military conquest. While
recognizing the PRC’s ability to launch a major arms attack against any of its neighbors,
US policymakers did not find any evidence of the PRC’s intent to expand its borders or
pursue it objectives by military might.54 Rather, Washington concluded that Beijing
would find it difficult to introduce an offensive military strategy because of the PRC
leadership’s awareness of the state’s vulnerability, the presence of a defense-oriented
doctrine, and the limited technical basis for the development of offensive military
capabilities.55 Furthermore, US policymakers advanced the argument that the SinoSoviet confrontation would make it difficult for the PRC leadership to allocate resources
toward offensive capabilities.56 The US assessment suggests that Washington was
skeptical that the PRC would introduce an offensive strategy to take over Taiwan
militarily.
It should be noted that ROC leadership came to agree with Washington’s assessment
that Sino-Soviet confrontation would constrain China from pursuing an offensive military
campaign against Taiwan. For example, Shen said that he did not find the absence of the
PRC’s military operation against Taiwan “unduly surprising, with the Chinese
Communists having the Russians on their back.”57 He reiterated this agreement by
saying that “Peking would not be able to pull off such a military campaign, particularly in
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[the] light of Soviet pressure from the north.”58 In addition, the ROC leadership, while
accepting the inevitability of a growing superiority of the PRC’s military capability and
the reduction in the level of US military presence in Taiwan, concluded that the PRC
would expend its efforts in maintaining détente with the US rather than pursuing the
assimilation of the ROC.59
The ROC leadership’s concern about the PRC’s strategy to isolate Taiwan led it to
emphasize the importance of establishing its viability for survival. Considering the
psychological importance the ROC leadership attached to UN membership, it was no
wonder Taiwan believed that its expulsion from the organization undermined its
international status and prospects for survival.60 As the ROC’s Vice Foreign Minister
Yang Hsi-kun pointed out, withdrawal from UN would mean “eventual political suicide”
for Taiwan, because “The increasing isolation that the Chinese Communists can force on
the GRC from their improved position within the UN will mean the rapidly increasing
besiegement and eventual strangulation of the GROC [Government of the Republic of
China] unless drastic change is undertaken immediately.”61
The examination of the ROC’s threat assessment suggests that Taiwan’ security
arrangement was of a different nature from that of South Korea. The case study of South
Korea shows that the South Korean leadership continued to be concerned about the
revisionist military strategy of North Korea as well as the reliability of the US security
commitment. This explains why the level of the ROC’s security concern was
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substantially high. In comparison, Taiwan’s assessment of the PRC’s threats shows that it
was not concerned about military threats from mainland China, but it still doubted the
reliability of the US security commitment to Taiwan. In this respect, it can be said that the
ROC was relatively less concerned about security than South Korea.
The comparison between South Korea and Taiwan suggests that the two states differ
in terms of their respective state leaderships’ preference for short-term military
preparedness over relatively longer-term objectives, such as economic growth and
political stability.62 In the case of South Korea, the leadership’s belief about the
imminence of military threats from North Korea led it to first maximize the state’s
military security in the short term, even though doing so had negative long-term
repercussion for the state’s other objectives. In comparison, the absence of direct military
threats from communist China suggests that the ROC leadership was not under pressure
to prioritize short-term military preparedness over the state’s relatively longer-term
objectives. Rather, it can be argued that the emphasis on sustainability led the ROC
leadership to try to achieve Taiwan’s military preparedness and other state objectives in a
balanced way.63
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4.2. Taiwan’s Security-Promoting Domestic Drives in the 1970s

4.2.1. Development of the Defense Industry in Taiwan

The Nixon administration’s military retrenchment in the periphery of China, coupled
with the decline in US military equipment grants to Taiwan, posed a question of national
security for the ROC leadership. The Nixon administration continued to provide Taiwan
with a reliable and adequate supply of military assistance for its security.64 But the SinoAmerican rapprochement led Taiwan to feel “apprehension about what the future might
hold that led to the search for alternatives” to the US military protection of Taiwan.65
This was the background against which the ROC leadership introduced domestic drives
for an autonomous defensive capability.
The ROC leadership’s motive behind the development of Taiwan’s defense industry
was providing for its own security. During the 1950s, the ROC government was left with
only limited weapon production capabilities. Thus Taiwan largely depended upon the US
air and naval forces for defense.66 Following the termination of US economic assistance
in 1965, the ROC government started to establish its own defense-industrial base.67
However, the ROC leadership did not make a serious attempt to expand the state’s
defense industry until the late 1960s, because of the financial burdens and the reluctance
of the Kuomintang leadership to believe that their stay on the island was permanent.68
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In particular, the Kuomintang’s commitment to keeping a large contingent of ground
forces prevented Taiwan from developing a viable defense industry. The presence of a
large ground force represented the ROC leadership’s ambition to retake the Chinese
mainland militarily.69 President Chiang Kai-shek was at the core of the group that
championed the dream of a triumphant return to mainland China.70 As the Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Chiang was the only apparent link between the state and the
military. This meant that the government lacked any authority for determining
expenditure on the ground forces.71
The absence of institutional constraint led the ROC government to unnecessarily
allocate a huge portion of national budget to the maintenance of ground forces. For
example, more than 90 percent of the central government’s budget was consumed by
military expenditure in 1950. This declined by only ten per cent during the early 1950s.
As a result, by the end of the decade, Taiwan’s military burden became one of the largest
outside the Communist bloc. The Kuomintang regime tried to increase military
expenditure even further during the 1960s.72
However, the offensive strategy could no longer be sustained after the Kuomintang
regime’s last unsuccessful attempt in 1967 to enlist Washington’s support for an attack
against the mainland. The ROC leadership did not have any choice but to accept the
inevitable budgetary realities of financing a large conventional ground force with
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diminishing resources.73 In addition, US retrenchment posed a question of national
security and demanded an alternative to the US military protection. As a result, the ROC
government increased an indigenous capacity for defense material production. Taiwan’s
defense industry matured to such an extent that, by 1980, it was estimated to be able to
produce most defense materials, which included ammunition, combat aircraft, military
vehicles, modern fighter aircraft, overhauling warships, tactical communication
equipment, air-to-air missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles.74
To begin with, US licensing arrangements helped Taiwan develop the capability for
weapons production for ground forces.75 With US sponsorship, the ROC government
developed the capability to produce M-14 and M-16 rifles, M-60 machines guns, four
calibers of mortars, and two types of recoilless rifles. Taiwan also developed capacity for
artillery production, which led to the production of 125 mm multiple-tube rocket
launchers, 3.5 inch and 66mm rocket launchers, and 100mm and 155 mm howitzers.
The ROC government also made efforts to increase indigenous capacity for naval
production.76 In the early 1970s, Taiwan built 30-ton patron boats, which were the first
navel craft produced indigenously. Then, in 1975, the ROC government signed a contract
with Tacoma Boat, a US defense industry, to produce a series of Multi-Mission Patrol
Ships under the aegis of China Shipbuilding, a state-owned enterprise of Taiwan. Taiwan
also contracted with Westinghouse to produce frigates.
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The development of ROC’s capacity for aircraft production was also done primarily
through the government’s licensed production arrangement with US defense industries.
For example, Taiwan signed a licensed agreement with Bell Helicopter Company in 1969
to jointly manufacture military helicopters. According to this offset agreement, Taiwan
built a factory to co-produce the military helicopters.77 Offset arrangements between the
ROC government and US defense industries grew so rapidly throughout the 1970s that,
by the mid-1970s, Taiwan was able to shift from direct import of defense materials to
licensed production of much of its military equipment.78 Furthermore, Taiwan produced
two-thirds of its defense materials by the end of the 1970s, as a result of the government’s
efforts to accelerate import substitution.79
The ROC’s efforts to produce aircraft should be noted. According to the Nixon
administration’s military retrenchment in Taiwan, Washington decided to withdraw two
squadrons of F-4 fighters, the most significant part of the US forces on Taiwan, by the
end of 1974.80 This stimulated the ROC government to sign an agreement with Northrup
Grumman for a joint venture production of the F-5E Tiger II fighter.81 The F-5E program
was the “centerpiece of Taiwan’s defense industrialization efforts,” and was “certainly its
most significant military project,” because it provided an important edge of superiority to
the PRC fighters, at least from a qualitative standpoint.82
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4.2.2. Establishment of a Centralized Decision-Making Process

The ROC government’s efforts to promote a domestic contribution to an
autonomous defensive capability began with the state’s establishment of a highly
centralized decision-making process to orchestrate the process. The ROC government
came to recognize that economic and security policy were becoming increasingly
interdependent. As a result, the decision-making process was arranged according to the
following line of reasoning:

Decisions in matters of economic development must … … be analyzed
simultaneously for their contribution to the military security of the state. At the same
time, military decisions whether or not to produce a given weapon system
indigenously, to purchase it ready-made, or to forgo it altogether must be looked at
from the point of view of their contribution to the economic health of the state.83

Taiwan established the state’s decision-making structure in such a way as to
encompass an economic or even social agenda in establishing defensive capability. The
National Security Council (NSC), which was established in 1967, took the primary role
in orchestrating the overall process. The NSC was a consultative body made up of the
Kuomintang regime’s military, political, and administrative elites and became the de
facto governing body, subordinating the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches
along with other state bodies. Under President Chiang’s initiative, the NSC was able to
circumvent bureaucratic and sectoral rivalries within the decision process and achieve an
integrated agenda for the development of defense capabilities. As a result, any policy



Ibid., 87.

163
objectives related to developing the state’s indigenous defense capabilities fell within the
NSC’s purview.84
In addition, between 1969 and 1972, the ROC government created a series of ad hoc
committees to formulate and execute policy according to the NSC’s guidelines. These
committees included the Budget Inquiry Committee; the Commission on Taxation
Reform; the Financial, Economic and Monetary Conference (FEMC); and the Council of
International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD). The committees were
responsible for directing domestic resources toward the establishment of Taiwan’s
autonomous defensive capability during the 1970s. In particular, the FEMC became the
state’s highest economic policymaking agency, whose task was to unify economic and
financial policy to coordinate state-led projects to develop strategic industries.85
Chiang Kai-shek took the initiative in organizing the national security apparatus. In
June 1969, he appointed his son Chiang Ching-kuo to the office of Vice-Premier in
charge of the CIECD, the FEMC, and the Budget Inquiry Committee. Then he promoted
Chiang Ching-kuo to the position of state Premier in 1971, giving him formal authority to
run the government. Chiang Ching-kuo immediately directed the cabinet to prepare a
plan for massive investments to strengthen the country both economically and militarily.
This resulted in the creation of Ten Major Construction Projects, which became the
centerpiece of the government’s drive for heavy industrialization, which was targeted to
establish an industrial basis of the state’s defensive capability.86
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4.2.3. Military Expenditure and Taxation

During the 1970s, Taiwan had the greatest share of its budget allocated to defense of
any country, second only to Israel. It was also surpassed only by Israel and Iraq in the
ratio of GNP allocated to military expenditure.87 As Table 4-1 shows, the level of the
ROC’s defense expenditure as a share of the state’s GDP during the 1970s was notably
higher than those of South Korea and Japan. But it should be noted that a huge portion of
Taiwan’s defense expenditure was allocated to the maintenance of a large ground force,
which represented the Kuomintang regime’s commitment to offensive strategy toward
mainland China. In this respect, the level of Taiwan’s military expenditure itself may not
represent the state’s willingness to direct national resources toward the establishment of
its own defensive capability.88
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Table 4-1. Military Expenditure of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as a Percentage of
GDP, 1967-1978.89
Year

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

Japan

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.9

0.8

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

Korea

4.1

4.2

4.1

3.9

4.3

4.4

3.7

4.4

5.0

5.7

6.4

5.4

Taiwan

11.2

11.1

9.7

8.8

9.6

9.3

8.4

7.0

6.8

6.6

7.5

7.5

To illustrate the domestic dimension of Taiwan’s security-promoting drives, the
present study examines how the nature of Taiwan’s threat assessment affected the scope
of its extraction of domestic resources under the initiative of national security. Extraction
enables political leaders to gain rapid access to funds from the country’s people; the more
the state’s leadership assesses that external threats are immediate, the more likely it is to
depend on extraction of its domestic resources in developing autonomous defense
capabilities.
As mentioned in the chapter on Korea, the ROK government introduced several
policies of extraction to secure a revenue base for the state’s projects for defense
capabilities, including a compulsory National Defense Tax in 1975 and a National
Investment Fund in 1973. These policy instruments facilitated South Korea’s
development of heavy industrialization projects as well the increase in the overall defense
capabilities of its regular forces. In contrast, given the absence of direct military threats
from the PRC, Taiwan did not introduce a policy of extraction directly targeted at
increasing the state’s defense capabilities.
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To be sure, the ROK government was able to increase its tax revenue during the
1970s. This was the result of the state’s tax reform in 1968. The ROC government did
institute a similar policy in response to the decline of the US military grants during the
1960s.90 Facing the decrease in US assistance, the government formed the Commission
on Taxation Reform in March 1968. Empowered with President Chiang’s full authority,
the commission was authorized to look for measures to improve tax administration, raise
revenues, and increase the responsiveness of tax collection to increases in private income.
The Commission’s proposals called for an increase in revenue through an enlargement of
the tax base, improvements in tax administration, and higher tax rates.
The tax reform, however, was not targeted primarily at financing the development of
the ROC’s defensive capability. Rather, as Table 4-2 shows, Taiwan decreased the portion
of the government’s budget allocated to defense while increasing the portion allocated to
economic development projects and to the state’s educational sector.91 This suggests that
the absence of direct military threats from communist China did not put the ROC
leadership under pressure to prioritize short-term military preparedness over the state’s
longer-term objectives. Rather, it can be argued that the emphasis on sustainability
focused the Taiwan government on the education and economic development sectors,
which represented the state’s long-term objectives.92
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Table 4-2. Allocation of the ROC Government’s Net Expenditures, 1968-1979

1968

Government
Budget Total
33,002

1969

41,869

1970

49,153

1971

54,829

1972

63,668

1973

79,856

1974

89,934

1975

126,436

1976

149,994

1977

192,493

1978

226,900

1979

254,711

Defense
17,938
(54.4)
20,393
(48.7)
23,977
(48.8)
26,172
(47.7)
27,569
(43.3)
33,074
(41.4)
36,865
(41)
49,608
(39.2)
54,873
(36.6)
69,498
(36.1)
84,186
(37.1)
95,400
(37.5)

Education, Science,
and Culture
4,865
(14.7)
6,818
(16.3)
7,992
(16.3)
9,636
(17.6)
11,046
(17.3)
13,512
(16.9)
14,994
(16.7)
20,741
(16.4)
23,783
(15.9)
28,277
(14.7)
38,990
(17.2)
41,228
(16.2)

Economic
Development
5,442
(16.5)
7,197
(17.2)
8,795
(17.9)
8,512
(15.5)
11,659
(18.3)
18,207
(22.8)
22,698
(25.2)
37,486
(29.6)
47,603
(31.7)
66,693
(34.6)
71,280
(31.4)
77,567
(30.5)

Other
4,757
(14.4)
7,461
(17.8)
8,389
(17.1)
10,509
(19.2)
13,394
(21)
15,063
(18.9)
15,377
(17.1)
16,745
(13.2)
23,735
(15.8)
28,025
(14.6)
32,444
(14.3)
40,516
(15.9)





4.2.4. The Development of Heavy Industrialization in Taiwan

The establishment of a vigorous economy through the development of heavy
industry was an important goal of the ROC leadership as early as the late 1950s. Taiwan
introduced planning measures to initiate heavy industrialization to support long-term
economic growth. However, the ROC government did not pursue mass-scale heavy
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industrialization at that time because it was reluctant to allocate the necessary resources.
Opposition also came from the Ministry of Finance, which was concerned about the costs
involved in heavy industrialization. As a result, the push for heavy industrialization was
largely shelved until the 1970s.94 At that point, the decline in the US military and
diplomatic commitment caused the ROC leadership to push for heavy industrialization as
an alternative to the US industrial base that it had relied upon for Taiwan’s defense.95
The state’s establishment of an industrial foundation for autonomous defensive
capability began with the issuance of the Long Range Plan in 1971. The plan called for
the development of strategic industries with a decisive importance to Taiwan’s defense
capability. They included shipbuilding, machinery, electrical equipment and steel, and
plastics and resins.96 This policy response differed somewhat from the state’s response to
reduced US financial support during the late 1950s. In the latter case, the ROC leadership
did not emphasize the necessity for becoming independent from the US security
commitment. In contrast, the decline in the US military and diplomatic commitment
during the 1970s led the ROC leadership to push for heavy industrialization as an
alternative to US military protection.97
As in the case of South Korea, the ROC government introduced several policies to
financially support the heavy-industrialization project. In doing so, the government
tightly controlled the state banks dominating Taiwan’s financial system.98 This allowed



 Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 306.
95
Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, 49.
96
Kristen Nordhaug, “Development through Want of Security: The Case of Taiwan,” Pacific Focus 7, no.1
(1997): 144.

 Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 306.
98
Ibid., 328-32.

169
ROC policymakers to direct the banks toward investing in the targeted strategic
industries. As a result, Taiwan was able to integrate the state’s industrial and financial
policies. For example, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) coordinated with the Central Bank
to look for means to increase capital accumulation, encourage private saving, and funnel
available financial resources into strategic industries.99 The MOF also introduced a series
of policies to transform commercial banks into industrial and investment banks, which
specialized in lending to targeted industries.100
The ROC government also introduced policy instruments to raise national savings.
Since both private and public savings were placed into state banks, the government was
able to directly access these resources to use according to the state’s needs. This suggests
that the state needed to raise the saving rate, which would lead to an increase in the
available financial resources allocated toward industrial development. The government’s
policy, combined with other factors, contributed to Taiwan’s high savings rate, which in
turn led to an increase in national savings and investment during the 1970s. As a result,
the ROC’s large-scale investment plan gained momentum from the mid-1970s.101 As
Table 4-3 shows, the targeted strategic industries gained momentum during the 1970s.
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Table 4-3. Output of Products from Strategic Heavy Industries in Taiwan, 1969-1979102

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Steel Bars
(m.t)
512,116
607,016
722,215
862,161
1,072,498
1,029,022
1,173,540
1,733,622
1,976,696
2,901,398
3,449,539

Machine Tools
(unit)
68,085
106,624
127,153
171,781
162,399
137,078
179,646
206,843
297,100
388,683
406,997

Motor Vehicles
(set)

19,591
22,012
23,759
28,915
31,278
31,013
44,272
77,177
116,103

Ship Building
(g.t)
117,329
217,421
279,711
305,405
341,249
355,743
315,089
456,284
703,550
431,130
382,051

Electric Power
(k.w.h.)
797
911
1,023
1,153
1,284
1,308
1,432
1,650
1,785
2,028
2,189

As in the case of South Korea, the existence of strong leadership facilitated the
placement of heavy industrialization under the initiative of national security. Thus, the
success of industrialization in the two states depended to a great extent upon the
leadership of strongmen, President Park Chung Hee in South Korea and Chiang Chingkuo in Taiwan. They decided which industries should be developed and introduced
various policy instruments to promote the targeted industries, as well as barriers to
protect them.
But a different pattern between the states should be also noted. Taiwan did not allow
privately held conglomerates to partake in the industrialization projects. Instead, ROC
leadership largely depended upon state-owned enterprise.103 In contrast, the ROK
government directed domestic big businesses to participate in the development of
strategic industries during the 1970s. As a result, industrialization in South Korea was
characterized by a conglomerate-dominated pattern.
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It can be argued that state-society relationships affected the different patterns
adopted by Taiwan and South Korea in their industrialization policies.104 According to
this argument, the nature of the "émigré regime" encouraged the Kuomintang government
to minimize the influence of social forces and to dominate the native Taiwanese. This
caused the ROC leadership to remain watchful of private businesses, the majority of
which were owned by Taiwanese natives. This explains why the ROC government did not
allow them to partake in industrialization projects. In contrast, South Korean leadership
fostered a few large conglomerates in the domestic market and allied with them after the
launch of its economic development project in 1961. The existing affiliation led to the
ROK government’s encouragement of big business to partake in developing strategic
industries during the 1970s.
The aforementioned argument, however, disregards the fact that the two states
commonly introduced their heavy industrialization projects as a security-promoting
strategy. In this respect, one should consider each state’s assessment of its own security as
the primary factor explaining its development of heavy industrialization. Thus, while
acknowledging the state-business relationship as important, the present study focuses on
security assessment to explain the differences between Taiwan and South Korea.
As mentioned earlier, the ROC leadership concluded that a military threat from the
PRC was not imminent. Rather, it was concerned about communist China’s apparent
attempt to isolate Taiwan from the rest of the world. In addition, the leadership feared a


104
Yongping Wu, “Rethinking the Taiwanese Developmental State,” The China Quarterly 177, March
(2004): 91-114; Yongping Wu, A Political Explanation of Economic Growth: State Survival, Bureaucratic
Politics, and Private Enterprises in the Making of Taiwan’s Economy, 1950-1985 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2005).

172
war of economic attrition in which the PRC’s consumer products might capture a large
portion of Taiwan’s foreign market.105 This threat assessment led the leadership to
emphasize sustaining economic viability as a survival strategy.106
This case study argues that the nature of the ROC leadership’s threat assessment
influenced the leadership’s decision to exclude the private sector from the state-led push
toward heavy industrialization. The leadership’s concern for economic survival, coupled
with the absence of direct military threat from the PRC, arguably led it to balance the
state’s security needs with the maintenance of economic viability. This arguably increased
the leadership’s sensitivity to the trade-offs inherent in directing privately held
conglomerates toward the defense industry “at the expense of civilian development
objectives.”107 This explains why the ROC government prevented the private sectors
from participating in the industrialization projects, which might have the potential to
negatively affect the growth of the state’s overall economy.
By comparison, the South Korean leadership assessed that North Korea would use
the US in East Asia as a window of opportunity to realize its revisionist purposes, both
militarily and politically. This security concern was also reinforced by the withdrawal of
US forces from Vietnam and US President Carter’s frequent calls to withdraw all US
ground forces from South Korea. This security assessment led ROK leadership to
conclude that North Korea presented an imminent military threat.
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Given the nature of the threat assessment, the imperative of establishing autonomous
defensive capability required the ROK leadership to rapidly increase the development of
the strategic defense industries. This helps to explain why the ROK government
depended not only upon state-owned enterprises but also on domestic big businesses to
establish an industrial basis for increasing defensive capabilities. In this respect, the scope
of the ROK’s domestic drive was wider than that of Taiwan.
In addition, the urgency of security led the ROK leadership to prioritize security
over economic rationale. Thus, the leadership constrained market rationality in favor of
promoting the targeted industries, harnessing domestic and international market forces
where necessary for security purposes. As a result, during the 1970s, the state’s defense
industry and was almost completely insulated from market pressure and even insured
from failure through government subsidies.
In contrast, ROC leadership tried to balance security and economic rationale in its
industrialization policies. In this respect, Nolan suggests the following conclusion:

Both [Taiwan and South Korea] devote enormous resources to military
preparedness, at obvious cost to their economies. … … The differences between the
two states, however, overshadow their similarities. Taiwan, as a result of careful and
deliberate policy, has managed the difficult process of economic growth with a
minimum of disruption and political discontent. Taiwan’s leaders understand that
economic difficulties can only heighten the island’s political isolation, perhaps at
last to a fatal degree. Korea, by contrast, has been overly ambitious and aggressive,
and the economic problems that threaten its long-term security are largely, though
certainly not solely of its own making. … … Korea has expanded its economy
beyond the ability of domestic structures to accommodate change. Rectifying the
serious imbalances that now exist after more than two decades of blind and rapid
growth will require major reforms in the Korean economy.108
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4.2.5. Policy of Taiwanization

The Kuomintang’s theory of political tutelage rested on the notion that citizens
should be mobilized behind the initiative of a revolutionary party. Since the early 1920s,
Kuomintang had attempted to penetrate volunteer associations and subordinate them
within the party ranks. Soon after it returned to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek
established a close alliance among the party, military, and government, allowing the
Kuomintang to function as the core of the alliance.109 Then he took measures to make it
possible for the party apparatus to penetrate systematically into every sector of society.110
Accordingly, party cells were established in all societal groups at all levels, which
included labor unions, farmers’ associations, professional organizations, state enterprises,
the business community, and student and youth organizations.111 As a result, during the
1950s, nearly all politically relevant groups were organized by the party or the state
organs it controlled.112
The ruling party’s tight control over societal organization suggests that the ROC
government was able to mobilize a substantial level of societal support under the security
initiative. So the question is whether the leadership actually mobilized societal support
under the state’s security initiative in response to the US retrenchment during the 1970s.
The following examination shows that the ROC government did not mobilize societal
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support under the state’s security initiative. This is arguably puzzling, considering the fact
that the ROC leadership faced challenges toward its authority during the 1970s.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC leadership enjoyed domestic and international
stability.113 Domestic opposition groups were all but invisible because there was no room
for civil activism to develop under the strong rule of Chiang Kai-shek, while the dynamic
of state corporatism turned many Taiwanese into supporters of the government.
Meanwhile, the Cold War confrontation required the US and the international community
to sustain support for Taiwan as a defense against the expansion of communism in East
Asia. However, that stability was shaken as the ROC leadership was increasingly
challenged on both domestic and international sides.
Taiwan experienced several international setbacks during the 1970s, which were
followed by declining public confidence and morale, economic difficulties, and stirrings
of domestic opposition.114 The most serious challenge came from expatriate Taiwanese
opposition movements, which argued that Taiwan’s hope for freedom only lay in
replacing the authoritarian government with a leadership of native Taiwanese with no
territorial claim to mainland China. In addition, there was a domestic movement
committed to a fundamental reform of the ROC’s political system. The ROC government
was also faced with criticism of its weak response to Japan’s claim on the Tiaoyutai
island chain, which is located in the East China Sea, between Taiwan and Japan.
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The PRC’s peace offensive also challenged the ROC leadership’s authority.115
Beijing appealed to the ROC government for a negotiated settlement of Taiwan’s status.
From Beijing’s standpoint, a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue would open the door
for the eventual subjugation of the Kuomintang regime. Beijing also took steps to obtain
the sympathy and support of native Taiwanese in order to alienate them from the
Nationalist regime.
What compounded these challenges was the development of factionalism within the
Kuomintang and uncertainty about the succession to Chiang Kai-shek.116 By 1972,
Chiang Ching-kuo had taken on many of his father’s responsibilities, but there was no
consensus within the ruling party regarding whether Chiang Ching-kuo should succeed
his father. In addition, President Chiang’s increasing infirmity intensified anxieties over
Taiwan’s political future.
The emergence of these challenges suggests that the ROC leadership’s link with
domestic society weakened. This diminished the state’s ability to balance external
threats.117 If the leadership had felt the urgency to increase security, it would have
introduced a large-scale domestic campaign to mobilize societal support under the
security initiative. But the leadership’s assessment of the PRC’s threats suggests that it
did not have an incentive to introduce such a large-scale domestic drive. The absence of
direct threats from its adversary also made it hard for the ROC leadership to manipulate
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external threats to strengthen the state-society link. Rather, the ROC government
moderated its position in dealing with oppositional movements.
This moderate policy, which is dubbed “Taiwanization,” attempted to gradually
incorporate the native Taiwanese into the state’s political system. Two dimensions
characterized the policy of Taiwanization.118 First, the ROC government tried to reform
national parliamentary bodies to make them more representative of Taiwan citizens. More
open electoral competition made it possible to co-opt many social forces. Second, the
government tried to achieve “interethnic power-sharing” through the method of recruiting
more Taiwanese into the Kuomintang regime. As a result, the number of ethnic
Taiwanese in leadership positions at provincial and local levels and in party organs
rapidly increased after 1972.119 These aspects of political transition suggest that there
was a shift from hard to soft authoritarianism in the sense that resorting to authoritarian
repression came to be less frequent, less direct, and more legalistic, even while the
Kuomintang’s dominance was still guaranteed.120
The policy of Taiwanization can be seen as the ROC leadership’s strategy to ensure
the state’s political survival by strengthening its foundation in Taiwanese society.121 In
the process, Chiang Ching-kuo orchestrated a major party reform to ease the regime away
from its authoritarian tendencies. In contrast, the imperative of national security in the
military sense led the Park regime in South Korea to establish a garrison state in South
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Korea, strengthening government control over domestic society. It also introduced
ideological mobilization to secure societal support for the state’s industrialization
program. This pattern, so different from the one in Taiwan, lends support to the argument
that the state’s willingness to mobilize societal support for national military preparedness
depends on its security assessment.

4.3. The Rise and Fall of Taiwan’s Nuclear Development Project in the 1970s

Dreaming of a triumphant return to mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek made known
his ambition to retake the mainland using military means. Washington tried to restrain
Taiwan’s unilateral raids on the mainland and other provocative actions in order to avoid
a direct confrontation with communist China. In this respect, Washington’s dilemma was
that it was forced to pursue a policy of dual deterrence. The US had to signal its resolve
to deter communist China from attacking Taiwan, while ensuring that the Taiwanese
leadership did not interpret this resolve as a signal to engage in provocative actions
against the mainland.122 Taiwan’s shift of emphasis from offensive to defensive strategy
toward the end of 1960s suggests that the ROC had no intention of engaging in a
unilateral offensive action against the PRC.
But the development of Taiwan’s nuclear weapon capability posed another challenge
for Washington’s policy of dual deterrence. Taiwan allegedly engaged in early tentative
efforts to develop nuclear weapons in response to the PRC’s first nuclear test in 1964.123
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The Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST), which was founded in 1965
under the sponsorship of the ROC Defense Ministry, financially supported Taiwan’s
nuclear program. The program, which was dubbed the “Hsin Chu” program, was placed
under the authority of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), after its
beginning in 1967. The program was targeted to produce and operate a heavy-water
reactor, a heavy-water production plant, a reprocessing research lab and a plutonium
separation plant.124
Washington intervened as early as 1966 to ensure that Taiwan would adhere to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to prevent diversion of materials
to building nuclear weapons.125 Under US pressure, Taiwan and the IAEA reached a
safeguard agreement in 1971.126 According to this agreement, any nuclear materials that
Taiwan acquired would be subject to restrictions in their application under U.S. law. In
this manner, the US became the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan’s status as a non-nuclear
weapons state.127
However, the 1971 agreement could not prevent Taiwan from pursuing a military
nuclear program. As Chiang Ching-kuo acknowledged in 1975, Taiwan acquired basic
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capabilities for nuclear weapons production by 1974.128 For example, Taiwan’s Institute
of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) developed a fuel fabrication factory. In addition, it
secured approximately 100 metric tons of uranium from South Africa, which was much
more than was necessary to operate the heavy-water research reactor, which it had
purchased from Canada in 1969.129 In addition, as a part of the Hsin Chu program, the
CIST tried to acquire a large-scale reprocessing plant through negotiations with West
Germany.130
The development of the Sino-American rapprochement caused Washington to
become hypersensitive about the direction of Taiwan’s nuclear program. Months after
Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972, State Department commissioned the CIA to
prepare a report on the subject.131 The CIA’s report, entitled Special National Intelligence
Estimate, opined that Taiwan's "present intention is to develop the capability to fabricate
and test a nuclear device."132 Department of State intelligence did not find any hard
evidence that the ROC leadership intended to develop an nuclear weapon capability.133
But the State Department decided to dispatch a special study mission to Taipei to identify
the “ROC coterie which advocates development of nuclear weapons capabilities.”134 The
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study team visited Taiwan during November of 1973, picking up hints that Taiwan was
keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons.135
The ROC government decided to develop its nuclear weapons capability as an
alternative to relying on the US security commitment. As Leonard S. Unger, the US
Ambassador to Taiwan, pointed out, “Washington would ultimately break diplomatic
relations and formal security ties with Taiwan as part of a normalization deal with Beijing
… … ROC actions will probably be affected by its perception of its security following
the termination of the US/ROC mutual defense treaty.”136 It was plain that the Taiwan’s
existential vulnerability vis-à-vis the PRC was a driving force behind the development of
a military nuclear program.137
However, a study of Taiwan’s military nuclear program during the 1970s should
consider the following two factors, which, jointly, raise questions about why the ROC
government attempted to develop nuclear weapons. First, ROC leadership was not
concerned about direct military threats from communist China. Second, the US was
“Taiwan’s main market, source of foreign investment, and provider of weapons and
security guarantees.”138 Considering this dependence, Taiwan was well advised not to
develop a nuclear weapons capability, as it would conceivably prompt retaliation from
Washington.139
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The present study characterizes Taiwan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability as
a security-seeking strategy designed to pressure Washington to reverse the objectionable
policy of rapprochement with the ROC’s main adversary. It can be argued that ROC
leadership tried to increase the price Washington would have to pay for abandoning
Taiwan, by jeopardizing US strategic interests. The ROC’s pursuit of nuclear weapons
capability went against US strategic interests in stabilizing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which was developed in the aftermath of India’s first successful nuclear
test in 1974. The spread of nuclear weapons capabilities became a major concern for
Washington; while there were a number of proliferation challenges other than India, such
as Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea, Taiwan was a special case because its military
nuclear program would plainly cause strain on US efforts to place “Sino-American
relations on a nonconfrontational basis.”140
Thus, it is no surprise that Washington opposed the development of Taiwan’s
military nuclear program. Washington began with introducing a low-key approach,
issuing verbal warnings and blocking the ROC’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons
technology through foreign assistance. In September 1972, for example, the Nixon
administration tried to extract a pledge from the leadership of Taiwan to forego pursuing
an independent nuclear weapons capability.141 Another verbal warning was given to
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Taiwanese officials in October 1973.142 Washington also discouraged the ROC
government from purchasing a reprocessing facility from West Germany.143
Facing pressure from its greatest ally, the ROC government assured the US that it
would definitely drop efforts to acquire a reprocessing plant and limit its nuclear program
to peaceful uses.144 But it became known later that the low-key approach was not
sufficient to stop Taiwan’s military nuclear program. This put US policymakers under
pressure to increase the pressure on the ROC government.145 However, Washington
could clearly not threaten with sanctions before Congress introduced the Symington
amendment in 1976, which authorized the US to strengthen its position on nuclear
proliferation.146
The absence of a direct threat of sanctions from Washington made it possible for the
ROC government to continue its military nuclear program. As a 1974 CIA estimate
concluded, "Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon option clearly in
mind, and it will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device after five years or so.”147
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By September 1976, the Department of State received conclusive evidence that the INER
was undertaking a covert program to gain reprocessing technology.148
Reacting to growing concerns about the direction of Taiwan’s nuclear program, the
State Department instructed the US Embassy in Taipei to clearly threaten “an end to
nuclear cooperation.”149 Unger was also instructed to deliver the following message:
“Should the ROC or any other government seek national reprocessing facilities, this
would risk jeopardizing additional highly important relationships with the US.”150 The
US ambassador pressed Premier Chiang to give assurances that Taiwan would abandon
the project to develop a pilot reprocessing plant. In response, Chiang assured the US
government that the ROC would abandon the project. In September 1976, the Premier
and his cabinet issued a public statement which declared that the ROC had no “intention
whatsoever to use its human and natural resources for the development of nuclear
weapons or to obtain equipment for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.”151
By the end of 1976, the US embassy in Taipei still reported that “We have rather
compelling evidence that in spite of solemn and public assurances given by the GROC
[Government of the Republic of China] and personally by Premier Chiang, the Chinese
may not yet have given up their intentions of acquiring a capability for reprocessing
nuclear fuels.”152 The report led Washington to conclude that the ROC government was
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not living up to its commitment.153 This suggested that Washington’s nonproliferation
efforts were still too vague for the ROC government to take seriously.154 Consequently,
Washington increased the credibility of its threats by presenting a number of far-reaching
demands, which included termination of all fuel cycle activities, reorientation of facilities
involving or leading to weapons-usable materials, transfer of all plutonium to the US, and
avoidance of any program or activity which, upon consultation with the US, would be
determined to apply to the development of a nuclear explosive capability.155 In addition,
the Carter administration successfully communicated to the ROC government its
determination to do everything to prevent nuclear proliferation.156
Taiwan subsequently complied with the US demands to the point that Washington
became confident of the ROC government’s nonproliferation efforts by the middle of
1977. As Carter’s security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski reported to him, Premier Chiang
allowed that Washington’s effort to “crack down” on Taiwan’s nuclear project “clearly
yielded its desired results.”157 In addition, Unger reported that the ROC government “has
made an honest, albeit reluctant, effort to comply.”158 The US nuclear team was also
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confident that “ROC officials were cooperative and indicated willingness to take all steps
necessary to assure compliance with agreements.”159
As the case of South Korea, Taiwan’s compliance with the US derived from its
consideration of that state’s substantial dependence upon the United States. As Premier
Chiang argued, Taiwan’s vulnerability and unique relationship with the United States
allowed Washington to deal with the ROC “in a fashion which few other countries would
tolerate.”160 In this respect, Taiwanese high-ranking officials believed that “it would be
folly for [the] ROC to endanger its nuclear power program by conducting nuclear
activities of questionable nature.”161 Thus one can reach the following conclusion: “The
[Kuomintang] and its successors’ military, political, and economic dependence on the US
are central to understanding Taiwan’s nuclear history. Nuclear decisions were embedded
in a model of regime survival emphasizing economic growth, prosperity, stability, and the
defeat of internal subversion, which explains widespread receptivity to US demands and
inducements.”162
The rise and fall of Taiwan’s military nuclear program during the 1970s suggests
that the ROC leadership, like its counterpart in South Korea, was trying to pressure the
United States to reverse its objectionable strategic posture in East Asia. According to the
theory posited in this study, the scope of a regional state’s willingness to engage in
military behaviors against its patron’s strategic interests is a function of its security
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concern in response to the patron’s retrenchment. The ROK leadership’s concern about
North Korea’s revisionist strategy was coupled with its skepticism of the reliability of US
security commitment. In comparison, the ROC leadership did not have an urgent need to
militarily balance communist China, even though it was skeptical of its patron’s
commitment. This suggests that the level of ROK leadership’s security concern was
relatively higher than that of the ROC leadership. Accordingly, there should be a
meaningful difference between the two countries in their pursuit of a military behavior
against the strategic interests of the United States. Regarding this, the present study raises
the following two points.
First, the ROC leadership was relatively unwilling to develop a missile capability as
part of the military nuclear program. Taiwan found it difficult to develop a missile
capability, an essential part of any nuclear deterrence program, during the 1960s. In the
mid-1970s, the ROC government initiated a missile program, which included hiring
missile-related specialists overseas and allocating research resources for developing a
medium-range ballistic missile. In addition, it was estimated that the ROC’s defense
industry matured during the 1970s to such an extent that Taiwan was able to produce
surface-to-surface missiles.163 However, the ROC government did not develop the
nuclear project beyond the initial stage, as it faced US pressure.164 As a result, Taiwan
could not develop the medium-range ballistic missiles or space launchers that were
required to establish a nuclear deterrence capability. 165 In contrast, the chapter on Korea
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shows that the ROK government sustained its project of missile development while
facing direct pressure from Washington.
The comparison of Taiwan and South Korea in terms of their response to US
pressure suggests that the ROC leadership was less committed than its ROK counterpart
to the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The ROK leadership was so committed to
the pursuit of nuclear and missile programs that it was unwilling to abandon the programs
even in the face of Washington’s coercive efforts to reverse them. In contrast, Washington
found it relatively easy to make the ROC leadership to abandon the pursuit of a missile
capability.
Second, the ROC leadership was relatively divided over the necessity for developing
a nuclear weapons capability, while the ROK did not witness such internal division. As
the US Embassy in Taipei reported, Chiang Kai-shek was the prime mover in the nuclear
weapons project.166 Chiang Ching-kuo, the president’s son and successor, also took the
initiative in the state’s decision to attempt the separation of plutonium.167 Despite the
existence of a political initiative to develop nuclear weapons, there was internal division
within the ROC leadership regarding such a step.
On the one hand, the ROC military played a key role in developing a nuclear
weapons capability. Because of its role as the key agency in charge of the nuclear
weapons development project under the ROC Defense Ministry’s sponsorship, the CIST
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was a source of concern for Washington’s efforts at nonproliferation.168 Under its aegis,
the INER secretly developed a small reprocessing facility and acquired a research reactor.
On the other hand, there were a group of policymakers within the government that
was opposed to the development of a nuclear weapons capability. General Tang Chun-po,
Vice Minister of Defense, for example, was opposed to the project, as he believed that it
would be impractical.169 Professor Ta-You Wu, a science adviser to president Chiang,
was another member of the group. While witnessing the development of the project since
its beginning in the 1960s, he criticized it for underestimating the true risk of causing a
confrontation with the United States and for overestimating its chance of success.170 The
Atomic Energy Council in Taiwan also played its part. In March 1973, Victor Cheng,
Secretary General of the civilian-controlled agency, privately informed US diplomats
about the state’s reprocessing deal with West Germany, emphasizing his concern about
the military-led project to acquire a fuel reprocessing capability.171 This provided
Washington with an opportunity to raise concerns over Taiwan’s military nuclear
program.
The development of internal division over the military nuclear program suggests that
the ROC government was less willing than the ROK leadership to pursue military
behavior against the U.S. strategic interests. Taiwan found it difficult to form a consensus
between military and civilian sectors over the necessity of developing a nuclear weapons
capability.

The internal division provided Washington with leverage to control the
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direction of Taiwan’s nuclear program by strengthening “the hand of moderate elements
in the ROC with regard to its peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”172 This explains why
Washington found it relatively easy to force Taiwan to abandon its objectionable military
behavior.173

4.4. Chapter Conclusion

The theory of this research hypothesized co-variation between the level of a regional
state’s security concern and the scope of the state’s efforts to increase the contribution of
domestic society to the establishment of an autonomous defense capability. This research
also suggests the existence of co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security
concern and the level of its commitment to the pursuit of military behaviors against the
patron’s strategic interests.
If we compare South Korea and Japan in terms of the leadership’s security concern
in response to the US strategic posture in East Asia, the former is at one end of the
spectrum while the latter is at the other end of the spectrum. The ROC leadership
experienced substantially high level of security concern while the Japanese leadership
experienced substantially low level of security concern in response to the superpower’s
retrenchment during the 1970s. This explains why there was a sharp difference in the two
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states’ security-promoting behaviors during the 1970s. First, South Korea was strongly
committed to the pursuit of military policies against the US strategic interests while Japan
developed its military policies in line with the superpower’s strategic interests. Second,
the ROK leadership introduced huge-scale domestic drives to rapidly increase the
contribution of domestic society to an autonomous defense capability while the Japanese
leadership established a minimalist approach to security.
The present chapter tests the theory of this research against Taiwan’s securityseeking behaviors during the 1970s in response to the US retrenchment in East Asia. For
this purpose, the case study documents the nature of the ROC leadership’s security
assessment. Then it examines whether there was co-variation between the level of the
leadership’s security concern and the scope of Taiwan’s domestic drives to increase
domestic contribution to an autonomous defense capability. It also examines whether
there was co-variation between the level of the leadership’s security concern and the level
of Taiwan’s commitment to the pursuit of a military behavior against the superpower’s
strategic interests.
The present chapter documents the ROC leadership’s security concern. There are
three points that together suggest that the leadership was highly skeptical of the US
reliability. First, the US ambiguity during the development of Sino-American
rapprochement made the ROC leadership skeptical of the patron’s reliability. Second, the
leadership believed that the US gave up its security commitment to Taiwan. Third,
Taiwan believed that Washington did not do all it could do, or all it had promised to do, to
keep the ROC’s representation in the UN. But the ROC leadership also believed that the
PRC’s offensive military strategy toward Taiwan was constrained by the Sino-Soviet
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Conflict and the development of the Sino-American rapprochement. This belief lessened
Taiwan’s security concern.
Thus the level of the ROC leadership’s security concern is estimated to be relatively
higher than that of Japan but to be relatively lower than that of South Korea. Accordingly,
the degree of the ROC leadership’s willingness to promote domestic contribution to
defensive capability was hypothesized to be relatively higher than that of the Japanese
leadership but to be relatively lower than that of the ROK counterpart. The case study
supports this hypothesis. In doing so, it introduces a two-step approach in measuring the
scope of the ROC leadership’s security-promoting domestic drives during the 1970s.
On the one hand, the case study finds that the ROC leadership’s security concern led
to Taiwan’s introduction of security-promoting domestic drives. First, the ROC
government developed a defense industry as it shifted emphasis toward the development
of an autonomous defensive capability. Second, it established a highly centralized
decision-making process to encompass an economic and social agenda in its defense
program. A third finding is that the ROC leadership pushed for heavy industrialization as
an alternative to the US industrial base that it had relied upon for defense. The
government also financially supported the development of its targeted strategic industries,
which had a decisive importance on Taiwan’s defense capability.
On the other hand, this case study finds several points to suggest that the leadership
of Taiwan was less willing than its ROK counterpart to introduce security-promoting
domestic drives. First, Taiwan did not introduce a policy instrument that particularly
targeted the extraction of domestic resources toward autonomous defense capability. In
contrast, South Korea introduced several policy instruments to extract national resources
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to establish a revenue base of its defensive capability. Second, the ROC government
decreased the portion of the government’s budget allocated to defense spending while
increasing the portion allocated to the state’s long-term objectives. This suggests the
ROC leadership was not under pressure to prioritize short-term security preparedness
over other long-term objectives. In contrast, South Korea felt itself to be under such
pressure. Third, Taiwan tried to balance security and economic rationale while pushing
for heavy industrialization. In contrast, the urgency of security caused the ROK
government to constrain economic rationality in favor of promoting strategic industries.
Fourth, the Kuomintang regime did not introduce social mobilization under the initiative
of national security. In contrast, the imperative of security led the ROK regime to
establish a garrison state in South Korea while introducing ideological mobilization to
secure societal support for the state’s push toward heavy industrialization.
According to the theory of this research, it is also hypothesized that the ROC
leadership was less committed than the ROK counterpart to the pursuit of a military
policy that went against the US strategic interests. This hypothesis is supported by the
case study. Like South Korea, the ROC leadership developed a nuclear weapons
capability as a strategy to put pressure on the United States to reverse its objectionable
strategic posture in East Asia. However, the ROC leadership was relatively unwilling to
develop a missile capability as part of the military nuclear program. In addition, ROC
leadership was relatively divided over the necessity of developing a nuclear weapons
capability. The two points suggests that Taiwan’s leadership was relatively less
committed than their ROK counterpart to the pursuit of a military nuclear program
against the US strategic interests. This explains why Washington found it relatively easy
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to force Taiwan to abandon its objectionable military behavior. In contrast, the leadership
of South Korea was so committed to the pursuit of nuclear and missile programs that it
sustained the programs even under Washington’s pressure.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

This research was planned to explore how a regional state could improve its security
during the time of its patron’s strategic retrenchment. What made this author interested in
this research topic was an empirical puzzle that is found in the security-seeking behaviors
of the US allies in Northeast Asia during the time of the Nixon administration’s strategic
retrenchment in the 1970s. The present research found that Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan did not respond to the US strategic retrenchment in a uniform fashion. Rather,
each state responded quite differently to promote security under the superpower’s
retrenchment. Why did they develop such different behaviors?
To solve this empirical puzzle, the present research introduced a theory of a regional
state’s security-promoting behaviors during the time of its patron’s retrenchment. The
theory is composed of three sections: operationalization of a regional state’s security
concern, a theory of a regional state’s security-promoting domestic drives, and a theory of
a regional ally’s pursuit of a military policy against the strategic interests of its patron.
The theory was tested against the context of the security-seeking behaviors of the US
regional allies in Northeast Asia during the time of the US strategic retrenchment during
the 1970s.

196
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theory
and research strategy of this study. In the third section, I synthesize the main empirical
findings regarding how each of the regional allies’ security assessment affected the
security-seeking domestic and military behaviors during the 1970s. The fourth section
discusses the implications that can be drawn from this research, with particular focus on
the context of the security relationship between a superpower and its regional allies. In
the fifth section, I will suggest an agenda for future research. Then a final section
suggests a few notes to conclude this study.

5.2. Review of Theory and Research Design

The theory of this research operationally defined a regional state’s perception of
security under the patron’s retrenchment. Rather than simply considering the state’s
security concern as the fear of abandonment, the theory treats it as a combination of a
regional state’s perception of patron reliability and its perception of military threats posed
by the adversary. This helped to discuss the level of a regional state’s security concern as
a continuous variable.
This study introduced three methods to infer each regional state’s security
assessment. The primary method of inference was qualitative analysis of the written and
spoken statements of each state’s leadership regarding its adversary’s military threats and
its patron’s reliability. Ideally speaking, I should have solely used each leadership’s
statements in measuring each state’s security concern. Because of the limited availability
of the primary source data, however, this study needed to introduce alternative methods
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to make inference of the state leadership’s perception of security. In this respect, the case
study referred to primary source documents and secondary source literature that contain
information on each state leadership’s perception of security in response to the Nixon
administration’s retrenchment. It also referred to the development of the security
environment each regional state directly faced, because this method provides
circumstantial evidence to make inference of each state’s assessment of security.
This study argued that a regional state’s security concern will lead the state’s
leadership to introduce domestic drives to increase societal contribution to its
autonomous defense posture. Then it was theorized that there is co-variation between the
level of a regional state’s security concern and the scope of its efforts to increase
domestic contribution to an autonomous defense capability.
To measure the state’s security-promoting domestic drives, this study examined a
change in defense spending as a share of national income because this is a
straightforward way to measure the scope of a state’s domestic drives to increase the
societal contribution to an autonomous defense posture. But it also acknowledged that
this quantitative indicator may not reflect the precise level of a regional state’s security
concern under the patron’s retrenchment. In this respect, the present study used other
qualitative indicators to measure the security-seeking behaviors. It examined each state
leadership’s initiative to direct domestic resources toward autonomous defense capability
because it is the essential strategy to increase the domestic contribution to autonomous
defense. It also examined whether each leadership tried to mobilize domestic support
under the initiative of national security. The case study used the quantitative and
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qualitative indicators in comparing the selected states’ responses to the Nixon
administration’s retrenchment in Northeast Asia.
The present study also theorized that a regional state’s pursuit of military policies
against its patron’s strategic interests is a function of its security assessment during the
security provider’s retrenchment. According to the theory, a regional state is supposed to
maintain deferential behaviors toward its patron when it does not negatively assess the
security implication of the patron’s strategic posture. As its security concern increases
under the patron’s retrenchment, however, the theory expected that a regional state
pursues military policies against the patron’s strategic interests to pressure the security
provider to reverse course. According to the theory, it was hypothesized that there is covariation between the level of a regional state’s negative assessment of security and the
level of its commitment to the pursuit of a military policy that jeopardizes the strategic
interests of its security provider.
The case study used the following three qualitative indicators to measure the level of
each regional state’s commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against its patron.
First, it measured the compatibility between each of the regional states’ military
behaviors and the US’s strategic interests in Northeast Asia. Second, the study examined
the level of internal cohesion within the leadership of the regional states when pursuing a
military policy against the US strategic interests. Third, it examined how each of the
regional states responded to the US’s coercive efforts to reverse the military behaviors
against its strategic interests.
This study suggested two points to justify why the theory of a regional state’s
security-seeking behaviors should be tested against the context of how the three regional
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allies responded to the Nixon administration’s strategic retrenchment. First, it is arguably
difficult to find substantial variation among them in terms of the level of security concern
under the superpower’s strategic retrenchment because each of them was highly
dependent upon the patron’s military protection. In this respect, each of them is arguably
a hard case to test the theory of this research that argues that the level of a regional state’s
security concern is the most proximate cause to explain different security-seeking
behaviors among regional allies. Second, the case selection arguably isolates the causal
link between the US strategic posture and the regional allies’ security-seeking behaviors.
Each of the states could not find an alternative source of allied support under the
superpower’s retrenchment. In addition, because the three regional states are located in
the same geopolitical area, the case selection helps to control for factors at the level of
international system that have the potential to affect each of the regional state’s
perception of security.

5.3. Synthesis of Empirical Findings

There were two research questions that the case study answered. First, was there
covariation between the levels of security concern expressed by each US ally in
Northeast Asia and the scope of each ally’s domestic drives to increase domestic
contribution to autonomous defense capability in response to the Nixon administration’s
strategic retrenchment? Second, was there covariation between the level of security
concern and the level of each ally’s commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against
the US strategic interests?
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To answer the two questions, each case study examined the level of security concern
expressed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan under the Nixon administration’s military
retrenchment in East Asia and the development of the Sino-American rapprochement.
The case study of Japan found that Japan was anxious about the US reliability. But it also
found that the development of the security environment during the 1970s substantially
mitigated Japan’s security concern. In contrast, the case study of South Korea found that
the ROK leadership was highly skeptical of the US reliability in response to the Nixon
administration’s force reduction. In addition, the leadership of South Korea believed that
North Korea would make use of the Nixon administration’s strategic posture for its
revisionist purposes. The case study of Taiwan found that the ROC leadership was highly
skeptical of the US reliability under the development of the Sino-American
rapprochement. But it also found that Taiwan’s threat perception of the communist China
came to be mitigated as a result of the state leadership’s belief that the adversary’s
offensive military strategy was constrained by the Sino-Soviet conflict and the
development of Sino-American rapprochement.
According to the case study, the Japanese leadership experienced substantially low
level of security concern while the ROK leadership experienced substantially high level
of security concern in response to the Nixon administration’s strategic posture in
Northeast Asia. In this respect, Japan was at one end of the spectrum while South Korea
was at the other end of the spectrum, if we compare them in terms of the level of security
concern. Then the case study of Taiwan found that the level of Taiwan’s security concern
is estimated to be relatively higher than that of Japan but lower than that of South Korea.
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The case study examined each regional ally’s domestic drives to promote societal
contribution to autonomous defense. The case study of Japan found that the Japanese
leadership restrained itself from introducing domestic drives to promote a societal
contribution to autonomous defense capability. This was the result of the establishment of
a minimalist defense posture during the 1970s. In contrast, the case study of South Korea
found that the leadership of South Korea introduced all-out efforts to promote societal
contribution to autonomous defense. According to the case study, the ROK government
made efforts to gain rapid access to national resources. It also pushed for heavy
industrialization, which was the state’s mobilization strategy to produce the required
defense materials through the development of targeted strategic industries. Furthermore,
the ROK regime introduced the Saemaŭl Movement and the Yushin system, which were
targeted to mobilize societal support of the heavy industrialization project. The case study
of Taiwan found that the ROC government pushed for the heavy industrialization as an
alternative to the US industrial base that it had relied upon for defense. But the case study
also found the ROC leadership did not introduce a policy instrument of extraction that
was targeted to gain rapid access to domestic resources. It also found that the ROC
government decreased the portion of the government’s budget allocated to defense
spending while increasing the portion allocated to the state’s long-term objectives. The
ROC government also balanced security and economic rationale while introducing the
heavy industrialization drive. In addition, the case study found that the ROC regime did
not mobilize social support under the initiative of national security.
To summarize, comparison of empirical findings from the case study supported the
existence of covariation between the levels of each regional state’s security concern and
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the scope of the state leadership’s security-promoting domestic drives. The case study
documented that the Japanese leadership’s security assessment during the détente period
led to the establishment of a minimalist posture to security while the substantially high
level of security concern made the leadership of South Korea try to establish a maximalist
posture to defense. The case study also found that the degree of the ROC leadership’s
security-promoting domestic drives was relatively higher than that of the Japanese
leadership but was relatively lower than that of the ROK counterpart.
The case study also examined whether each of the regional allies pursued a military
policy against US strategic interests. The case study of Japan found that the Japanese
government voluntarily ratified the NPT to ensure that Japan would not pursue nuclear
armament, despite its capability and the existence of a motive to pursue nuclear weapons.
The government also institutionalized defense cooperation with the United States. In
contrast, the case study of South Korea found that the ROK leadership pursued military
policies which placed the superpower’s strategic interests at risk. The ROK government
tried to develop a missile capability, even beyond the scope allowed by the superpower.
This jeopardized the patron’s strategic interests to sustain the status-quo in the Korean
peninsula. The ROK government also began to develop an autonomous nuclear weapon
capability, which was evidently against the US strategy to stabilize the NPT system. The
case study of Taiwan found that the ROC leadership began to develop a nuclear weapon
capability which was against the US policy to place the Sino-American relations on a
nonconfrontational basis. But the case study also found that the leadership of Taiwan was
internally divided over the necessity for the military nuclear program and that the ROC
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government did not develop its missile program beyond the initial stage, as it faced US
pressure.
The empirical findings from the case study supported the existence of covariation
between the levels of each regional state’s security concern and the level of its
commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against the US strategic interests. First, the
case study found that Japan was not committed to the pursuit of a military policy that
would jeopardize the US strategic interests. Rather, the Japanese government chose to
develop its military behaviors in the direction favored by the United States. This finding
lent support to the argument that a regional state is supposed to maintain deferential
behaviors toward its patron when it does not negatively assess the security implication of
the patron’s strategic posture. Second, given the ROK leadership’s substantially higher
level of security concern, it was hypothesized that South Korea was strongly committed
to the pursuit of a military policy that jeopardized the US strategic interests. The
empirical findings supported this hypothesis. Third, the case of Taiwan found that the
ROC leadership was more committed than the Japanese counterpart but was less
committed than the ROK counterpart to the pursuit of a military policy that went against
the US strategic interests.
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5.4. Implication

This study suggested the theory of a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors
based upon criticism of existing scholarship on asymmetric alliance. In this respect, there
are several points to discuss regarding how the present study contributes to the existing
scholarship. In addition, the case study suggested several empirical findings that help us
to better understand the security relationship between the US and its regional allies in
Northeast Asia. This section discusses three points regarding the implications of this
research.
First, this study suggests that a regional state’s assessment of security leads to a
dynamic of conflict and cooperation in the security relationship between the regional
state and its superpower patron. This study suggests that a regional state’s choice between
the contrasting military behaviors toward its patron is a function of its assessment of
security in response to the patron’s retrenchment. Then the case study finds that South
Korea and Taiwan commonly pursued military nuclear programs, which led to conflict
between the superpower and the regional allies. In contrast, the Japanese leadership
directed the state’s military policies to honor the patron’s strategic interests. This led to
the development of military cooperation between the US and Japan.
A second point is about the role of perception in the dynamic of cooperation
between a regional state and its superpower patron when they do not agree how to
interpret security environment. In this respect, the case study of Korea finds that the
different perception of the security environment led to conflict between the US and South
Korea during the 1970s. US policymakers believed that North Korea would not launch a
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full-scale military provocation and that South Korea would be able to counter North
Korea’s military provocations. This belief led to Washington’s conclusion that the Nixon
administration’s force reduction policy would not affect the overall balance of power in
the Korean peninsula. In addition, the Nixon administration believed that the
development of détente in the Korean peninsula would ease tension in the Korean
peninsula. However, the US assessment of security was substantially different from that
of the South Korean leadership. The case study finds that ROK government persistently
emphasized North Korea’s revisionist purpose in the Korean peninsula. Because of this
concern, the ROK leadership believed that the US force reduction would inevitably lead
to the adversary’s initiation of a revisionist war against South Korea. Even the
development of détente in the Korean peninsula did not change the ROK’s threat
perception. Rather, the ROK leadership expressed the belief that North Korea would
make use of the détente for its revisionist purpose and that the Nixon administration’s
rapprochement with communist China would negatively affect the security of South
Korea. Because of the perception of security, the leadership did not agree with the
superpower’s strategic posture and even pursued military policies that would jeopardize
the patron’s strategic interests. In response, Washington criticized the ROK leadership’s
security assessment and pressured the regional ally to reverse the objectionable military
behaviors.
Lastly, this study suggests that the role of perception needs to be fully integrated into
the existing scholarship on the second-image reversed logic. According to this
scholarship, the imperative of security competition under the anarchic setting of
international politics induces states to organize themselves internally in order to meet
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external threats. While following this logic, the present study suggests that the causal
effect of anarchy should be mediated by a state’s perception of security. The case study of
Korea finds that the ROK leadership’s movement to control domestic society was a result
of its perception of insecurity in response to the Nixon administration’s retrenchment. But
the case study of Japan finds that the Japanese leadership’s assessment of security led the
Japanese government to refrain from changing the existing state-society relationship. The
case study of Taiwan also found that the absence of the ROC government’s movement to
control domestic society, given the state leadership’s modest level of security concern. To
summarize, the comparative analysis suggests that a superpower’s retrenchment can be
discussed as an external factor to affect the state-society relationship of its regional allies
when the regional states are highly sensitive to the superpower’s strategic retrenchment.

5.5. Recommendation for Future Research

This research supported the theory of a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors
by studying the security-seeking behaviors of US allies in the Northeast Asia. In this
respect, one may suggest that whether the theory can be introduced into the explanation
of a regional ally in another regional context. This research acknowledges the necessity to
test the external validity of the main arguments of this research.
First, testing external validity of the theory needs to consider how to test it against a
regional state which finds it relatively easy to find alternative sources of allied support.
For example, it may be argued that a study should test the theory against a regional state
under multipolarity, because this state may find it relatively easier to secure alternative
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sources of allied support than another regional state under the structure of bipolarity or
unipolarity. This research could also be tested against the US allies in Western Europe.
The presence of institutionalized military cooperation in this region makes each of the
regional allies relatively less sensitive to the superpower’s strategic retrenchment than the
US allies in Northeast Asia that do not enjoy benefits of the institutionalized military
cooperation.
It also needs to be noted that the three cases examined did not witness a substantial
level of domestic opposition to the state’s formulation of defense posture. The case
selection helps to control for the neoclassical realist perspective that a regional state’s
willingness to introduce security-promoting domestic drives is constrained by its
relationship with domestic society. This helps to highlight the realist version of the state
as a rational actor in the security studies that introduces security-promoting behaviors
according to its assessment of security. Thus this research supports the state’s assumed
privileged international position and the realist characterization of the state as an agent
that possesses a realm of autonomous behavior in conducting foreign policy. 1 It also
characterizes the state as “a well-established public arena that is both normatively and
organizationally distinguishable from private interests and pursuits.”2
As a neoclassical realist points out, however, it may be hard to support the notion of
the realist version of rational state in the context of contemporary security studies.3 In

1
Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” 460.
2
Kohli, State-Directed Development, 9.
3
In this respect, Schweller (2009, 249) points out that Waltz’s neorealist version of the principle of the
balance of powers explains the golden age of the balance of power, which occurred from 1648 to the
Napoleonic era, when: “(1) the state truly was an individual, and therefore fit the realist assumption of a
unitary, intentional actor, (2) the state floated above society rather than being integrated with it, and (3) war
between states overlaid rather than engulfed the lives of average citizens.”
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this respect, the present research acknowledges that the state-society relationship in South
Korea and Taiwan has substantially changed as a result of democratization. This suggests
that the two states’ security-seeking behaviors are likely to be constrained by the state’s
relationship with domestic society.4 In addition, Japan’s security policy during the 1970s
was a deviant case for the antimilitarist model. Considering these points, it may not be
easy to support the notion of the realist version of rational state in the contemporary
context of the three states.
This criticism suggests that the theory of this research needs to address how the
state-society relationship affects a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors, particularly
when the state leadership and domestic society disagree about the security implication of
its patron’s strategic retrenchment. The disagreement is likely to occur because the state
leadership is usually “responsible for long-term grand strategic planning including the
identification of changes in the global and regional balance of power” while societal
elites are “primarily concerned about immediate shifts in the domestic balance of political
power.”5 Given the different emphases, the state leadership is unable to adopt policies

4
Benson and Niou discuss this point in the context of Taiwan’s independence movement. Sterling-Folker
examines state-society relationship in Taiwan to explain why Taiwan sustained military competition with
the mainland China despite the development of economic interdependence during the 1990s, which is an
anomaly to the liberal interdependence literature. See Brett V. Benson and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Public
Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait, Security Studies,” Security Studies
14, no. 2: 274-89; Jenifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril despite Profit across
the Taiwan Strait,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M.
Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99-138.
5
Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” in
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey
W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 45-6. To discuss how the disagreement
between the state and domestic society affects the state’s balancing strategy, Lobell suggests “a complex
threat identification model” which outlines “the nested and multitiered nature of threat assessment.” Then
he argues that the complex nature of threat assessment will make it the case that what matters in a state’s
balancing strategy are “shifts in specific components of the rising state’s power rather than shifts in
aggregate power alone.”
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that are consistent with its preferred strategies when it is substantially penetrated by
domestic society or faced with a substantial level of societal opposition.6 In contrast, the
state leadership is likely to make the state’s policy consistent with its preferred strategies
when it is able to override domestic opposition. The same also holds true if domestic
society does not offer any substantial resistance to the strategies adopted by political
leaders.7 To conclude, the dynamic of the state-society relationship should be fully
addressed in a study of a regional state’s security-promoting behaviors in response to its
patron’s strategic posture.


6
Regarding this situation, Christensen suggests a two-step approach that helps to determine the effects that
state’s relationship with domestic society may have on the state’s implementation of a predetermined
optimal policy package in response to external security environments. This approach begins with discussing
which policy options the leadership would prefer if it enjoyed an ideal state-society environment. Then it
discusses “the degree to which state-society relations distort leaders’ preferred policies depends on the
height of the domestic political obstacles facing those leaders.” Regarding the two-step approach, see
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 24-5.
7
Ibid., 20-1.
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5.6. Chapter Conclusion

No one may object to the argument that a superpower’s strategic retrenchment
affects the security of its regional allies. But this argument should be demonstrated.
Existing scholarship pays littles attention to elaborating on how a regional state’s security
concern under its patron’s strategic retrenchment affects its choice of strategy to promote
security. This criticism led the present study to theorize a regional state’s strategy to
promote security in response to its patron’s strategic retrenchment. Then the case study of
the US regional allies in Northeast Asia documented each regional ally’s strategy to
increase security under the Nixon administration’s strategic retrenchment. I believe that
the present research demonstrated that a superpower’s strategic posture indeed affected
security-seeking behaviors of its regional allies.
What is the relevance of this research in the context of the unipolar system where
the United States has sustained the global hegemony? There may be the chance that the
superpower will be tempted to retrench militarily in the face of a decline in her relative
power vis-à-vis other major powers and domestic public attitudes hostile to high level of
global military commitment. Facing pressures from the international and domestic
situations, the superpower may introduce another Nixon Doctrine. This will be a chance
to test the empirical validity of the theory suggested in this research.




BIBLIOGRAPHY

211

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albright, David and Corey Gay. 1998. “Taiwan: Nuclear nightmare averted.” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 54 (1): 54-60.
Altfeld, Michael F. 1984. “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test.” Western Political
Quarterly 37 (4): 523-544.
Amsden, Alice H. 1985. “The State and Taiwan’s Economic Development.” In Bringing
the State Back in, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 78-106.
Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Ayako, Kusunoki. 2008. “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear
Policy.” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 15 (Special Volume): 25-50.
Bandow, Doug. 1996. Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World.
Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute.
Barnett, Michael N. 1990. “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic
Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977.” World Politics 42 (4): 529-62.
Barnett, Michael N. and Jack S. Levy. 1991. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and
Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73.” International Organization 45 (3): 36995.
Beeson, Mark 2009. “Developmental States in East Asia: A Comparison of the Japanese
and Chinese Experiences.” Asian Perspective 33 (2): 5-39.
Bellow, Thomas J. 1976.” Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of
Adaptation and Viability.” Asian Survey 16 (7): 593-610.

212
Benson, Brett V. and Emerson M. S. Niou. 2005. “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and
the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait, Security Studies.” Security Studies 14 (2):
274-89.
Berger, Thomas U. 1998. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and
Japan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bobrow, Davis B. 1989. “Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 33 (4): 571-604.
Brooks, Stephen G. 1997. “Dueling Realisms.” International Organization 51 (3): 44577.
Buckley, Roger. 1992. US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990. Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press.
Burr, William. 1999. New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese "Nuclear Intentions", 19661976. The National Security Archive. Electronic Briefing Book 221.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/ (Accessed March 6, 2015).
Burr, William. 2007. The Nuclear Vault. The National Security Archive. Electronic
Briefing Book No. 221. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb221/ (Accessed
March 6, 2015).
Calder, Kent E. 1988. Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in
Japan, 1949-1986.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Carr, Edward Hallet. 1964. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan.
Cha, Victor D. 1999. Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan
Security Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Cha, Victor. 2000. “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The
United States, Japan, and Korea.” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2): 261-91.
Cha, Victor. 2009/10. “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia.”
International Security 34 (3): 158-96.
Chai, Sun-Ki. 1997. “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for
Institutionalization.” International Organization 51 (3): 389-412.

213
Chan, Steve 1992. “Military Burden, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality: The
Taiwan Exception.” In Defense, Welfare and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence,
eds. Steve Chan and Alex Mintz. New York: Routledge, 163-178.
Cheng, Tun-Jen. 1989. “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan.” World
Politics 41 (4): 471-99.
Christensen, Thomas J. 1996. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Christensen, Thomas J. 1999. “China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma
in East Asia.” International Security 23 (4): 49-80.
Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder. 1990. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44 (2):
137-68.
Clough, Ralph N. 1976. Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
Clough, Ralph N. 1978. Island China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cole, Bernard D. 2006. Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects. New York: Routledge.
Crawford, Timothy W. 2011. “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies
Shape Power Politics.” International Security 35 (4): 155-89.
Curtis, Gerald. 1979. “Domestic Politics and Japanese Foreign Policy.” In Japan and the
United States: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. William J. Brands. New York:
New York University Press, 21-85.
Desch, Michael C. 1996. “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International
Organization 50 (2): 237-68.
Dittmer, Lowell. 1981. “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical
Analysis.” World Politics 33 (4): 485-515.
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case studies and theory in political science," In Handbook of
Political Science, Vol. 7, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 79-138.

214
Evangelista, Matthew. 1989. “Issue-Area and Foreign Policy Revisited.” International
Organization 43 (1): 147-71.
Feldman, Harvey, Michael Y.M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim. 1988. Taiwan in a Time of
Transition. New York: Paragon House.
Friedberg, Aaron L. 1992. “Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison State?”
International Security 16 (4): 109-42.
Friedberg, Aaron L. 2000. In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism
and Its Cold War Grand Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Garver, John W. 1997. The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American
Cold War Strategy in Asia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Gelpi, Christopher 1999. “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control,” In Imperfect
Unions:Security Institutions over Time and Space, eds. Helga Haftendorn, Robert.
O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander. New York: Oxford University Press, 107139.
George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development
in the Social Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Gibney, Frank. 1977. “The Ripple Effect in Korea.” Foreign Affairs 56 (1): 160-175.
Goldstein, Avery. 1995. “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the
Postwar World.” International Organization 49 (1): 39-71.
Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of
Domestic Politics.” International Organization 32 (4): 881-912.
Green, Michael J. 1995. Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the
Postwar Search for Autonomy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Green, Michael J. 2003. Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era
of Uncertain Power. New York: Palgrave.
Greene, Megan J. 2008. The Origins of Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy
and the Quest for Modernization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

215
Gregor, A. James. 1984. "Republic of China." In Arms Production in Developing
Countries, ed. James E. Katz. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 301-320.
Harrison, Selig S. 1996. “Japan and Nuclear Weapons.” In Japan’s Nuclear Future: The
Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, ed. Selig S. Harrison. Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-44.
Hoey, Fintan. 2012. “The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful
Challenge to Japan’s Defense Policy, 1969-1971.” The Journal of American-East
Asian Relations 19 (1): 52-74.
Hook, Glenn D. 1996. Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan.New
York: Routledge.
Hong, Seuk-Ryule. 2001. “1968nyŏn Pueblo Sageongwa Namhan, Bukan, Migugui
Samgakgwangye.” ["The Pueblo Crisis in 1968 and the Triangular Relations among
South Korea, North Korea, and the United States."] Hanguksayeongu 133: 179-208.
Hong, Sung Gul. 2011. “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” In The Park
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and
Ezra E. Vogel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 483-510.
Hughes, Christopher. 2004. Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Huth, K. Paul. 1988. “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War.” American Political
Science Review 82 (2): 423-43.
Ikenberry, John G. 2001. After Victory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Im, Hyuk Baeg. 2011. “The Origin of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled.” In The
Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim
and Ezra E. Vogel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 233-261.
Ito, Go. 2003. Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle.
New York: Routledge.
Izumikawa, Yasuhiro. 2010. “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist
Constraints on Japan’s Security Policy.” International Security 35 (2): 123-60.

216
Jentleson, Bruce W., and Christopher A. Whytock. 2005/06. “Who "Won" Libya? The
Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy.” International
Security 30 (3): 47-86.
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jo, Dong-Joon and Erik Gartzke. 2007. “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (1): 167-194.
Kase. Yuri. 2001. “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the
1968/70 Internal Report.” The Nonproliferation Review 8 (2): 55-68.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. Cultural Norms and National Security: Policy and Military in
Postwar Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 2008. Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External
Dimensions. New York: Routledge.
Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo Okawara. 1993. “Japan’s National Security: Structures,
Norms, and Policies.” International Security 17 (4): 84-118.
Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo Okawara. 2000/01. “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and
the Case for Analytical Eclecticism.” International Security 26 (3): 153-85.
Kau, Michael Ying-mao. 1996. “The Power Structure in Taiwan's Political Economy.”
Asian Survey 36 (3): 287-305.
Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi. 2001. “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy.” Pacific
Review 14 (2): 221-40.
Keddell, Joseph P. 1993. The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and
External Pressures. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Kim, Byung-Kook. 2011. “The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park.” In The
Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim
and Ezra E. Vogel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 200-232.
Kim, Byung-Kook, and Vogel, Ezra F. 2011. The Park Chung Hee Era: The
Transformation of South Korea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kim, Hyung-A. 2003. Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid
Industrialization, 1961-1979. New York: Routledge.

217
Kim, Jin-Ki. 2008. “Hanguk Bangwisaneobui Baljeonjeollyake Daehan Yeongu:
Pakchŏnghŭi Sidaeui Bangwisaneob Baljeonjeollyakeul Jungsimeulo.” [“A Study of
the South Korea’s Strategy to Develop Defense Industry: Case Study of the Park
Chung Hee Era.”] Gukgajeollyak 14 (1): 95-121.
Kim, Seung-Young. 2001. “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons
and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82.”Diplomacy & Statecraft 12 (4):
53-80.
Kim, Sung-Chull. 2014. “Sino-Japanese Normalization and Japan’s Korean Policy, 197275.” In The Koreas between China and Japan, eds. Teo Victor, and Geun Lee
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 42-62.
Kohli, Atul. 2004. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in
the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Komine, Yukinori. 2009. “The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with
China, 1969–1972.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20 (3): 494-514.
Koo, Sang Hui. 1998. Hanguk Bangwisaneob [Korea’s Defense Industry] Sejong
Yeonguso Yeongu Nonmun 98-09. Sejong Yeonguso.
Lake, David. 1996. “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations.”
International Organization 50 (1): 1-33.
Lanoszka, Alexander. 2012. “Protection States Trust? Superpower Patronage, Nuclear
Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics.”
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-Lanoszka-ProtectionStates-Trust-022012.pdf (Accessed March 30, 2016).
Layne, Christopher. 1993. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.”
International Security 17 (4): 5-51.
Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”
International Security 24 (2): 5-55.
Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson 2005. “Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power
Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999.” Security Studies 14 (1): 1-33.
Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States
Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35 (1): 7-43.

218
Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese
Security Policy.” International Security 29 (1): 92-121.
Lobell, Steven E. 2009. “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A
Neoclassical Realist Model.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign
Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 42-74.
Ma, Sang-Yoon. 2003 “Anbowa Minjujuui Geuligo Pakchŏnghŭiui Gil: Yusincheje
Sulibwonin Jego.” [“Security, Democracy and Park Chung Hee’s Road: The Origins
of the Yushin System Revisited.”] Gukjejeongchinonchong 43 (4): 171-96.
Macdonald, Paul K. and Joseph M. Parent. 2011. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising
Success of Great Power Retrenchment." International Security 35 (4): 7-44.
Macmillan, Margaret. 2007. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World. New
York: Random House.
Mastanduno, Michael, David A. Lake and John G. Ikenberry. 1989. “Toward a Realist
Theory of State Action.” International Studies Quarterly 33 (4): 457-74.
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.
Midford, Paul. 2002. “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grant Strategy.” Security
Studies 11 (3): 1-43.
Midford, Paul. 2011. Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism
to Realism? Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Miller, Nicholas L. 2014. “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions.”
International Organization 68 (4): 913-44.
Mistry, Dinshaw. 2003. Containing Missile Proliferation Strategic Technology, Security
Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. Seattle: University of
Washington Press.
Mitchell, Derek. 2004. “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Project: Deterrence, Abandonment, and
Honor.” In The Nuclear Tipping Point:Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear
Choices, eds. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 293-313.

219
Momoi, Makato. 1977. “Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies,” In The Foreign
Policy of Modern Japan, ed. Robert A. Scalapino. Berkley: University of California
Press, 341-64.
Moon, Chung-In and In-Taek Hyun. 1992. “Muddling through Security, Growth, and
Welfare: The Political Economy of Defense Spending.” In Defense, Welfare and
Growth: Perspectives and Evidence, eds. Steve Chan and Alex Mintz. New York:
Routledge, 137-62.
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
Moorsteen, Richard and Morton Abramowitz. 1971. Remaking China Policy: U.S.-China
Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1966. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.
New York: Knopf.
Morrow, James D. 1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability
Aggregation Model of Alliances." American Journal of Political Science 35-4: 90433.
Morrow, James D. 1993. “Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security.”
International Organization 47 (2): 207-33.
Morrow, James D. 2000. “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of
Political Science 3 (June): 63-83.
Nam, Joo-Hong. 1986. America’s Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the
Nixon Doctrine.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nakasone, Yasuhiro. 1999. The Making of the New Japan: Reclaiming the Political
Mainstream. Trans. Lesley Connors. New York: Routledge.
Narizny, Kevin. 2003. “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political
Economy of Rearmament.” American Political Science Review 97 (2): 203-20.
Nixon, Richard M. 1967. “Asia after Vietnam.” Foreign Affairs 46 (1): 111-25.
Nixon, Richard M. 1978. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
Nolan, Janne E. 1986. Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea. London: Macmillan.

220
Nordhaug, Kristen. 1997. “Development through Want of Security: The Case of Taiwan.”
Pacific Focus 7 (1): 129-61.
Oberdorfer, Don 2001. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic
Books.
Oh, Won Chul. 1999. Naega jeonjaengeul hajaneun geotdo aniji anhneunya [I am not
Planning a War]. HanGukhyeong Gyeongjejeongchaek Yeonguso
Osgood, Robert E. 1968. Alliances and American Foreign Policy. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Pan, Liang. 2007. “Whither Japan’s Military Potential? The Nixon Administration’s
Stance on Japanese Defense Power.” Diplomatic History 31 (1): 111-42.
Park, Chung Hee. 1979. Korea Reborn: A Model for Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Phillips, Lewis Reese. 1993. “The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies.”
Ph.D.diss. Columbia University.
Pollack, Jonathan D. and Mitchell B. Reiss. 2004. “South Korea: The Tyranny of
Geography and the Vexations of History.” In The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, eds. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and
Mitchell B. Reiss. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 254-92.
Posen, Barry R. 1993. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.” International
Security 18 (2): 80-124.
Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity.”
Security Studies 15 (2): 271-309.
Pyle, Kenneth B. 2007. Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose.
New York: Public Affairs.
Ravenal, Earl G. 1971. “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments.” Foreign
Affairs 49 (2): 201-17.
Resende-Santos, Joao. 2007. Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rigger, Shelley.1999. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. New York: Routledge.

221
Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World
Politics 51 (1): 144-72.
Sagan, Scott D. 1996/97. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in
Search of a Bomb.” International Security 21 (3): 54-86.
Samuels, Richard J. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of
East Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Schaller, Michael. 1997. Altered States: The United States and Japan since the
Occupation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, Paul. 1976. “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of
Management.” In Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus
Knorr. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 227-262.
Schroeder, Paul. 1994. “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory.” International Security
19 (1): 108-48.
Schwartz, Thomas A. 1995. “The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances,
Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 19
(4): 549-68.
Schweller, Randall L. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of
Underbalancing." International Security 29 (2): 159-201.
Schweller, Randall L. 2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of
Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schweller, Randall L. 2009. “Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization, Expansionist
Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and
Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 227-50.
Sebata, Takao. 2010. Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc.
Shen, James C. H. 1984. The U.S. & Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally.
Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books

222
Shin, Wookhee. 2010. Suneunggwa Jeohangeul Neomeoseo: Iseungmangwa
Pakchŏnghŭiui Daemijeongchaeg [Beyond Compliance and Resistance: The
Policies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee toward the United States].
Seouldaehakgyo Chulpanmunhwawon.
Siler, Michael J. 1998. “The U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the Northeast Asian
Region During the Cold War: The South Korean Case.” East Asia: 16 (3/4): 41–86.
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research.” In Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-37.
Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." World Politics 36
(4): 461-95.
Snyder, Glenn H. 1996. “Process variables in neorealist theory.” Security Studies 5 (3):
167-92.
Snyder, Glenn. 2002. “Mearsheimer’s World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for
Security.” International Security 27 (1): 149-73.
Solingen, Etel. 2007. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle
East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sorely, Lewis. 1983. Arms Transfers under Nixon. Lexington, KY: University Press of
Kentucky.
Sorokin, Gerald L. 1994. “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring
Rivalries.” International Studies Quarterly 38 (3): 421-46.
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2009. “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril despite Profit
across the Taiwan Strait.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,
eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 99-138.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000/01. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism
Revisited.” International Security 25 (3): 128-61.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2006. “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and
the Resource-Extractive State.” Security Studies 15 (3): 464-95.

223
Taylor, Jay. 2000. The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in
China and Taiwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Temerson, Timothy. D. 1992. Double Containment and the Origins of the U.S.-Japan
Security Alliance. Center for International Studies. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/17094/JP-WP-91-1425982229.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed March 6, 2016).
Tien, Hung-mao. 1975. “Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political Change,”
The China Quarterly 64 (December): 615-644.
Tien, Hung-mao. 1988. “Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan.” In Taiwan
in a Time of Transition, eds. Harvey Feldman, and Ilpyong J. Kim. New York:
Paragon House, 1-37.
Tien, Hung-mao. 1989. The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the
Republic of China. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 2005. “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to
China.” The Journal of American History 92 (1): 109-35.
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 2009. Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the
Crisis with China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Twomey, Christopher P. 2000. “Japan, A Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive
Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security.” Security Studies 9 (4): 167205.
Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of
Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Walt, Stephen M. 1990. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Walt, Stephen M. 1997. “Why alliances endure or collapse.” Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy 39 (1): 156-79.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.”
International Security 18 (2): 44-79.

224
Wang, Vincent We-Cheng. 2008. “Taiwan: Conventional Deterrence, Soft Power, and the
Nuclear Option.” In The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st
Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 40428.
Welfield, John. 1988. An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar America Alliance
System. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press.
Winckler, Edwin A. 1984. “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard
to Soft Authoritarianism?” The China Quarterly 99 (September): 481-99.
Wohlforth, William C. 1993. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the
Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Woo, Jung-en. 1991. Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Wu, Yongping. 2004. “Rethinking the Taiwanese Developmental State.” The China
Quarterly 177 (March): 91-114.
Wu, Yongping. 2005. A Political Explanation of Economic Growth: State Survival,
Bureaucratic Politics, and Private Enterprises in the Making of Taiwan’s Economy,
1950-1985. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World
Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.




VITA

225

VITA

Seok Ryul Kang
Department of Political Science, Purdue University

EDUCATION

Ph.D Candidate, Political Science
Purdue University, West Lafayette

Expected in August 2016

Dissertation Title: US Strategic Retrenchment and Security-Seeking Behaviors of
the US Allies in Northeast Asia
Dissertation Chair: Keith L. Shimko, Associate Professor
Department of Political Science, Purdue University
Committee Members: Aaron M. Hoffman, Harry R. Targ, Eric N. Waltenburg.
Major Field: International Relations
Minor Fields: Public Policy, American Politics

M.A., International Relations.
Seoul National University, South Korea

February 2005

B.A., English Linguistics and Literature
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea

February 2002

226
GRANT and ASSISTANSHIP

Fulbright Grant for Ph.D Degree Program in the United States, Fall 2007 through
Spring Semester 2012.
Teaching Assistantship Sponsored by the Department of Political Science at Purdue,
Fall 2011 to Spring 2014.
Purdue Summer Research Grant, Summer 2013.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant for Professor David Brulé’s Course Entitled as “Introduction to
International Relations,” Spring Semester 2014
Teaching Assistant for Professor Keith Shimko’s Course Entitled as “Introduction to
International Relations,” Fall Semester 2013
Teaching Assistant for Professor Mark Tilton’s Course Entitled as “Governments of
the World,” Fall Semester 2011 through Spring Semester 2013
Research Assistant for the Research Project Entitled as “Research Methods in
Studying the Korean-American Alliance,” September 2002 through November 2004.
Research Assistant for the Research Project Entitled as “Issues of Human Rights in
North Korea from Comparative Perspective,” April 2006 through May 2007.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

“A Weak Ally’s Fear of Abandonment and Entrapment and Dynamics of Conflict and
Cooperation between U.S. and her Regional Allies: Theoretical Discussion and
Case Study of the U.S.-Republic of Korea Military Alliance," Presented at the
Annual Conference of Midwest Political Science Association in April 2013.
“Internal Balancing as the State’s Security-Enhancing Strategy,” Presented at the Annual
Conference of International Studies Association Midwest in November 2013.
“Fear and Power: International Vulnerability and the State’s Internal Balancing
Strategy,” Presented at the Annual Conference of Southern Political Science
Association in January 2014.

227
“A Regional State's Military Behaviors in Response to Her Security Patron's Strategic
Posture of Retrenchments,” Presented at the Annual Conference of International
Studies Association Midwest in November 2015.
“A Regional State’s Military Behaviors in Response to her Superpower Patron’s Strategic
Posture of Retrenchment,” Presented at the Annual Conference of Southern Political
Science Association in January 2016.
“A State’s Security-Promoting Domestic Drive in Times of her Superpower Patron’s
Strategic Posture of Retrenchment,” Presented at the Annual Conference of Southern
Political Science Association in January 2016.
“Fear and Resistance: Security Assessment and Responses to Pressures to stop
Adventurous Military Behaviors,” Presented at the Annual Conference of Midwest
Political Science Association in April 2016.
“Security Assessment and Japan’s Security Policy under the Nixon Administration’s
Strategic Posture of Retrenchment,” Presented at the Annual Conference of Midwest
Political Science Association in April 2016.

Published Non-Academic Paper

“Analysis of the Security Relationship between the United States and Republic of Korea,”
October 1, 2003 on Joongang Daily. This article won the grand prize at the National
Essay Contest on the topic of Alliance Relationship between U. S. and South Korea.
The contest was sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea.

